Women and Justice: Keywords

The 2019 Act made the 2015 Act’s (available here) health benefits available to a broader group of women – including those who had worked in 'the institutions covered by the Magdalen Restorative Justice ex-gratia Scheme' while residing in certain adjoining institutions (Section 2).

Article 11 requires that the state guarantee equality between women and men in all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The state must work to adopt measures ensuring the proportional representation of women in the houses of parliament, as determined by the constitution. In addition, the state must ensure women’s rights in pursuing public employment, employment in the senior management of the state, and appointment in judicial agencies without discrimination. The state is committed to the protection of women against all forms of violence and guarantees the empowerment of women in reconciling familial duties and professional obligations. Article 53 mandates that all citizens enjoy equality under the law, equally in their rights, freedoms, and general obligations, without discrimination on the basis of religion, faith, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, economic status, political affiliation, geography, or otherwise. Such discrimination, as well as the incitement of hate, constitutes a crime punishable under the law. The state is committed to adopting the necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and the law establishes a special independent commission to this end. English translation available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf.

This law promotes protection for victims of domestic violence who have suffered physical or psychological aggression from any of the members of the family, whether or not they cohabitate. Protection orders, as precautionary measures, shall be granted by a ‘Peace Judge’ (Juez de Paz). This law also regulates other support measures for the victim-survivor, such as the immediate attention and health care by the public health agencies.

Esta ley promueve la protección de las víctimas de violencia doméstica que hayan sufrido agresiones físicas o psíquicas por parte de alguno de los miembros de la familia, convivan o no. Las órdenes de protección, como medidas cautelares, serán otorgadas por un Juez de Paz. Esta ley también regula otras medidas de apoyo a la víctima-sobreviviente, como la atención inmediata y el cuidado de la salud por parte de los organismos públicos de salud.

This law seeks to promote and guarantee women’s right to live free from violence. Its purpose is to promote prevention and protection strategies, sanctions, and integral reparation measures for any kind of violence exercised against women. This law fosters public policies to prevent and remediate different forms of violence, such as psychological, sexual, and physical violence. It also assigns broad responsibilities to each Ministry and Governmental Agency to support the fight against discrimination. The law provides both for protection measures for women that are victims of abuse, such as specific agencies to channel the claims; and penalties for abusers, for instance from 10 to 30 years of imprisonment for femicide. In turn, Decree 6973 specifies that interpretation and application of Law 5777 of 2016 shall provide the broadest protection for women subject to violence. Subsequently, no legal provision may deny, undermine, or limit the rights guaranteed therein. The Decree sets specific courses of action authorities must undertake to prevent violence against women and particular procedures to accomplish that goal. Romantic, platonic, and other sorts of intra-family relationships are considered domestic. For these purposes, marriage is not a requirement.

Esta ley busca promover y garantizar el derecho de las mujeres a gozar de una vida libre de violencia. Su finalidad es promover estrategias de prevención y protección, sanción y medidas de reparación integral frente a cualquier tipo de violencia contra las mujeres. Esta ley fomenta políticas públicas para prevenir y remediar diferentes formas de violencia, como la violencia psicológica, sexual y física. También asigna amplias responsabilidades a cada Ministerio y agencia gubernamental para apoyar la lucha contra la discriminación. La ley prevé tanto medidas de protección para las mujeres que son víctimas de maltrato, como organismos específicos para canalizar las denuncias y penas para los abusadores, por ejemplo, de 10 a 30 años de prisión por feminicidio. A su vez, el Decreto 6973 especifica que la interpretación y aplicación de la Ley 5777 de 2016 brindará la más amplia protección a las mujeres víctimas de violencia. En consecuencia, ninguna disposición legal podrá negar, menoscabar o limitar los derechos en ella garantizados. El Decreto establece cursos de acción específicos que las autoridades deben emprender para prevenir la violencia contra las mujeres y procedimientos particulares para lograr ese objetivo. Las relaciones intrafamiliares, románticas y similares se consideran domésticas. A estos efectos, el matrimonio no es un requisito.

This law modified some articles of Law 599 from 2000 and 906 from 2004, and adopted measures that expanded access to justice for victims of sexual violence, especially for those who experienced it during the armed conflict. As such, it stated the conduct and behaviors that amount to sexual violence crimes and the way they must be judicialized. Furthermore, it established that victims of sexual violence have the right to receive comprehensive compensation and reparation upon their individualized the damages.

Esta ley modificó algunos artículos de la Ley 599 de 2000 y 906 de 2004, y adoptó medidas que ampliaron el acceso a la justicia de las víctimas de violencia sexual, especialmente de aquellas que la vivieron durante el conflicto armado. En tal sentido, señaló las conductas y comportamientos que constituyen delitos de violencia sexual y la forma en que deben ser judicializados. Asimismo, estableció que las víctimas de violencia sexual tienen derecho a recibir una indemnización y reparación integral sobre la base de los daños y perjuicios individualizados.

This law extended the powers of authorities in investigations of alleged crimes of violence against women as well as amended the domestic violence and food assistance provisions, as contained in articles 229 and 233 of the Criminal Code. With the issuance of this law, the prosecutor is allowed to engage in investigations of the aforementioned crimes at the moment it learns from the conduct in any manner, thus, the prosecutor no longer has to wait until someone presses charges to start the correspondent investigations.

Esta ley amplió las facultades de las autoridades en las investigaciones de presuntos delitos de violencia contra la mujer y modificó las disposiciones sobre violencia doméstica y asistencia alimentaria, contenidas en los artículos 229 y 233 del Código Penal. Con la expedición de esta ley el fiscal puede iniciar investigaciones de los delitos antes mencionados en el momento en que tenga conocimiento de la conducta de cualquier manera, por lo que el fiscal ya no tiene que esperar a que alguien presente cargos para iniciar las investigaciones correspondientes.

This law enacted rules for the prevention and sanction of several forms of violence and discrimination against women. It established provisions that guarantee all women i) a life free of violence, both in the public and private sectors, ii) the exercise of their rights granted both by the domestic and the international legal systems, iii) access to administrative and judicial procedures for protection and attention, and iv) the adoption of public policies against violence and discrimination.

Esta ley promulgó normas para la prevención y sanción de diversas formas de violencia y discriminación contra la mujer. Estableció disposiciones que garantizan a todas las mujeres i) una vida libre de violencia, tanto en el sector público como en el privado, ii) el ejercicio de los derechos que les otorgan tanto el ordenamiento jurídico interno como el internacional, iii) el acceso a los procedimientos administrativos y judiciales para su protección y atención, y iv) la adopción de políticas públicas contra la violencia y la discriminación.

This law aims to develop article 42 of the Constitution which establishes standards to prevent, remedy, and punish domestic violence. The Law stipulates the behaviors considered violative of structured harmony/unity within a family, protective measures against domestic violence, medical and physiological assistance for victims, and sanctions by the courts against the aggressor.

Esta ley tiene por objeto desarrollar el artículo 42 de la Constitución que establece normas para prevenir, remediar y sancionar la violencia intrafamiliar. La Ley estipula las conductas consideradas violatorias de la armonía y unidad dentro de un núcleo familia, las medidas de protección contra la violencia doméstica, la asistencia médica y fisiológica a las víctimas y las sanciones judiciales contra el agresor.

The 2018 Act permits (i) abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy by a medical practitioner who has a certified, reasonable good-faith opinion that the pregnancy has not exceeded 12 weeks (Section 12); (ii) where two medical practitioners have a good-faith opinion that that there is a risk to the life, or of serious harm to the health, of the pregnant woman, that the fetus has not yet reached viability, and that it is appropriate to carry out the termination of pregnancy to avert these risks (Section 9), or that there is a condition affecting the fetus that is likely to lead to the death of the fetus either before, or within 28 days of, birth (Section 11); or (iii) where a single medical practitioner has a good-faith opinion that there is an immediate risk to the life, or serious harm to the health, of the pregnant woman and that it is immediately necessary to terminate the pregnancy in order to avoid that risk (Section 10). The Act also makes certain services, like medical surgery and midwifery, available to women without charge for the purpose of terminating a pregnancy in accordance with Sections 9, 10, 11, or 12. Under the Act, it is an offense for anyone other than the pregnant woman herself to intentionally terminate a pregnancy, or supply the means for doing so, other than in accordance with the Act, or to aid or abet such an offense (Section 23(4)). Penalties for offenses include fines and imprisonment up to 14 years (Section 23); there are also provisions for offenses committed by a corporate body (Section 24). The 2018 Act also repeals the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995 and the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013.

The legislation implements the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the Lithuanian Parliament ratified in 1995. The Act sets out the rights of a child and defines neglect, physical, psychological, and sexual abuse. In 2019, the text was amended to include a clause on the prioritization of biological family, which means that the separation of children and parents against their will is only allowed in “extreme cases,” where it is “unavoidable and necessary to protect a child from real danger to his physical and psychological security, health, or life and when there is no other recourse to achieve such protection.”

Šiuo teisės aktu įgyvendinama Jungtinių Tautų Vaiko Teisių konvencija, kurią Lietuvos Seimas ratifikavo 1995 metais. Šis įstatymas nustato vaiko teises ir apibrėžia nepriežiūrą, fizinę, psichologinę ir seksualinę prievartą. Tekstas buvo iš dalies pakeistas 2019 m., įtraukiant nuostatą dėl biologinės šeimos prioriteto, kuri reiškia, kad vaikų ir tėvų atskyrimas prieš jų valią leidžiamas tik „kraštutiniais atvejais“, kai „neišvengiama ir būtina apsaugoti vaiką nuo realaus pavojaus jo fiziniam ir psichologiniam saugumui, sveikatai ar gyvybei ir kai nėra kitų priemonių tokiai apsaugai pasiekti“.

The purpose of the Equal Opportunities Act is to prohibit any discrimination, harassment, or sexual harassment based on gender within employment, education, consumer protection, social security schemes, and involvement in organizations. It also established a duty of state and municipal institutions, educational establishments, and employers to actively implement equal rights for women and men. It defines the different types of discrimination and establishes that the burden of proving that equal rights were not violated rests within the person or institution against whom a complaint was filed. Under Article 24, a person who has suffered such discrimination has the right to demand pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages following the Civil Code. English translation available here.

Lygių galimybių įstatymo tikslas yra uždrausti bet kokią diskriminaciją, priekabiavimą ar seksualinį priekabiavimą dėl lyties darbe, švietimo institucijose, skelbimuose, socialinės apsaugos sistemoje ir organizacijose. Taip pat nustatyta valstybės ir savivaldybių institucijų, švietimo įstaigų ir darbdavių pareiga aktyviai įgyvendinti lygias moterų ir vyrų teises. Teisės akte apibrėžiamos skirtingos diskriminacijos rūšys ir nustatoma, kad pareiga įrodyti, kad lygios teisės nebuvo pažeistos, tenka asmeniui ar institucijai, prieš kurią buvo pateiktas skundas. Pagal straipsnį 24, asmuo, patyręs tokią diskriminaciją, turi teisę reikalauti turtinės ir neturtinės žalos atlyginimo pagal civilinį kodeksą.

The plan outlines the materialization of the National Plan for the Advancement of Women (Plano Nacional para o Avanço da Mulher) by mapping out its objectives, finances, and progress evaluations given specific deadlines. It focuses on expanding services available to victims of domestic, sexual, physical, and psychological violence; improving institutions to educate the public on gender-based violence; implementing advocacy strategies to prevent and combat violence against women; and establishing multi-sector mechanisms to intervene in violent situations in which women may find themselves. For example, as women are 57% of all HIV-positive people in Mozambique, the plan provides for an STI, including HIV, prophylaxis service for victims of sexual violence. Each sector is in charge of managing its own budget in accordance with its objectives, but the Mozambican government and the Economic and Social Plan (Plano Económico e Social) are expected to be driving forces in attracting more partners and resources for the plan. The timeline is set for five years, with the Monitoring and Evaluation (Monitoria e Avaliação) creating conditions, such as annual check-ins, and using the Report on the Economic and Social Plan (Balanço do Plano Económico e Social) to ensure that each division maintains consistency in their actions.

O plano esboça a materialização do Plano Nacional para o Avanço da Mulher ao mapear os seus objetivos, finanças, e avaliações de progresso em prazos específicos. Ele foca em expandir os serviços disponíveis para as vítimas de violência doméstica, sexual, física, e psicológica; melhorando as instituições para educar o público sobre violência de gênero; implementando estratégias legais para prevenir e combater violência contra mulheres; e estabelecendo mecanismos multissetoriais para intervir em situações de violência em que as mulheres se encontrem. Por exemplo, como as mulheres são 57% das pessoas HIV-positivas em Moçambique, o plano fornece serviço de profilaxia para ISTs, incluindo HIV, para vítimas de violência sexual. Cada setor está responsável por administrar o seu próprio orçamento de acordo com os seus objetivos, mas é esperado que o governo Moçambicano e o Plano Econômico e Social sejam forças motrizes na atração de mais parceiros e recursos para o plano. O cronograma é de cinco anos, com a Monitoria e Avaliação criando condições, como check-ins anuais, e usando o Balanço do Plano Ecônomico e Social para garantir que cada divisão mantenha consistência em suas ações.

The President approved the National Policy for Gender Equality and Equity in December 2013. The policy and strategic plan on gender equality between men and women promotes equal opportunities, rights, and responsibilities in all domains of their economic, political, and social lives. It further establishes state liability in the adoption and execution of policies and promotes sustainable development, along with other basic human rights principles, such as non-discrimination, gender equality, and respect of individuals. The National Policy also brings data regarding the population of women in the country, analyzing the social, political, and economic situation. Finally, the Policy maps out the main problems faced by women (related to basic services, such as education and health, as well as domestic violence, participation in politics, and access to resources) and defines strategies and targets to achieve the specific goals in order to reduce gender inequalities present in the country.

O Presidente aprovou a Política Nacional para Igualdade e Equidade de Gênero em Dezembro de 2013. A política e o plano estratégico para equidade de gênero entre homens e mulheres promove oportunidades, direitos, e responsabilidades iguais em todos os âmbitos das suas vidas econômicas, políticas, e sociais. Ela também estabelece a responsabilidade do estado na adoção e execução de políticas e promove desenvolvimento sustentável, junto de outros princípios de direitos humanos básicos, como a não discriminação, equidade de gênero, e respeito aos indivíduos. A Política Nacional também traz dados relativos à população feminina do país, analizando as situações sociais, políticas, e econômicas. Finalmente, a Política mapeia os principais problemas enfrentados por mulheres (relativos a serviços básicos, como educação e saúde, assim como violência doméstica, participação na política, e acesso a recursos) e define estratégias e objetivos a serem alcançados para atingir metas específicas a fim de reduzir desigualdades de gênero presentes no país.

Originally enacted in 1995 as the Child and Youth Sexual Transaction Prevention Act, this Act (the “CYSEPA”) was enacted to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation of children and youths and ensure their healthy physical and mental development. The CYSEPA specifies the responsibilities of the relevant authorities and governs the prevention of sexual exploitation of children and youths and the rescue, protection, and counseling of victims. Competent authorities must arrange the placement of the victim in a child and youth welfare institution, foster family, or other appropriate medical or educational institution on an emergency basis; evaluate the necessity of continuing placement within 72 hours; and to apply to the court for longer-term placements. The authorities must also offer counseling, intervention, and assistance with school enrollment, employment, independent living, or other necessary matters for a period of at least one year or until the victim’s 20th birthday. If the offender is the victim’s parent, foster parent, or guardian, the victim, the prosecutors, or other interested parties may apply to a court to stop such person from exercising parental rights over the victim and to appoint another guardian. After becoming aware of any victim or any suspect of a crime covered by the CYSEPA, medical personnel, social workers, educational personnel, caregivers, and personnel of other business or governmental organizations must report the crime to the authorities. Internet platform providers, online application service providers, and telecommunications companies are obligated to remove information relating to suspicious criminal activities, to notify law enforcement, and to provide data to law enforcement and judicial authorities for investigation. The competent authorities are also authorized to require the parents, guardian, or other caregiver of a victim to receive parental education and counseling for a period of up to 50 hours and to attend a family treatment program. Persons found guilty under the CYSEPA are subject to imprisonment as well as to fines up to N.T.10 million, with offenders who intentionally kill the victim subject to the death penalty or life imprisonment. English translation available here.

Ratified by BiH in November 2013, this Convention opens the path for creating a legal framework at the pan-European level to protect women against all forms of violence and to prevent, prosecute, and eliminate violence and domestic violence against women. The Convention also establishes the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention. Its members are elected by the state parties. The structure of the treaty is based on the “four Ps”: (1) prevention, (2) protection and support of victims, (3) prosecution of offenders, and (4) integrated policies. The Convention also establishes obligations in relation to the collection of data and supporting research in the field of violence against women. Article 2 of the Convention indicates that the provisions shall apply in time of peace and also in situations of armed conflicts. The treaty came into effect in Bosnia on the 1 August 2014.

The “Equality Act” broadly prohibits almost all forms of gender discrimination. It establishes two groups, the Committee for the Promotion of Gender Equality (the “PGE Committee”) and the Committee on the Determination of the Unfair Gender Discrimination (the “UGD Committee”). The PGE Committee’s powers and duties broadly include prescribing and recommending policy on promoting gender quality, prescribing guidelines for providing assistance and remedy to victims of gender inequality, overseeing the performance of duties under the Equality Act, and promoting study and research into the prevention of gender discrimination. The UGD Committee’s powers and duties include considering problems submitted by petition claiming unfair gender discrimination, prescribing provisional measures before rendering decisions for protection or mitigation, and issuing orders to perform duties or provide compensation. Any person or organization found guilty of an offense shall be ordered to cease and prevent recurrence of unfair gender discrimination. Whoever fails to comply with such an order shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding 20,000 Baht. Under section 17(2) of the Equality Act gender discrimination is permitted on the basis of religious principles or national security. English translation available through External Link.

The main objective of this law is to establish a judicial mechanism that allows for an effective reestablishment of the rule of law whenever an act of arbitrary discrimination is committed. Pursuant to this law, arbitrary discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction that lacks reasonable justification, made by agents of the State or individuals, and that causes deprivation, disturbance or threat in the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Political Constitution of the Republic or in the international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile and that are in force, in particular when based on race or ethnicity, nationality, socio-economic situation, language, ideology or political opinion, religion or belief, unionization or participation in trade union organizations or the lack thereof, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, age, affiliation, personal appearance, and illness or disability.

Article 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana relates to respect for human dignity and prohibits torture or cruel and inhuman punishment. Article 16 prohibits involuntary servitude or slavery. Article 17 relates to equality and non-discrimination and establishes that every person in Ghana is equal before the law. To this end, Article 17 specifically prohibits discrimination on the grounds of gender, race, color, ethnic origin, religion, creed, or social or economic status. Article 18 pertains to property rights and states that every person has the right to own property either alone or in association with others. Article 22 builds upon Article 18 and establishes that a spouse shall not be deprived of a reasonable provision out of the estate of a spouse whether or not the spouse died with a will. Article 22 states that Parliament shall enact legislation regulating the property rights of spouses as soon as possible after the Constitution came in to force. Article 22 clarifies that spouses shall have equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage and that assets that are jointly acquired during marriage shall be distributed equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of the marriage. Article 24 of the Ghanaian Constitution concerns economic rights and establishes pay parity as a constitutionally enshrined principle. It states that every person has the right to work under satisfactory, safe, and healthy conditions and shall receive equal pay for equal work without distinction of any kind. Article 26 concerns cultural rights and practices and states that (a) every person is entitled to enjoy, practise, profess, maintain, and promote any culture, language, tradition, or religion subject to the provisions of the Constitution; but also that (b) all customary practices that dehumanise or injure the physical and mental well-being of a person are prohibited. Article 27 refers specifically to women’s rights. It states that special care shall be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after childbirth; and during these periods, working mothers shall be entitled to paid leave; that facilities shall be provided for the care of children below school-going age to enable women, who traditionally care for children, to realise their full potential; and that women shall be guaranteed equal rights to training and promotion without impediments. Article 36(6) refers specifically to the economic obligations of the state, which include ensuring that the State afford equality of economic opportunity to all citizens. Article 36(6) emphasizes that the State must take all necessary steps to ensure the full integration of women as equal partners in Ghana’s economic development.

The amended law aims to harmonize its provisions with the highest international standards. The amendments include a new provision (Article 58 (The Rights of the Victim of the Criminal Offence)), which provides a number of guaranteed rights for victims of gender-based violence in criminal proceedings in accordance with international standards. Article 58 Paragraph 1 includes, among others, the right of access by the victim to various support services (such as psychological assistance, counseling etc.), the right to use his/her own language during the proceedings and the right to be informed at all stages of the proceedings about the arrest and release of the offender and the victim’s right to compensation. Article 58 Paragraph 2 requires the public authority in charge of the criminal procedures to immediately notify the victim of the rights in Paragraph 1 and keep records of such notification. Article 58(b) includes amendments to provisions related to victims of sexual violence and human trafficking. This includes the right to be interviewed by a police officer or prosecutor of the same gender, the right to refuse to respond to questions about his/her private life that are not related to the case, and the right to testify through audio-visual technology. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

The Domestic Violence Act (No. 10 of 2008) seeks to provide survivors of domestic violence with protection. The Act defines domestic violence as "any controlling or abusive behaviour that harms the health or safety of the applicant." The Act empowers Courts including Customary Courts to pass an order (Section 7 of the Act prescribes orders available to applicants such as restraining orders and interim orders) that seeks to immediately protect applicants (victims); Section 9 (2) (b) (i) provides that the order shall direct a member of the Botswana Police to prohibit the respondent (the offender) from committing an act of domestic violence. The Act also outlines the jurisdiction of the courts, describes how an applicant can file an application for an order by the court, details how documents are served to respondents, and explains the nature of proceedings in a domestic violence case.

The law defines and prohibits human trafficking. The penalty for human trafficking is 16 - 20 years imprisonment. Longer prison sentences are recommended when the victim is a woman or a child. The law provides that victims can benefit from witness protection measures and other forms of assistance, such as medical services and counseling.

Article 9 of the FDRE Constitution provides that all international treaties ratified by Ethiopia are integral parts of the law of the land. Similarly, Article 13.2 provides that fundamental rights and freedoms shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia. Ethiopia has ratified many of these treaties including ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW. Article 35 of the FDRE Constitution pertains to the Rights of Women. The article provides for equal rights under the constitution, equal rights with men in marriage, entitlement to affirmative measures, protection from harmful traditional practices, the right to maternity pay, the right to consultation, property rights (including acquiring and controlling and transferring property), employment rights, and access to family planning education. It is worth noting that this article explicitly imposes an obligation and accountability on the state to protect women from violence at Article 35.4: “The State shall enforce the right of women to eliminate the influences of harmful customs. Laws, customs and practices that oppress or cause bodily or mental harm to women are prohibited.”

This decision established the guidelines for the institutional policy on gender for the Paraguayan Judicial Branch. The Supreme Court agreed on: i) ensuring that users of judicial services receive communications (with an emphasis on gender) in a timely manner that are both easily accessible and understandable; ii) providing information on gender and gender rights; raising awareness on the importance of reporting events that violate individuals’ rights and dignity; iii) publicizing case law that studies gender issues; iv) digitizing the rulings (with a focus on gender issues) issued by different courts; complying with international standards; creating a framework for decision-making that incorporates a gender approach; v) hiring trained personnel to handle gender-related claims.

Esta decisión estableció los lineamientos de la política institucional de género del Poder Judicial de Paraguay. La Corte Suprema acordó: i) asegurar que los usuarios de los servicios judiciales reciban comunicaciones (con énfasis en género) en tiempo y forma que sean de fácil acceso y comprensión; ii) brindar información sobre género y derechos de género; sensibilizar sobre la importancia de denunciar hechos que vulneran los derechos y la dignidad de las personas; iii) difundir jurisprudencia que estudie temas de género; iv) digitalizar las sentencias (con enfoque de género) emitidas por diferentes tribunales; cumplir con los estándares internacionales; crear un marco para la toma de decisiones que incorpore un enfoque de género; v) contratación de personal capacitado para atender reclamos relacionados con el género.

This decision resolved to implement the content of the ‘United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders,’ known as the ‘Bangkok Rules.’ The incorporation of such rules seeks for the creation of public policies aimed to eliminate discrimination against convicted women, establish legal protection of women’s rights in courts, and promote equality between women and men before the Justice Administration System. The decision also provided for a multidisciplinary commission composed of the Secretariat for Gender, the Directorate of Human Rights, the Directorate of International Affairs and the Penitentiary Monitoring Unit. Such commission is responsible of promoting the Bangkok Rules and raising awareness of all components of the Judiciary branch.

Esta decisión resolvió implementar el contenido de las 'Reglas de las Naciones Unidas para el Tratamiento de Reclusas y Medidas no Privativas de la Libertad para Mujeres Delincuentes', conocidas como 'Reglas de Bangkok'. La incorporación de dichas reglas busca la creación de políticas públicas dirigidas eliminar la discriminación contra las mujeres condenadas, establecer la protección legal de los derechos de las mujeres en las cortes y promover la igualdad entre mujeres y hombres ante el Sistema de Administración de Justicia. La decisión también dispuso una comisión multidisciplinaria integrada por la Secretaría de Género, la Dirección de Derechos Humanos, la Dirección de Asuntos Internacionales y la Unidad de Seguimiento Penitenciario. Dicha comisión es responsable de promover las Reglas de Bangkok y sensibilizar a todos los componentes del Poder Judicial.

This case concerned women’s equality in public-sector employment. The court ruled in favor of gender quotas for positions of public power. The plenary of the court reviewed a statutory project regulating the effective participation of women in public institutions by the establishment of gender quotas. A minimum of 30% of the top decision-making positions, among other senior positions in public Colombian institutions, shall be held by women. Sanctions were established for those appointing authorities that would not comply with the rule. Sanctions consisted of a 30-day period suspension and, if non-compliance persisted, destitution from public charges. It was argued that the aim of the project was to ensure genuine and effective equality of opportunities, which was considered a legitimate constitutional end. Nevertheless, the court held that some of the proposed provisions did not comply with the Constitution. For instance, some of the regulated sanctions were considered to be disproportionate. Thus, the court endorsed the Congress to issue the legislation excluding the provisions that were unconstitutional.

Este caso se refería a la igualdad laboral de la mujer en el sector público. La Corte Constitucional consideró constitucional el establecimiento de cuotas de género para los cargos del poder público. La plenaria de la Corte revisó un proyecto de ley que regulaba la participación efectiva de las mujeres en las instituciones públicas mediante el establecimiento de cuotas de género. Al menos el 30% de los cargos directivos y otros altos cargos de las instituciones públicas colombianas, deberán ser ocupados por mujeres. Se establecieron sanciones para aquellas autoridades que no cumplieran con la norma. Las sanciones consistían en la suspensión por un período de 30 días y, de persistir el incumplimiento, la destitución de los cargos públicos. Se argumentó que el objeto del proyecto era garantizar una igualdad de oportunidades real y efectiva, lo que se consideraba un fin constitucional legítimo. Sin embargo, la Corte argumentó que algunas de las disposiciones propuestas no estaban alineadas con la Constitución, por ejemplo, algunas de las sanciones reguladas se consideraron desproporcionadas. De esta manera, el tribunal avaló al Congreso para dictar la legislación excluyendo las disposiciones que fueran inconstitucionales.

The case concerned issues of language in judicial rulings that led to revictimization. The protected applicant, the leader of an association of peasant women, was kidnapped and raped by an illegal armed group that considered her a threat. The plaintiff brought suit against two potential perpetrators who were acquitted by the court of Cundinamarca. The Constitutional Court ruled to exclude a section of the aforementioned decision because of the section’s use of vulgar and disqualifying expressions in relation to the victim of sexual violence. The court argued that judges must, in their decisions: (a) avoid value judgments that refer to the personality or physical appearance of an alleged victim of sexual violence; (b) quote literally the testimonies and sections that refer to the analyzed criminal behavior, and; (c) make the descriptions of the provided evidence with an objective and respectful tone.

El caso se refería al uso del lenguaje en sentencias judiciales que conducen a la re-victimización. La persona protegida, líder de una asociación de mujeres campesinas, fue secuestrada y violada por un grupo armado ilegal que la consideraba una amenaza. La víctima denunció a dos posibles perpetradores del crimen, pero fueron absueltos por la Corte de Cundinamarca. La Corte Constitucional resolvió excluir una sección de la sentencia proferida por la Corte de Cundinamarca por el uso de expresiones vulgares e insultantes contra la víctima de violencia sexual. La Corte Constitucional argumentó que los jueces deben, en sus decisiones: (a) evitar hacer juicios de valor que se refieran a la personalidad o apariencia física de una presunta víctima de violencia sexual; (b) citar literalmente los testimonios y apartados que se refieran a la conducta delictiva analizada, y; (c) hacer las descripciones de las pruebas aportadas con un tono objetivo y respetuoso.

This case concerned issues of personal freedom and the discrimination against sex workers. The ruling resulted in the protection of two sex workers’ fundamental rights: to be treated equally and not be discriminated because of their profession. The events that triggered such protection concerned a police raid against sex workers in Bogotá under the excuse of regaining a public space. At that time, the Government was working on the implementation of a special protection program, including special training for police, to promote the importance of the dignified treatment of sex workers and the prohibition of verbal and physical abuse. The decision ultimately further reinforced constitutional protections for sex workers’ rights to freedom, work, free movement, and non-discrimination.

Este caso se refería a cuestiones de libertad personal y discriminación contra las trabajadoras sexuales. El fallo otorgó la protección de los derechos fundamentales de dos trabajadoras sexuales a ser tratadas por igual y a no ser discriminadas por su profesión. Los hechos que desencadenaron tal protección se referían a un allanamiento policial en contra de trabajadoras sexuales en Bogotá bajo el pretexto de la recuperación del espacio público. En ese momento, el Gobierno estaba trabajando en la implementación de un programa de protección especial, incluida la capacitación especial para policías para promover la importancia del trato digno de las trabajadoras sexuales y la prohibición del abuso verbal y físico contra ellas. La decisión finalmente reforzó aún más que los derechos de las trabajadoras sexuales a la libertad, el trabajo, la libre circulación y la no discriminación están protegidos constitucionalmente.

The deceased victim D.K. met her partner A.J. in secondary school, formed a union with him, and gave birth to a daughter. D.K. subsequently filed a claim to dissolve the union and for child custody at the Municipal Court because of a deterioration in her relationship with A.J. She also took their daughter to live with her parents. Following continuous threats by A.J., D.K. submitted a request to the Municipal Court for an emergency protection order under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence. The court did not act within the statutorily mandated 24 hours of the request, and A.J. shot and killed D.K. several weeks later. The Kosovo Judicial Council (“KLJ”, the body which administers the judiciary) disciplinary committee issued a decision to discipline the responsible Municipal Court judge in response to a request by the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel, but D.K.’s parents were not party to the disciplinary proceedings. D.K.’s parents submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging the Municipal Court by its inaction violated D.K.’s rights under the Constitution of Kosovo, including Article 25 (Right to Life), Article 32 (Right to Legal Remedies), and Article 54 (Judicial Protection of Rights), as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), including Article 2 (Right to Life) and Article 13 (Right to Effective Remedy). The Constitutional Court observed that ECHR caselaw stresses that it is the duty of state authorities to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This includes a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive measures to (i) protect one whose life is at risk from another, (ii) where the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from a criminal offense, but (iii) failed to take measures which reasonably might have been expected to avoid the risk. The court found the Municipal Court ought to have known about the real risk in existence when D.K. requested the emergency protection order since she had explained the deterioration of her relationship with A.J., specifically his death threats and her reports to the police. Furthermore, the Municipal Court was handling D.K.’s case for the dissolution of union and child custody. Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that the Municipal Court was responsible for acting under the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and that its inaction was a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the ECHR. The court also found that the Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and the statute governing the judiciary do not offer effective legal remedies for the protection of the applicants’ rights, because the former does not contain measures for addressing court inaction, and the latter does not allow the applicants to participate in any disciplinary investigation or procedure. Thus, the inaction of the Municipal Court and the KJC’s practice of not addressing judicial inaction violated the deceased’s and applicants’ right under Articles 32 and 54 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the ECHR. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

Here, Justice Lydia Mugambe held that Mulago National Referral Hospital’s negligence and the resulting disappearance of the couple’s baby amounted to psychological torture for the parents and violated their rights to health and access to information. Specifically, Justice Mugambe held that a woman’s inability to access sufficient antenatal care demonstrates a failure on the part of the State to fulfill its obligations under the right to health. The decision outlines Uganda’s obligations under international law to devote special attention and resources to women whose circumstances make them vulnerable.

In 2001, the female victim was kidnapped, tortured, raped and kept in captivity for four months. All complaints made by her sister to the competent authorities related to her sister’s disappearance were dismissed by the police. In 2007, the competent criminal court issued a partial conviction to the offender. He was convicted for the crimes of kidnapping and captivity. However, the acts of physical, verbal, psychological and sexual violence were not considered by the court because, according to the court, there was not enough evidence to determine that sex and violence were committed without the plaintiff’s consent. Between 2001 and 2007 the victim went through many judicial processes. Decision No. C07-0187 was the final decision issued by Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice, as the court of last recourse in Venezuela. After having exhausted all national procedures, the complainant referred her case to the international courts in order to sue the Venezuelan state for failing to safeguard and protect her human rights. On March 6, 2018 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found the Venezuelan state responsible for the violation of the rights established in the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.

The Court held that it was not empowered to impose measures that guaranteed the physical and psychological integrity of domestic violence victims when other tribunals and bodies established for that purpose were competent. However, plaintiffs have the right to make the requests from the competent courts to take necessary measures in order to enforce its orders, using persuasive or coercive means.

La Corte sostuvo que no estaba facultada para imponer medidas que garantizaran la integridad física y psicológica de las víctimas de violencia doméstica donde otros tribunales y organismos establecidos con ese fin eran competentes. Sin embargo, los demandantes tienen el derecho de hacer las solicitudes de los tribunales competentes para tomar las medidas necesarias para hacer cumplir sus órdenes, utilizando medios persuasivos o coercitivos.

The plaintiff daughters, R.H. and V.C., filed suit against the State government and certain police officials requesting damages for the loss of the lives of their mother, Mrs. S., and father, Mr. A. The day after her decision to flee her home together with her daughters and reside with other family members, Mrs. S. filed a civil proceeding against Mr. A. for domestic violence. Mr. A. was prohibited from approaching Mrs. S. and his daughters, and Mrs. S. obtained permission to remove her and her daughters’ personal belongings from their previous home while escorted by police officers. While accompanied by police officers and her sister to remove the belongings, Mr. A. killed Mrs. S. with a knife and subsequently committed suicide. In finding for the daughters in the case of Mrs. S., the appellate court identified the following factors in support of its finding: (1) the existence of a real and immediate risk that threatened the rights of Mrs. S. and her daughters that had the potential to materialize immediately and which was expressly referenced by the Office of Domestic Violence, (2) the risk related to a specific threat against a woman and was therefore particular, (3) the State knew of the risk or should have reasonably known of the risk and (4) the State could have reasonably prevented and avoided the materialization of the risk.

Las hijas de la demandante, RH y VC, presentaron una demanda contra el gobierno del estado y ciertos oficiales de policía que solicitaron daños por la pérdida de la vida de su madre, la Sra. S. y el padre, el Sr. A. El día después de su decisión de huir de la casa junto con sus hijas, la Sra. S. presentó un proceso civil contra el Sr. A. por violencia doméstica. Al Sr. A. se le prohibió acercarse a la Sra. S. y a sus hijas, y la Sra. S. obtuvo permiso para retirar a ella y las pertenencias personales de sus hijas de su hogar anterior mientras estaba escoltada por agentes de policía. Mientras estaba acompañada por oficiales de policía y su hermana para retirar las pertenencias, el Sr. A. mató a la Sra. S. con un cuchillo y posteriormente se suicidó. Al encontrar a las hijas en el caso de la Sra. S., la corte de apelaciones identificó los siguientes factores que respaldan su descubrimiento: (1) la existencia de un riesgo real e inmediato que amenazaba los derechos de la Sra. S. y sus hijas que tenía el potencial de materializarse de inmediato y que la Oficina de Violencia Doméstica hacía referencia expresamente, (2) el riesgo relacionado con una amenaza específica contra una mujer y, por lo tanto, era particular, (3) el Estado sabía del riesgo o debería haberlo hecho razonablemente conocido del riesgo y (4) el Estado podría haber prevenido y evitado razonablemente la materialización del riesgo.

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria issued may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women “Convention of Belém do Pará,” states that violence against women is an offense against human dignity, which constitutes a violation of fundamental rights. In addition, Article 18 of the General Law for Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence establishes that any public servant’s conduct, whether by act or omission, which is discriminatory or which impairs the woman’s human rights is considered institutional violence. Therefore, if a governmental authority deprives a woman of any right in the context of family law, the court shall acknowledge the authority’s intention to discriminate or impair the plaintiff’s human rights in its ruling. Further, any court ruling seeking to restore the woman’s rights shall identify the authority responsible for the violation. (Amparo Directo: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=462/04620000174646210006004.d...)

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son vinculantes para todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, los criterios emitidos pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. La Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer "Convención de Belém do Pará", afirma que violencia contra la mujer es un delito contra la dignidad humana y constituye una violación de los derechos fundamentales. Además, el artículo 18 de la Ley General para el Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia establece que la conducta de cualquier servidor público, ya sea por acto u omisión, que sea discriminatoria o que perjudique los derechos humanos de la mujer se considera violencia institucional. Por lo tanto, si una autoridad gubernamental priva a una mujer de cualquier derecho en el contexto del derecho de familia, el tribunal reconocerá la intención de la autoridad de discriminar o menoscabar los derechos humanos del demandante en su decisión. Además, cualquier fallo judicial que busque restaurar los derechos de la mujer deberá identificar a la autoridad responsable de la violación.

The applicant, Ms. Kaya, applied to the Office of Public Prosecutor (the “OPP”), claiming that she had been the victim of domestic violence. After investigating, the OPP charged the applicant’s husband with domestic violence and went to trial. However, during the trial, the applicant withdrew her claim and said that the bruises she had submitted as evidence were actually the result of an accident at the couple’s home. The OPP dropped the charges against the applicant’s husband. Two years later, the applicant filed another claim with the OPP alleging that her husband stole her jewellery and again subjected her to domestic violence. The OPP notified the proper Court of First Instance for Family Affairs (the “Court of First Instance”). The Court issued a restraining order against the husband that prevented him from approaching the applicant and ordered that he pay alimony to her for four months. The government offered the applicant state housing for the victims of domestic violence, but she rejected the offer. The applicant was subjected to several more incidents of domestic violence. During that time, the OPP requested the Court of First Instance to issue a warrant for the arrest of the applicant’s husband. The Court of First Instance rejected the OPP’s request. The applicant appealed, but her appeal was dismissed because Ms. Kaya’s statements alone were not adequate evidence of domestic abuse. After Ms. Kaya appealed, the Constitutional Court ruled that Turkey had a duty to take affirmative steps to prevent further acts of domestic violence against the appellant and effectively investigate her claims in this case. However, after applying the legal framework addressing victims of domestic violence, the Constitutional Court ruled that Ms. Kaya’s fundamental rights under the framework had not been infringed. This decision is important because it demonstrates that even though there is a legal framework available for women affected by domestic violence, claims against state officials for failing to act on their duties under that framework need to be specific and supported by substantial evidence.

The petitioners are eleven minors and the non-governmental organization that shelters, educates, and cares for the eleven minors. Each child claims to have been subjected to child abuse and defilement in Meru County, where police "neglected...or otherwise failed" to investigate or protect the children in any way. The High Court of Kenya held that the police have a duty to investigate allegations of sexual abuse made by female complainants, stating that “by failing to enforce existing defilement laws, the police have contributed to the development of a culture of tolerance for pervasive sexual violence against girl children and impunity.”

K. sued to recover damages from the Minister of Safety and Security from being raped and assaulted by three uniformed and on-duty police sergeants. The High Court held that the actions of the police officers fell out of the scope of their employment and that the Minister could not be held vicariously liable for their conduct. The Court held that although the police officers' actions were obviously a clear deviation from their duty, there was a sufficiently close relationship between their employment and the wrongful conduct to hold the Minister liable.

K. het gedagvaar om skadevergoeding van die Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit te verhaal as gevolg van haar verkragting en aanranding deur drie aan-diens en polisie-sersante met hul univorms aan. Die hooggeregshof het beslis dat die optrede van die polisiebeamptes buite die bestek van hul indiensneming val en dat die Minister nie middellik aanspreeklik gehou kan word vir hul optrede nie. Die Hof het beslis dat, hoewel die optrede van die polisiebeamptes uiteraard 'n duidelike afwyking van hul plig was, daar 'n voldoende noue verband bestaan ​​tussen hul indiensneming en die onregmatige optrede om die Minister aanspreeklik te hou.

The 2014-2018 National Strategy promoted strategic objectives such as improving the sexual and reproductive health of the Paraguayan population. This was to be achieved through the development of fair, equitable, and inclusive public policies with a gendered and intercultural focus.

El Plan Nacional 2014-2018 promovió objetivos estratégicos como mejorar la salud sexual y reproductiva de la población paraguaya. Esto se lograría a través del desarrollo de políticas públicas justas, equitativas e incluyentes con enfoque de género e interculturalidad.

This report, published by Amnesty International, documents how the Bosnian authorities have violated a wide range of rights of the survivors of rape and other forms of sexual violence. The report discusses the prevalence of rape and other forms of sexual violence against women during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It then considers how successive governments have consistently failed to bring those responsible to justice, ensure survivors’ access to an effective remedy, and provide survivors of sexual violence with reparations. Also available in Bosnian and French through External URL.

The objective of the protocol is the standardization of conduct of police officers in cases of domestic and intimate partner violence against women, as well as the specialization of certain police officers who will participate in the police response in these cases. (Official English translation available through External URL.)

In this case, the three applicants were Irish residents, but had abortions in the United Kingdom because abortion was unlawful in Ireland. Two of the applicants sought abortions for health and/or wellbeing-related reasons, while the third applicant was unable to establish her eligibility for a lawful abortion in Ireland. The third applicant was in remission for cancer and, due to a lack of information on the impact of the pregnancy on her remission and the effect of her treatment on the pregnancy, sought the abortion because of the risks involved with the pregnancy. The court found that while the European Convention of Human Rights did not confer a right to abortion, the prohibition of abortion in circumstances involving the applicant’s health and/or well-being, and the fact that the third applicant was unable to establish her eligibility came within the scope of the applicants’ right to their private lives under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court found no violation of Article 8 with respect to the first and second applicants because the interference with the right was in accordance with Irish law and “moral values deeply embedded in the fabric of society in Ireland”; however, the Court found that the prohibition violated the third applicant’s Article 8 right because there were no “effective and accessible procedures” that would allow the third applicant to establish that she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ireland. The State therefore had failed to comply with the “positive obligation to secure to the third applicant effective respect for her private life by reason of the absence of any implementing legislative or regulatory regime providing an accessible and effective procedure by which she could have established whether she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ireland.” In 2018, Ireland enacted the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.

The complainant in this case was informed that her fetus was suffering from a fatal fetal abnormality and would die in utero. At the time, she was unable to terminate her pregnancy in Ireland, so she traveled to the UK to obtain an abortion there, returning after 12 hours because she could not afford to stay longer. After returning to Ireland, she had no access to aftercare or counseling. The complainant applied to the UN Human Rights Committee (“the Committee”), claiming that Ireland had violated her rights under Articles 2(1) (freedom from discrimination, including sex-based), 3 (gender equality), 7 (freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment), 17 (right to privacy), 19 (freedom of information, including health-related), and 26 (equal protection of the law) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). The Committee found that because of the unavailability of abortion and other care, Ireland had violated the complainant’s rights under the following ICCPR articles: Art. 7 by denying the complainant reproductive health care and bereavement support, forcing her to continue carrying a dying fetus, compelling her to travel abroad to terminate her pregnancy, and causing her to feel extremely vulnerable, stigmatized, and abandoned; Art. 17 by interfering arbitrarily in the complainant’s right to privacy by denying respect for her physical and psychological integrity and reproductive autonomy; and Art. 27 by discriminating against the complainant for obtaining an abortion because the Irish healthcare system provides bereavement counseling to pregnant women after stillbirth resulting from carrying a fetus with fatal impairments to term, but not to women who terminate such pregnancies. The Committee held that Ireland had to provide the complainant with an effective remedy, including adequate compensation, and had to amend domestic law on the voluntary termination of pregnancy to comply with the ICCPR. In 2018, Ireland enacted the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act, which allows abortion (i) during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, (ii) when the fetus has a condition that is likely fatal, or (iii) to protect the life or health of the woman.

Two men published a Facebook post of them kissing, which sparked hundreds of homophobic comments. At their request, an LGBTQ rights advocacy organization complained to the prosecutor’s office, asking to launch an investigation for instigation of homophobic hatred and violence. Both the prosecutor’s office and court on appeal refused on the basis that the post was “eccentric” and the authors’ comments, even though obscene, did not contain actual criminal act and intent. The ECtHR unanimously ruled that Lithuania violated the right to an effective remedy (Article 13), awarding the applicants non-pecuniary damages.

Du vyrai susilaukė šimtų homofobinių komentarų socialiniame tinkle paskelbę įrašą, kuriame jie bučiuojasi. Jų prašymu LGBTIQ teisių gynimo organizacija pasiskundė prokuratūrai, prašydama pradėti tyrimą dėl homofobinės neapykantos ir smurto kurstymo. Tiek prokuratūra, tiek apeliacinis teismas prašymą atmetė, remdamiesi tuo, kad įrašas buvo „ekscentriškas“, o autorių komentaruose nebuvo rimto pagrindo ir visų nusikaltimo požymių. EŽTT vienbalsiai nusprendė, kad Lietuva pažeidė pareiškėjų teisę į veiksmingą teisinės gynybos priemonę bei priteisė pareiškėjams neturtinę žalą. Vertimas lietuvių kalba: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-203614

The decedent’s husband shot and killed her in front of their two daughters in 2002. Before her death, the decedent had obtained three expulsion and prohibition-to-return orders against her husband in response to repeated episodes of domestic violence. The Vienna Public Prosecutor denied police requests to detain the decedent’s husband, and stopped the prosecution against him on the basis of insufficient grounds two days before the murder. Police reports show that the law enforcement failed to respond in a timely fashion to the dispute that resulted in the decedent’s murder. The decedent’s heirs brought this complaint to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on behalf of the decedent. The complaint argued that Austria’s Federal Act for the Protection against Violence within the Family provided ineffective protection for victims of repeated, severe spousal abuse, and that women are disproportionately affected by the State’s failure to prosecute and take seriously reports of domestic violence. The Committee found that although Austria has established a comprehensive model to address domestic violence, State actors must investigate reports of this crime with due diligence to effectively provide redress and protection. The Committee concluded that the police knew or should have known that the decedent was in serious danger, and were therefore responsible for failing to exercise due diligence in protecting her. By allowing the perpetrator’s rights to supersede the decedent’s human rights to life and to physical and mental integrity, Austrian law enforcement violated its obligations to end gender discrimination through the modification or enactment of appropriate legislation under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”), and its Article 3 obligation to guarantee women’s exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedom on a basis of equality with men. Particularly, the Committee recommended that Austria strengthen its implementation and monitoring of the Federal Act for the Protection against Violence within the Family, respond to complaints of domestic violence with due diligence, and provide adequate sanctions for failure to do so.

Der Ehemann erschoss die Verstorbene vor den Augen der beiden Töchter im Jahre 2002. Vor ihrem Tod hat die Verstorbene in Reaktion auf wiederholte Ausbrüche von häuslicher Gewalt bereits dreimal ein Hausverbot und ein Rückkehrverbot gegen ihren Ehemann erwirkt. Die Staatsanwaltschaft Wien wies das Ersuchen der Polizei, den Ehemann festzunehmen, wiederholt zurück. Zwei Tage vor der Tötung hat die Staatsanwaltschaft die Strafverfolgung mangels ausreichender Beweislage eingestellt. Aus den Polizeiberichten ergibt sich, dass die Strafverfolgung versagt hat, zeitgemäß auf die Gefahrenlage, aus der sich die Tötung ergeben hat, zu reagieren. Die Beschwerde wurde von den Erben der Verstorbenen in ihrem Namen angestrengt und vor den Frauenrechtsausschuss der UNO gebracht. Hierin argumentieren die Erben, dass das Bundesgesetz zum Schutz vor Gewalt in der Familie keinen ausreichenden Schutz für Opfer von wiederholter, ernstzunehmender häuslicher Gewalt bietet und Frauen das Versagen der staatlichen Strafverfolgung dessen überproportional oft erfahren.

Three applicants, all Roma women, alleged that a public hospital sterilized them without their consent and that they were unable to obtain appropriate redress from the Slovakian authorities. Although the Court found that the third applicant’s children lacked standing to continue the proceedings in their mother’s stead, it ruled in favor of the first and second applicants. The first and second applicants argued that they had been denied their right to have a family because the hospital sterilized them without consent. The Court accepted that the first applicant felt debased and humiliated when she learned that she had been sterilized without her or her legal guardians’ prior informed consent. Considering the nature of the sterilization, its circumstances, the applicant’s age, and the fact that she was a member of a vulnerable population group, the Court concluded that the second applicant’s sterilization was also with a violation of the requirement of respect for her human freedom and dignity. The Court’s decision ultimately rested on Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

When the applicant was four years old, her mother requested that she be examined by psychologists as the mother suspected the applicant’s father of sexual abuse. Psychologists concluded that the applicant exhibited symptoms of Child Abuse and Neglect (CAN) syndrome. Based on this report, the mother lodged a criminal complaint for sexual abuse against the father. Another psychological expert produced an opinion, which found that the applicant showed no signs of sexual abuse. The criminal prosecution was discontinued. A year later, the applicant’s mother again lodged a complaint based on the applicant’s additional allegations of sexual abuse by her father. The investigator opened a criminal prosecution and commissioned three expert opinions. One concluded that the applicant did not display signs of abuse and the other two concluded that the applicant did display symptoms of sexual abuse. The investigator charged the father with sexual abuse, but the regional prosecutor’s office annulled the decision to press charges and discontinued the criminal prosecution after the father filed a complaint. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint challenging this decision, alleging that her Article 8 right to an effective investigation had been violated by the domestic authorities’ investigation into the allegation of abuse by her father. The Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The European Court of Human Rights held that the national authorities had violated the applicant’s Article 8 right to respect for private and family life by failing to adequately investigate the abuse allegations. The Court ordered the State to pay damages because authorities ended proceedings without compelling reason and despite several expert witnesses indicating that the applicant had been sexually abused by her father.

The applicant was repeatedly sexually abused by her school principal during the 1970s. When these events were reported to the police in 1996, the complete police investigation revealed that the principal had sexually abused 21 former students during a 10-year period. In total, the principal was charged with 386 criminal offences of sexual abuse. The applicant brought a civil action against the Minister for Education and the Attorney General of Ireland, claiming that the State had vicarious liability for the personal injury she suffered as a result of the abuse in the public school. The High Court ruled that the state did not have vicarious liability for its employee’s actions, and the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. In January 2014, the applicant brought a case to the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), alleging violations of Article 3 (torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and Article 13, alleging that she did not have an effective domestic remedy. The ECtHR held the following: (1) the Irish State failed to meet its positive obligation, in violation of Article 3; (2) there was no violation of the procedural obligations under Article 3 since an effective official investigation into the ill-treatment of the applicant had been carried out in 1995 once the a complaint was made by another former pupil to the police; (3) the applicant did not have an adequate remedy available to her regarding her Article 3 complaints, in violation of Article 13; and (4) the applicant was awarded 85,000 euros for the costs and expenses of the proceedings. As a result of this case, Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny gave an apology to the applicant, and, in August 2014, the Irish government submitted an Action Plan to the Council of Europe setting out the measures that have been taken since this ECtHR decision.

A.Sh., his wife Z.H. and their children, ethnic Chechens of the Muslim faith with Russian citizenship were residing in Switzerland and awaiting deportation to the Russian Federation. A.Sh.’s brother-in-law was a leader of a Chechen insurgent group who went into hiding. A.Sh. helped his sister and was arrested and beaten for collaborating with insurgents. He left the Russian Federation with his eldest son for Switzerland. When the police searched for him, they interrogated Z.H. about his whereabouts and then closed his shop and would not allow her to re-open it, stating it was her husband’s. The police came to her house, searched it, and took her passport, after which the commanding officer raped Z.H. She and her traumatize younger son went to live with her parents, and then left the Russian Federation illegally by car for Switzerland, where the complainants’ request for asylum was denied. The Committee considered complainants’ claim that, if they were returned to the Russian Federation, they would be exposed to torture, and Switzerland would be in violation of article 3 of the Convention. The Swiss authorities questioned complainants’ credibility and argued that the possibility they could settle in another region of the Russian Federation, other than Chechnya, meant they were not likely to be exposed to serious risk of treatment contrary to the Convention in case of return. The Committee addressed the claim that because Z.H.’s rape was not raised at the time of the first asylum procedure, the complainants lacked credibility, stating that Z.H. and her husband had been subjected to torture and suffered post-traumatic stress disorder according to the medical reports issued by Swiss psychiatrists and psychologists. Accordingly, since complete accuracy is seldom to be expected from victims of torture, the delay in reporting the sexual abuse did not undermine Z.H.’s credibility. In this connection, the Committee recalled prior its prior holdings that rape constitutes “infliction of severe pain and suffering perpetrated for a number of impermissible purposes, including interrogation, intimidation, punishment, retaliation, humiliation and discrimination based on gender”, and that in other cases it has found that “sexual abuse by the police … constitutes torture” even when it is perpetrated outside of formal detention facilities.” The Committee also rejected the Swiss authorities’ reliance on “internal flight,” citing the Russian requirement that Russian nationals must register within 90 days of arriving in a new place of residence and that this information will be accessible to Chechen authorities. By rejecting the asylum application based on the assumption of the availability of an internal flight alternative and without giving sufficient weight to whether they could be at risk of persecution, the Committee determined that Switzerland failed its obligations under article 3 of the Convention. It concluded that Switzerland could not forcibly return complainants to the Russian Federation or any country where there was a risk they could be returned to the Russian Federation. Switzerland was given 90 days to respond with the steps it planned to take.

Abromchik attended a peaceful assembly on 19 December 2010 with friends in Minsk following the announcement of presidential election results. After the event, when she and her friends were stopped by a special unit of riot police and tried to escape, they were blocked and beaten. An officer punched her on the leg with a rubber truncheon several times. She realized she had a broken leg and told the police officer. She was not taken to the hospital for several hours. She made a complaint to the prosecutor of Minsk about the unlawful actions of the police. She provided details about the incident and witnesses were questioned, but no other actions were taken to investigate the incident or to identify the police officer who had beaten her. The prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation, stating that it was impossible to find those responsible. The office resumed the investigation and then suspended it again on the same grounds. In her appeal to the Committee, Abromchik claimed that she was physically assaulted and affected mentally in violation of article 7 of the Covenant because authorities wanted her to feel helpless and to victimize her and that her age and gender should be taken into account when assessing the gravity of the ill treatment. She also noted that her complaint of ill-treatment was not investigated promptly and impartially by the authorities, contrary to article 7. The Committee found that, in the absence of any information from Belarus that it undertook to address the allegations made, due weight must be given to the allegations. On this basis, the Committee concluded that Belarus failed in its duty to adequately investigate the allegations made in violation of article 7, read in conjunction with article 2(3) of the covenant. The Committee determined that Belarus was required to provide an effective remedy, including conducting a full investigation of the ill treatment in order to prosecute the perpetrators and to punish them with appropriate sanctions, providing adequate compensation, including reimbursement of legal and medical expenses and non-pecuniary losses, and issuing a formal apology to Abromchik. Further, the Committee stated that Belarus was under an obligation to take necessary steps to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future.

R.R., an Iranian national, had left Iran for Italy with her husband and children due to her husband’s activities for the Kurdish Komeleh party. While in Italy, they lived in an asylum center and then were provided with a dwelling. They had difficulty paying rent as they could not find steady employment and her husband became addicted to narcotics. Her husband subjected her and the children to domestic violence and she was forced into prostitution by her husband. She left her husband and took her children. She was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression, and cervical cancer, and received help from friends to pay for surgery. Her youngest son suffered from heart disease. She and her children left Italy and sought asylum in Denmark. Danish authorities rejected her asylum application, finding that Italy should serve as her first country of asylum. R.R. claimed that by forcibly returning her and her two children to Italy, Denmark would violate its rights under article 7 of the Covenant. She stated that her family unit were particularly vulnerable as she was a single mother, she and her son required medical attention, and they risked facing inhuman and degrading treatment upon return to Italy, including a risk of homelessness and destitution, with limited access to the necessary medical care. The Committee, acting under article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, decided that the deportation of R.R. and her two children to Italy without proper assurances from Italy that it would renew her residence permit and issue permits for her children and that it would receive her family in conditions appropriate for her children’s age and the family’s vulnerable status to enable them to remain in Italy, would violate their rights under article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee required Denmark to review her claim in consideration of its obligations under the Covenant and the need to obtain proper assurances from Italy. While considering her request for asylum, the Committee requested that Denmark not deport her and her children.

C. was a citizen of Australia and the United Kingdom who lived with A. as a couple in the State of Victoria and then Queensland. They agreed to have a baby and that C. would be the birth mother. They traveled to Canada and got married and then separated shortly after the marriage. C. is the sole caregiver of the baby and no longer knows of the whereabouts of A. C. wanted to formally dissolve her Canadian legal marriage so that she could remarry or enter a civil partnership in the future. She also wanted to ensure she was not held responsible for A.’s debts. Finally, when traveling abroad, she did not want A. to be deemed her legal spouse in certain countries where the marriage might be recognized and A deemed next of kin. In Queensland, in order to obtain a file a divorce application to dissolve a marriage, a marital relationship must be legally recognized as a marriage. Section 5(1) of the Marriage Act of 1961, which provided the relevant definition of marriage, define this term to mean “the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.” Further, Section 88EA of the Act provided that, “a union solemnized in a foreign country between: (a) a man and another man, or 9b) a woman and another woman, must not be recognized as a marriage in Australia.” C. did not file for divorce in Australia because of the laws, nor did she apply in Canada or the United Kingdom because both had residency requirements for divorce. C. filed her claim with the Committee claiming that the denial under Australian law of access to divorce proceedings for same-sex couples who have validly married abroad and the consequential denial of court-based relief in the form of a court order amounts to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to article 1491), ready together with article 291) (equal access to courts and tribunals), and article 26 (equality before the law) of the Covenant. The Committee determined that C. was precluded from accessing divorce proceedings in Australia because her same-sex marriage was not recognized under sections 5(1) and 88EA of the Marriage Act of Australia, whereas couples in specific opposite-sex marriages not recognized in Australia, such as polygamous couples, do have access to divorce. This was found to constitute differential treatment. Australia stated they made a reasonable exception for polygamous marriages to enable parties to such marriages access to the assistance, relief and help provided by the family law courts in relation to (but not limited to) children’s matters, property matters, maintenance matters or divorce. The Committee determined that Australia did not explain why this stated reason does not apply equally to unrecognized foreign same-sex marriages. In the absence of more convincing explanations from Australia, the Committee found that the differentiation of treatment based on sexual orientation to which C. was subjected regarding access to divorce proceedings was not based on reasonable and objective criteria and therefore constitutes discrimination under article 26 of the Covenant. Under article 2(3) of the Covenant, the Committee stated that Australia was under an obligation to provide C. with an effective remedy by providing full reparation for the discrimination suffered through lack of access to divorce proceedings. Australia also was obligated to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future and to review its laws in accordance with the Committee’s views, and to provide the Committee information about the measures taken to give effect to the Committee’s views within 180 days.

O.G. was in a civil partnership with K. who used drugs and alcohol and had a gambling addiction. After O.G. left him, he sent her harassing texts, attempted to visit her, and when she refused to let him in her building, he hit her. She reported the events to a Crisis Center for Women. K. was sentenced to four months of labor which was suspended to a six-month probation and ordered to pay $50. After his release, he continued to send texts to O.G. threatening to kill her. She filed seven criminal complaints with the police, who took no action claiming there was nothing they could do because K. would not come to the police station and he was not acting on his threats. O.G. filed a complaint with CEDAW alleging that the Russian Federation failed to fully implement the Convention by not introducing legislation on domestic violence, and that the authorities had violated her rights under the Convention by not responding adequately to her claims or implementing protective orders to ensure her safety, not providing any effective remedy or psychological support, not conducting meaningful investigation, and allowing prosecution to be time barred due to a two-year statute of limitation. The Committee decided in O.G.’s favor, rejecting the Russian authority’s argument that O.G.’s claim to be a domestic violence victim was unsubstantiated because he was not a member of her family at the time of the alleged violence, finding that there is no statutory time limit on how long after the end of a relationship a partner can claim that violence falls within this definition. The Committee determined that Russia had not adopted comprehensive legislation to prevent and address violence against women, and noted recent amendments to national legislation that decriminalized battery under which many domestic violence cases are prosecuted due to the absence of a definition of “domestic violence.” This failure to amend legislation relating to domestic violence directly affected O.G.’s access to remedies and protection. The Committee determined Russia violated O.G.’s rights under articles 1, 2 (b)-(g), 3 and 5 (a) of the Convention. It recommended that Russia provide financial compensation to O.G., adopt comprehensive legislation to prevent and address violence against women, including domestic violence, reinstate criminal prosecution of domestic violence, introduce a protocol for handling domestic violence complaints at the police station level to ensure adequate protection, renounce private prosecution in domestic violence cases, ratify the Istanbul Convention, provide mandatory training for judges, lawyers and law enforcement personnel on the Convention and related documents, investigate allegations of gender-based violence against women promptly and provide safe and prompt access to justice, provide rehabilitation programs to offenders, and develop and implement effective measures with relevant stakeholders such as women’s organizations, to address stereotypes and practices that condone or promote domestic violence. A written response and report on actions taken was due to the Committee within six months. (Available in English, Russian, Arabic, Chinese, French, Spanish.)

A.S., a Uganda national, applied for asylum in Denmark. She claimed she was wanted in Uganda and at risk of being killed there because she was a lesbian. She was forced to marry a man and have three children, and when he died, she made a living working in a bar frequented by lesbians. Three men made advances to her in the bar, she turned them down, and they became aggressive. Her home was ransacked and burned, her belongings were stolen, and the police looked for her, including at her mother’s house. She left Rwanda traveling with a visa obtained in Kampala. Danish authorities rejected the asylum application, noting the visa contained the wrong name. A.S. filed a complaint with CEDAW claiming that, deportation to Uganda would violate her rights under articles 1-3 of the Convention because her life would be in danger at the hands of the police and ordinary people due to her sexual orientation. She claimed that her case was not properly investigated by the Refugee Appeals Board. The Committee noted that the Danish authorities found A.S.’ account lacked credibility due to factual inconsistencies and lack of support related to her claim to be a lesbian and her account of the bar incident. The Committee also noted that the authorities considered the situation of gay people in Uganda, and found that, notwithstanding the fact homosexuality is prohibited under the Penal Code, the ban has not been enforced and gay people are not targeted. The Committee deemed the communication inadmissible under article 4 (2)(c) concluding that A.S. failed to support that the lack of reference to the Convention in the asylum decision or the refusal to call a witness stemmed from any gender-based discrimination. It also did not find any procedural defect or arbitrariness in the decision-making process or any breach of the Convention as a result of the initial error related to A.S.’ name.

The applicant intended to change her patronymic (this term means a part of a personal name was traditionally derived from the name of the father of the person concerned) to disassociate herself from her biological father and associate herself more closely with her stepfather and half-brother. Despite the fact that the woman successfully changed her surname to the surname of her stepfather, she was not allowed to change her patronymic. The authorities' main argument was that new legislation prohibited such a change, which the applicant argued was an illegal and unjustified restriction of her rights. She appealed the decision to the local court, which concluded that the state authorities acted in accordance with the law, after which a change of a patronymic was only legally possible when the father of the person concerned had previously changed his forename. The appellate court and the Higher Administrative Court upheld the decision of the first-instance court. The woman appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), alleging that there was a violation of her right to private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR drew attention to the fact that the Ukrainian legislation regulating change of a forename or surname was flexible, but did not provide sufficient reasons for the restrictions on changing the patronymic. Thus, the ECtHR held that authorities failed to comply with their obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by denying her right to change the patronymic, which was an important aspect of woman`s private and family life. In the most recent version of the Civil Code, the right to change one`s patronymic is established without restriction.

Заявниця мала намір змінити своє по батькові (цей термін означає частину особистого імені, що традиційно походить від імені батька відповідної особи), щоб відмежуватися від свого біологічного батька та більш тісно пов’язати себе із вітчимом та неповнорідним братом. Незважаючи на те, що заявниця успішно змінила своє прізвище на прізвище свого вітчима, їй не дозволили змінити по батькові. Основним аргументом уповноважених осіб було те, що нове законодавство забороняло таку зміну, що, на думку заявниці, було незаконним та необґрунтованим обмеженням її права. Жінка оскаржила відмову до місцевого суду, який дійшов висновку, що державні органи діяли у відповідності до закону, який визначав, що зміна по батькові можлива тільки у тому випадку, коли батько такої особи попередньо змінив своє ім’я. Суди апеляційної інстанції та Вищий адміністративний суд залишили рішення суду першої інстанції без змін. Жінка звернулася до Європейського суду з прав людини (“ЄСПЛ”), стверджуючи, що мало місце порушення її права на приватне та сімейне життя відповідно до статті 8 Конвенції з прав людини. ЄСПЛ звернув увагу на те, що українське законодавство, яке регулювало зміну імені чи прізвища було гнучким, але не містило достатніх підстав для обмежень щодо зміни по батькові. Таким чином, ЄСПЛ постановив, що органи влади не виконали своїх зобов’язань за статтею 8 Європейської конвенції з прав людини, відмовивши їй у праві змінити по батькові, яке було важливим аспектом приватного та сімейного життя жінки. В останній редакції Цивільного кодексу право на зміну по батькові встановлено без обмежень.

In 1990 at age 18, W. was raped by a group of seven men. Three other men aided and abetted the rape. Seven months later, the court acquitted the men of all charges, finding that the victim had not “seriously resisted sexual intercourse.” The Public Prosecutor appealed the judgement and in 1991, a year after the assault, the appellate court overturned the acquittal. The Slovenian authorities attempted to locate the perpetrators, but two defendants had emigrated to Austria and could not be found. Between 1995 and 2001, the victim wrote eight letters to the court urging the proceedings to continue and five hearings were adjourned for failure of some of the defendants to appear. Various excuses, such as frequent changes in the presiding judges, were offered to the victim as excuses for the stalled proceedings. Finally, in May 2001, the authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the defendants located abroad. In June 2002, six defendants were found guilty of rape and aggravated rape. However, due to the passage of time, they were only sentenced to eight months to one year of prison. The last defendant was extradited in 2004, convicted of aiding and abetting the rape, and sentenced to eight months in prison. The victim received €5,000 from the Slovenian government in recognition of delay in prosecuting the defendants; however, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that this amount (while the statutory maximum in Slovenia) was insufficient redress. The ECtHR noted that Slovenian authorities failed to proceed with the case in a diligent manner and that the defendants received prison sentences of less than the minimum sentences prescribed by law. Thus, the domestic authorities failed to comply with their obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The ECHR, deciding in equity, awarded the victim €15,000 in addition to the €5,000 she received from the domestic authorities.

This case involved issues involving the exposure of vulnerable members of indigenous communities, particularly children, pregnant women, and the elderly. A petition was filed against Paraguay on behalf of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, alleging violations of, among other things, the right to fair trial and judicial protection, the right to property and the right to life. The petition noted that these violations placed children, pregnant women and the elderly in particularly vulnerable situations. The Court found Paraguay to be in violation of Articles 1(1), 2, 3, 4(1), 8, 19, 21 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Court ordered Paraguay to formally and physically convey to the Sawhoyamaxa their traditional lands, to establish a community development fund, to pay non-pecuniary damages, to provide the Sawhoyamaxa with basic necessities until their lands were restored, to provide the Sawhoyamaxa with the necessary tools for communication to access health authorities, and to domestically enact legislation creating a mechanism for indigenous communities to reclaim their traditional lands.

The applicant brought this case to the Inter-American Commission (“IACHR”), arguing that Brazil effectively condoned violence against women through ineffective judicial and prosecutorial action. The applicant’s husband shot her in the back while she was sleeping. She survived, but was paralyzed from the waist down. Her husband received a sentence of two years in prison after 19 years of trial. The IACHR found that the delays and the lack of protections in Brazil for domestic violence survivors amounted to violations of da Penha's human right to live free from violence and to access justice. Also, the IACHR issued determinations to Brazil requiring that the government continue and intensify the reform process to avoid state tolerance and discriminatory treatment with respect to domestic violence against women in Brazil. In response to this decision, Brazil enacted the Maria da Penha Act in 2006.

A Peticionária levou o caso à Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos (CIDH), sob o argumento de que o Brasil foi conivente com a violência doméstica por ela sofrida, na medida não lhe foi prestado atendimento jurisdicional necessário e efetivo. O marido da Peticionária atirou em suas costas enquanto ela dormia, bem como tentou eletrocutá-la no banho. Em razão dos atendados do marido, a Peticionária ficou tetraplégica. Após 19 anos de julgamento do caso, o agressor cumpriu apenas 02 anos de sua pena na prisão. Em virtude disso, a CIDH entendeu que a demora na punição do agressor bem como a falta de proteção às mulheres vítimas de violência doméstica violou os direitos humanos da Peticionária, especialmente o direito de viver livre de violência e o seu direito de acesso à justiça. Ademais, a CIDH determinou que o governo brasileiro continuasse a intensificasse o processo de reforma do judiciário, a fim de evitar a intolerância e o tratamento discriminatório das vítimas de violência doméstica no país.