Women and Justice: Topics: Employment discrimination

Article 63 of the Code of Labor Laws prohibits overtime work for pregnant women and women with children under the age of three. This rule is meant to protect women, but at the same time it makes them vulnerable to discrimination. The direct application of this rule violates women's right to freely choose their work, restricts women's access to jobs for which additional payment is provided (for example, under the hourly payment system, overtime work is paid at doubled hourly rate), and can also inhibit women’s career and professional growth. In addition, such a prohibition leads to the unofficial, unsanctioned employment of women in such types of work, which leads to women lacking legal protection and adequate wages. Articles 176-177 determine that women are not allowed to work on nights or weekends. These articles also prohibit employers from sending pregnant women and women with children under three on business trips. Women with children aged three to fourteen, or children with disabilities cannot work overtime, and they cannot be sent on business trips without their consent. These rules also apply to men with children, but only if they are raising them without a mother permanently or long-term (for example, the mother is receiving long-term medical care). This approach discriminates against both men and women, and further reinforces stereotypes that child care is exclusively a woman's duty. For violations of these prohibitions, the Code of Labor Laws provides for fining the employer the amount of the minimum wage for each such violation (currently 6,700 hryvnias).

Статтею 63 Кодексу законів про працю забороняється надурочна робота вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років. Це правило покликане захистити жінок, але водночас воно робить їх уразливими до дискримінації. Пряме застосування цієї норми порушує право жінок на вільний вибір роботи, обмежує доступ жінок до робіт, за які передбачена додаткова оплата праці (наприклад, за погодинної системи оплати праці понаднормова праця оплачується у подвійному розмірі годинної ставки), а також може перешкоджати. кар'єрному і професійному росту жінки. Крім того, така заборона призводить до неофіційного незаконного працевлаштування жінок на такі види робіт, що призводить до того, що жінки не мають правового захисту та належної оплати праці. Статті 176-177 визначають, що жінки не можуть працювати у нічний час та у вихідні дні. Ці статті також забороняють роботодавцям направляти у відрядження вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років. Жінки, які мають дітей віком від трьох до чотирнадцяти років або дітей-інвалідів, не можуть працювати понаднормово, а також направлятися у відрядження без їх згоди. Ці правила поширюються і на чоловіків, які мають дітей, але тільки в тому випадку, якщо вони виховують їх постійно або тривалий час без матері (наприклад, мати перебуває на тривалому лікуванні). Такий підхід дискримінує як чоловіків, так і жінок і ще більше зміцнює стереотипи про те, що догляд за дітьми є виключно жіночим обов’язком. За порушення цих заборон Кодексом законів про працю передбачено накладення штрафу на роботодавця в розмірі мінімальної заробітної плати за кожне таке порушення (зараз це 6700 гривень).

The Law 'On Civil Service,' among the other main principles of civil service, defines equal access to civil service, namely the prohibition of all forms of discrimination, unjustified restrictions, and granting unjustified advantages to certain categories of citizens when entering and completing civil service. It is interesting that the enforcement of this rule is carried out through some measures, which are taken by the National Agency of Ukraine for Civil Service. For example, in 2021, amendments were made to the General Rules of Ethical Conduct of Civil Servants and Local Self-Government Officials, including regulations regarding combating discrimination, ending sexual harassment, and ensuring gender equality among civil servants and local self-government officials. In addition, the National Agency of Ukraine for Civil Service issues, within the scope of its powers, provides advanced training of employees of state authorities, enterprises, institutions and organizations, and local self-government bodies to ensure equal rights and opportunities for women and men. Also, the Law prohibits sending pregnant women, civil servants who have children under 14 years of age, or women who independently raise children with disabilities on business trips without their consent. It is forbidden to involve pregnant women and women with children under the age of three in overtime work, as well as work on weekends, holidays and work at night. Women who have children aged 3 - 14 years or a child with a disability may engage in overtime work only with their consent.

Закон "Про державну службу" серед основних принципів державної служби визначає рівний доступ до державної служби, а саме заборону будь-яких форм дискримінації, необґрунтованих обмежень, надання необґрунтованих переваг окремим категоріям громадян під час вступу та проходження державної служби. Цікаво, що виконання цієї норми здійснюється за допомогою заходів, які вживає Національне агентство України з питань державної служби. Наприклад, у 2021 році внесено зміни до Загальних правил етичної поведінки державних службовців та посадових осіб місцевого самоврядування, зокрема норми щодо протидії дискримінації, припинення сексуальних домагань та забезпечення ґендерної рівності серед державних службовців та посадових осіб органів місцевого самоврядування. Крім цього, Національне агентство України з питань державної служби в межах своїх повноважень забезпечує підвищення кваліфікації працівників органів державної влади, підприємств, установ і організацій, органів місцевого самоврядування щодо забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей жінок і чоловіків. Також Законом заборонено направляти у відрядження вагітних жінок, державних службовців, які мають дітей віком до 14 років, а також жінок, які самостійно виховують дітей-інвалідів, без їх згоди. Забороняється залучати до надурочних робіт вагітних жінок і жінок, які мають дітей віком до трьох років, а також до робіт у вихідні, святкові дні та у нічний час. Жінки, які мають дітей віком від 3 до 14 років або дитину-інваліда, можуть залучатися до надурочних робіт лише за їх згодою.

The Law (No 2523-VIII) amended the Statute of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Law of Ukraine 'On Military Service and Military Duty' in order to allow women to be assigned to 24-hour military duty on an equal basis with men. Before these amendments, the Statute of the Internal Service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine contained the rule according to which female soldiers, as a rule, are not assigned to 24-hour military duty. In addition, all officer and sergeant positions now are available to women in the Armed Forces, subject to compliance with legislation on childhood and maternity protection. At the same time, advantages for women in the field of military service still exist. For example, Article 101 of the Law of Ukraine 'On social and legal protection of servicemen and members of their families' defines the following procedure for granting leave to men: only a female soldier can receive maternity leave during “special” periods, specifically (i) from the moment of the announcement of the decision to mobilize; (ii) the introduction of martial law in Ukraine or in some of its localities and includes the time of mobilization, wartime, and partial of the reconstruction period after the end of military actions. In contrast, a male soldier can use childcare leave only in peacetime. Similarly, the legislation of Ukraine contains a rule that prohibits male soldiers using childcare leave before a child reaches three years of age for military men during martial law or “special” period. Amendments introduced by the Law (No. 2523-VIII) are a step towards the equality of men and women in the field of military service, but there are still certain gender discriminatory norms that are not regulated by the current legislation.

Законом (№ 2523-VIII) внесено зміни до Статуту внутрішньої служби Збройних Сил України та Закону України "Про військову службу і військовий обов’язок", аби дозволити призначення жінок на цілодобове військове чергування на рівні з чоловіками. До цих змін у Статуті внутрішньої служби Збройних Сил України була норма, згідно з якою військовослужбовці-жінки, як правило, не призначаються на цілодобове військове чергування. Крім того, усі офіцерські та сержантські посади тепер доступні жінкам у Збройних Силах, за умови дотримання законодавства про охорону дитинства та материнства. Водночас переваги для жінок у сфері військової служби все ж існують. Наприклад, статтею 101 Закону України "Про соціальний і правовий захист військовослужбовців та членів їх сімей" визначено такий порядок надання відпустки чоловікам: лише військовослужбовець-жінка може отримати відпустку у зв’язку із вагітністю та пологами в "особливий" період, а саме (I) з моменту оголошення рішення про мобілізацію; (II) введення воєнного стану в Україні або в окремих її місцевостях, що охолює мобілізацію, воєнний стан та частково період відбудови після закінчення військових дій. Натомість військовослужбовець-чоловік може використовувати відпустку по догляду за дитиною лише в мирний час. Так само, в законодавстві України є норма, яка забороняє військовослужбовцям-чоловікам використовувати відпустку по догляду за дитиною до досягнення нею трирічного віку під час воєнного стану чи "особливого" періоду. Зміни, внесені Законом № 2523-VIII, є кроком до рівноправності чоловіків і жінок у сфері військової служби, але залишаються певні ґендерно-дискримінаційні норми, які не врегульовані чинним законодавством.

The Act requires the Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth to make regulations requiring employers to publish information relating to the pay of their employees to show whether there are differences on account gender and the size of such differences (if they exist). Employers must publish the difference between both the mean and the median hourly pay of male and female employees, the difference between both the mean and the median bonus pay of male and female employees, the difference between both the mean and the median hourly pay of part-time male and female employees, and the percentage of male and female employees who received bonuses and benefits in kind. In addition, employers will be required to publish the reasons for any existing differences and the measures (if any) taken or proposed to be taken by the employer to eliminate or reduce such differences. The regulations will only apply to employers with 250 or more employees in the first two years after their introduction. In the third year, the requirements will also apply to employers with 150 or more employees. Thereafter, the requirements will apply to employers with 50 or more employees. The regulations will not apply to employers with fewer than 50 employees.

Article 11 requires that the state guarantee equality between women and men in all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The state must work to adopt measures ensuring the proportional representation of women in the houses of parliament, as determined by the constitution. In addition, the state must ensure women’s rights in pursuing public employment, employment in the senior management of the state, and appointment in judicial agencies without discrimination. The state is committed to the protection of women against all forms of violence and guarantees the empowerment of women in reconciling familial duties and professional obligations. Article 53 mandates that all citizens enjoy equality under the law, equally in their rights, freedoms, and general obligations, without discrimination on the basis of religion, faith, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, economic status, political affiliation, geography, or otherwise. Such discrimination, as well as the incitement of hate, constitutes a crime punishable under the law. The state is committed to adopting the necessary measures to eliminate all forms of discrimination, and the law establishes a special independent commission to this end. English translation available at: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf.

The French Parliament modified the Labor Code through Article 8, which protected any candidates for recruitment, internships, and training periods against sanction, dismissal, or discrimination on the basis of sexual harassment. Before the article modified the Labor Code, only employees were protected under the relevant section of the French Labor Code. The law also specified the types of discrimination covered, which are all forms of direct or indirect discrimination, in regards to any remuneration, training, upgrading, posting, status, staff category, promotion, transfer, and renewal of contract.

Le Parlement Français a modifié le Code du Travail avec Article 8, qui protège tout candidat pour tout recrutement, stage, et période de formation contre la sanction, la licence ou la discrimination sur la base du harcèlement sexuel. Avant que l’article ne modifie le Code du Travail, ce n’était que les employés qui étaient protégés sous la section pertinente du Code du Travail. La loi aussi spécifie les formes de discrimination couvertes, qui inclut toute forme de discrimination directe ou indirecte, en particulier avec respect à la rémunération, la formation, le reclassement, d’affectation, de qualification, de classification, de promotion personnelle, de mutation, ou de renouvellement de contrat.

This law promotes, protects, and supports motherhood and breastfeeding for working women, up to 24 months of age, to ensure the proper care of the children. On this note, every pregnant worker shall have the right to access a maternity leave, for a period of 18 uninterrupted weeks, regardless the type of contract under which she provides a service. This leave will be extended to 24 weeks in cases of baby’s severe diseases or premature births. Mothers have the right to receive their regular salary during maternity leave.

Esta ley promueve, protege y apoya la maternidad y lactancia de la mujer trabajadora, hasta los 24 meses de edad del menor, asegurando el cuidado adecuado de los hijos. En este sentido, toda trabajadora embarazada tendrá derecho a acceder a la licencia de maternidad, por un período de 18 semanas ininterrumpidas, independientemente del tipo de contrato bajo el cual preste un servicio. Este permiso se extenderá a 24 semanas en caso de enfermedades graves del bebé o parto prematuro. Las madres tienen derecho a recibir su salario regular durante la licencia de maternidad.

This law establishes rules that further develop equal opportunities for women. It establishes guidelines for the design of public policies that foster and guarantee the full exercise of women’s political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights, and the free development of their personality, capacities, and aptitudes. The law also appoints the institutions responsible for their execution.

Esta ley consagra reglas que desarrollan la igualdad de oportunidades para las mujeres. Establece lineamientos para el diseño de políticas públicas que propicien y garanticen el pleno ejercicio de los derechos políticos, civiles, económicos, sociales y culturales de las mujeres, y el libre desarrollo de su personalidad, capacidades y aptitudes. La ley también designa las instituciones encargadas de su ejecución.

In 2015, the Lithuanian Military Code of Ethics was amended to include the obligation to “respect and protect the dignity and fundamental rights and freedoms of every human being, regardless of gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, religion, belief, opinion, age, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, religion.” The original version did not expressly include protection against discrimination based on gender or sexual orientation.

Lietuvos karo etikos kodeksas buvo pakeistas 2015 m. įtraukiant pareigą „gerbti ir ginti kiekvieno žmogaus orumą bei pagrindines teises ir laisves, neatsižvelgiant į jo lytį, rasę, tautybę, kalbą, kilmę, socialinę padėtį, tikėjimą, įsitikinimus ar pažiūras, amžių, lytinę orientaciją, negalią, etninę priklausomybę, religiją“. Pirminėje versijoje nebuvo aiškiai numatyta apsauga nuo diskriminacijos dėl lyties ar seksualinės orientacijos.

The Labor Code confers upon the employer a duty to implement gender equality and non-discrimination principles, which include equal selection criteria, working conditions, benefits, work evaluation criteria, and remuneration for employees. Moreover, eligible employees are entitled to pregnancy and childbirth leave, amounting to 70 calendar days before and 56 calendar days after childbirth. Also, an employer cannot present a termination notice without mutual agreement to an employee they know to be pregnant until the day the baby turns four months old. In addition, employers with more than 50 employees must publish the measures, implementation, and enforcement of their equal opportunities’ strategy. English translation available here.

Darbo kodeksas įpareigoja darbdavį įgyvendinti lyčių lygybės ir nediskriminavimo principus, kurie apima vienodus atrankos kriterijus, darbo sąlygas, išmokas, darbo vertinimo kriterijus ir darbuotojų atlyginimą. Be to, reikalavimus atitinkantys darbuotojai turi teisę į nėštumo ir gimdymo atostogas, kurios sudaro 70 kalendorinių dienų iki gimdymo ir 56 kalendorines dienas po gimdymo. Darbdavys negali pateikti pranešimo apie atleidimą iš darbo be abipusio susitarimo su darbuotoja, kuri jų žiniomis, yra nėščia, iki tos dienos, kai kūdikiui sukaks keturi mėnesiai. Be to, darbdaviai, turintys daugiau nei 50 darbuotojų, privalo paskelbti savo lygių galimybių strategijos priemones, įgyvendinimą ir vykdymą.

The Constitution is an essential pillar of gender equality legislation in Lithuania. Article 29 affirms that human rights may not be restricted, or any privileges granted, on the grounds of “gender, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, belief, convictions, or views.” Further, Article 38 declares that marriage can only be concluded upon free mutual consent between a man and a woman, and that the rights of spouses are equal. The provisions do not declare same-sex marriages or partnerships valid. Article 39 states that working mothers are entitled to paid leave before and after childbirth, and favorable working conditions. English translation available here.

Konstitucija yra esminis lyčių lygybės teisės aktų ramstis Lietuvoje. Straipsnyje 29 teigiama, kad žmogaus teisės negali būti ribojamos ar suteikiamos privilegijos dėl „lyties, rasės, tautybės, kalbos, kilmės, socialinės padėties, tikėjimo, įsitikinimų ar pažiūrų“. Be to, straipsnyje 38 nustatyta, kad santuoka gali būti sudaroma tik gavus laisvą vyro ir moters tarpusavio sutikimą ir kad sutuoktinių teisės yra lygios. Šios nuostatos nedeklaruoja tos pačios lyties asmenų santuokų ar partnerysčių galiojančiomis. Straipsnyje 39 nustatyta, kad dirbančios motinos turi teisę į mokamas atostogas prieš gimdymą ir po jo bei palankias darbo sąlygas.

The Federal Equality Act aims at creating equality throughout various service agreements (see Section 1) the Federal Government might have with individuals. The main body no. 1 (1. Hauptstück) focuses on the equal treatment of men and women (Section 3). Section 7(2) states that job advertisements should be written in such a way that they equally refer to both men and women and do not contain details that could lead to the conclusion that the advertisement is only for one gender. Sections 8 and 8a define sexual and gender-based harassment and emphasize that they constitute gender discrimination. Section 11 requires the promotion of equal opportunities for women. Section 11b states that, where women are underrepresented (meaning less than 50% of employees), employers must prioritize women applicants if they are equally well suited for the position as the best-suited male applicant until the percentage of employed women reaches at least 50%. Section 11c applies the same rule to job promotions. Section 11d provides that employers must prioritize female employees in participation in training and coaching measures to prepare them to assume higher-ranking and more senior positions.

Das Bundes-Gleichbehandlungsgesetz zielt darauf ab, für alle Dienstverhältnisse, die die Bundesregierung mit Einzelpersonen hat, Gleichheit zu schaffen. Das 1. Hauptstück des Gesetzes fokussiert sich auf die Gleichbehandlung von Mann und Frau (§ 3). § 7 Abs. 2 verlangt, dass Stellenausschreibungen in einer Art und Weise verfasst werden müssen, dass sie sich gleichermaßen an Männer und Frauen wenden und keine Details enthalten, die den Leser zu dem Schluss kommen lassen könnten, dass die Ausschreibung sich nur an ein Geschlecht richtet. § 8 und § 8a betonen, dass eine Diskriminierung auch in einem Fall vorliegt, in dem ein Arbeitnehmer (sexuell) belästigt wird. § 11 enthält ein Frauenförderungsgebot. In diesem Sinne gelten Frauen als unterrepräsentiert, wenn weniger als 50% der Angestellten Frauen sind. Nach § 11b müssen Frauen in unterrepräsentierten Bereichen bei der Bewerberauswahl bevorzugt behandelt werden, wenn sie für die Stelle gleichgeeignet sind wie der bestqualifizierte männliche Bewerber. Dies gilt, bis der Anteil der Frauen in diesem Bereich mindestens 50% beträgt. § 11c wendet diese Regel auch auf Beförderungen an. Nach § 11d sind weibliche Angestellte zur Teilnahme an Aus- und Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen, die zur Übernahme höherwertiger Verwendungen qualifizieren, vorrangig zuzulassen.

The legislation shall support planning, execution, and controlling of personnel allocation on the Federal level. Personnel controlling shall ensure, inter alia, gender equality (Article 1 para. 1 no. 2). Therefore, Article 5 provides that federal service authorities shall submit to the chancellor biennially a report detailing the target quota of women holding the highest remuneration levels (para. 2). If the targeted percentage ratios are not met, the relevant federal service authority shall submit to the chancellor an additional report explaining the reasons for such non-compliance by the end of the first quarter of the following year (para. 4).

Dieses Gesetz soll die Planung, Ausführung und der Kontrolle von Personenallokation auf Bundesebene unterstützen. Personalkapazitätskontrolle soll u.a. Geschlechtergleichheit sicherstellen (Art. 1 Abs. 1 Ziff. 2). Hierfür haben die haushaltsleitenden Organe gemäß Artikel 5 dem Bundeskanzler alle zwei Jahre einen Bericht vorzulegen, der detailliert auf die Zielquoten von Frauen in der höchsten Vergütungsklasse eingeht (Abs. 2). Für den Fall, dass die angestrebten Zielanteile nicht erreicht werden, müssen die Organe dem Kanzler bis zum Ende des ersten Quartals des Folgejahres einen Zusatzbericht vorlegen, der die Gründe für das Nichterreichen der Quote angibt (Abs. 4).

In recognition of the inherent dignity and worth of each human, Article 12 requires that the State and all persons recognize and protect human rights and afford the fullest protection to the rights and views of all individuals, groups, and minorities. All persons have equal status before the law. Limitations of rights are only justifiable insofar as they ensure peaceful human interaction in the context of an open and democratic society. Article 13 requires the State to actively promote the welfare and development of the people by affirmatively adopting legislation and policies to achieve gender equality. This requires: (i) women’s full participation in all spheres of society with opportunities equal to men; (ii) the implementation of nondiscrimination principles and other measures; and (iii) the implementation of policies addressing domestic violence, personal security, maternity benefits, economic exploitation, and rights to property, among other relevant social issues. Article 22 mandates that all members of a family shall enjoy equal respect and shall be protected under law against all forms of neglect, cruelty or exploitation. No person shall be forced to enter into any marriage, and no person over the age of 18 can be prevented from entering into marriage. All provisions of this section apply to civil, customary, and other forms of marriage. Article 24 specifically guarantees that women are entitled to full and equal protection of law, and have the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of gender or marital status. This includes the following rights: (i) equal rights under civil law, including equal capacity in the realms of contracts, property, custody, decision-making regarding children, and acquisition and retaining of citizenship and nationality; and (ii) upon the dissolution of marriage, entitlement to fair disposition of jointly held property and to fair maintenance. Further, any laws that discriminate against women are invalid and legislation must affirmatively be passed to eliminate customs and practices that discriminate against women. This affirmative requirement particularly applies to practices of: sexual abuse, harassment, or violence; discrimination in work, business, or public affairs; and deprivation of property (inherited or otherwise). Article 30 provides that, while all persons have a right to the enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and political development, women in particular shall be given special consideration in regards to this right. The State must take all necessary measures for the realization of this right, including reforms aimed to eradicate social injustice and inequality. Other gender-related provisions include: the prohibition of torture, inhumane, and degrading treatment or punishment (Article 19); Article 20’s ban on all forms of discrimination; the right to education for all people (Article 25); Article 27’s prohibition of slavery, servitude, and forced labor; and Article 31’s requirement that all persons are entitled to fair wages and equal remuneration for equal value work without discrimination of any kind, especially on the basis of gender.

The Equal Pay Law, effective since February 2019, establishes policies and obligations aiming at the effective reduction of income inequality between men and women. To that end, the law mandates employers to develop transparent remuneration policies and creates a presumption of discrimination in case the employer does not show that an alleged pay gap was based on objective criteria.

A Lei de Igualdade de Remuneração, em vigor desde fevereiro de 2019, estabelece políticas e obrigações visando a redução efetiva da desigualdade de renda entre homens e mulheres. Para esse fim, a lei obriga os empregadores a desenvolverem políticas de remuneração transparentes e cria uma presunção de discriminação, caso o empregador não demonstre que uma suposta lacuna salarial foi baseada em critérios objetivos.

The Resolution lists “hard” work and work with harmful or hazardous conditions in which the employment of women is prohibited. The list features, for example, work that includes manually lifting and moving heavy loads, underground work in the mining and construction industries, work in the processing of oil, gas, and petroleum products among many others.

Women are granted leave for reasons of pregnancy and childbirth for 126 calendar days (140 days if there are complications at birth). After the birth of the child, women are entitled to maternal leave for a period of up to three years in accordance with Arts. 184-185. During this time, women are paid a monthly allowance by the State.

Art. 199 prohibits the unjustified refusal to hire or the unlawful firing of a person, including a woman for reasons related to her pregnancy. This crime is punishable by a prohibition to occupy certain offices or be engaged in certain activities, correctional labor, or imprisonment for a term of up to three years.

The President approved the National Policy for Gender Equality and Equity in December 2013. The policy and strategic plan on gender equality between men and women promotes equal opportunities, rights, and responsibilities in all domains of their economic, political, and social lives. It further establishes state liability in the adoption and execution of policies and promotes sustainable development, along with other basic human rights principles, such as non-discrimination, gender equality, and respect of individuals. The National Policy also brings data regarding the population of women in the country, analyzing the social, political, and economic situation. Finally, the Policy maps out the main problems faced by women (related to basic services, such as education and health, as well as domestic violence, participation in politics, and access to resources) and defines strategies and targets to achieve the specific goals in order to reduce gender inequalities present in the country.

O Presidente aprovou a Política Nacional para Igualdade e Equidade de Gênero em Dezembro de 2013. A política e o plano estratégico para equidade de gênero entre homens e mulheres promove oportunidades, direitos, e responsabilidades iguais em todos os âmbitos das suas vidas econômicas, políticas, e sociais. Ela também estabelece a responsabilidade do estado na adoção e execução de políticas e promove desenvolvimento sustentável, junto de outros princípios de direitos humanos básicos, como a não discriminação, equidade de gênero, e respeito aos indivíduos. A Política Nacional também traz dados relativos à população feminina do país, analizando as situações sociais, políticas, e econômicas. Finalmente, a Política mapeia os principais problemas enfrentados por mulheres (relativos a serviços básicos, como educação e saúde, assim como violência doméstica, participação na política, e acesso a recursos) e define estratégias e objetivos a serem alcançados para atingir metas específicas a fim de reduzir desigualdades de gênero presentes no país.

This Act superseded the Vishakha guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court of India. Before the institution of this Act, a woman facing harassment at the workplace had to lodge a complaint under Section 354 and/or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code, which dealt with, respectively, assault or use of criminal force with the intent to outrage the modesty of a woman and words, gestures, or acts to outrage the modesty of a woman. This act is important because it obligates the employer to provide an environment free of sexual harassment. This is in contrast to the pre-Vishakha guidelines era during which the female employee would have to lodge complaints with the police authorities. Such obligation is a part of the company’s legal compliance and non-compliance triggers significant penalties. The Act defines various terms like ‘sexual harassment,’ ‘aggrieved woman,’ ‘workplace’ etc., which clarify actions covered under the Act. The Act broadly interprets these terms and efforts have been made to cover as many facets of employment as possible. Significantly, the term workplace has been expanded to include remote and telecommuting work. The Act also includes guidelines regarding the filing of complaints, the formation of the inquiry committee, and the process of conducting inquiries. Lastly, the Act also provides safeguards against malicious complaints.

This Act prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination between men and women. Direct discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or motherhood, and indirect discrimination is based other characteristics that result in sex discrimination. The Act covers discrimination in employment, equal pay and pension schemes, and excludes discrimination aimed at placing women in a privileged position or occupations in which sex is a determining factor because of the nature of the occupation in question.

This Act prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination between men and women. Direct discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or motherhood, and indirect discrimination is based other characteristics that result in sex discrimination. The Act covers discrimination in employment, equal pay and pension schemes, and excludes discrimination aimed at placing women in a privileged position or occupations in which sex is a determining factor because of the nature of the occupation in question. Sections 5(2)-(3) list the conditions in which sex may be considered. (English translation available here: https://mensenrechten.nl/sites/default/files/2013-05-08.Legislation%20Eq...)

The Labour Act outlines workers’ rights in the public and private sectors. Part VI provides specific safeguards for women, such as the protection of pregnant women and the right to maternity, annual, and sick leave. Any violation of these provisions can be reported to the National Labour Commission. Section 55 prohibits employers from assigning pregnant women workers night work or overtime without their consent. Further, after the fourth month of pregnancy, employers cannot assign pregnant women to work outside her place of residence if the assignment is deemed detrimental to her health by a medical practitioner or midwife. Female workers are entitled to a period of maternity leave of at least 12 weeks in addition to any period of annual leave she is entitled after her period of confinement. Moreover, while on maternity leave a worker is entitled to full remuneration and benefits and cannot be dismissed for absence. The Act also specifies that every worker shall receive equal pay for equal work without distinction of any kind. Finally, section 87 prohibits an organization’s or trade union’s constitution or rules from discriminating against any person on grounds of race, place of origin, political opinion, color, religion, creed, gender, or disability.

The Code only relates to industries over which the federal government has jurisdiction and not those governed by provincial statutes. The Code defines sexual harassment and states that every employee is entitled to employment free of sexual harassment. The Code puts responsibility on employers to make “every reasonable effort” to ensure that no employee is subject to sexual harassment. As part of this responsibility, an employer must issue a policy statement on sexual harassment and the Code prescribes certain mandatory contents for the statement.

The Equal Opportunity Act aims to eliminate discrimination, sexual harassment, and victimisation to the greatest extent possible and to promote equality as far as reasonably practicable. It defines and prohibits discrimination in relation to various “attributes,” including sex, sexual orientation, marital status, and pregnancy. The prohibitions apply in a range of situations, including employment-related discrimination. Sexual harassment and victimisation are also defined and prohibited. The Act also regulates the operation of the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (“VEOHRC”), its powers, and the process by which people may bring disputes concerning violations of the Act to the Commission. After investigating a dispute, the VEOHRC may refer a matter to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, which may order a person to refrain from further violating the Act or pay compensation to the applicant for loss, damage or injury suffered.

The Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-Free Life for Women (Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia) (“LEIV”) establishes a framework for prosecuting and preventing acts of violence against women, and for providing assistance and support for victims of gender-based violence. The law establishes 11 new crimes that aim to sanction various aspects of gender-based violence in various forms: physical (femicide, aggravated femicide, obstruction of justice, induced or assisted suicide); psychological (inducement and promotion of sex acts through electronic media; unlawful dissemination of information, dissemination of pornography); economic (breach of duty of economic assistance, theft of birthright, theft of profits of economic activity); and speech (violent speech against women). Rape is prosecuted through the Penal Code. The Salvadorean Institute for the Advancement of Women (Instituto Salvadoreno para el Desarollo de la Mujer) (“ISDEMU”) is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the law and with establishing women’s shelters and other programs designed to help victims of domestic and gender-based violence.

La Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres (LEIV) establece una avenida para enjuiciar y prevenir actos de violencia contra las mujeres, y para brindar asistencia y apoyo a víctimas que hayan sufrido violencia por razón de género. La ley establece 11 nuevos delitos que tienen como objetivo sancionar varios aspectos de la violencia de género en diversas formas: física (femicidio, femicidio agravado, obstrucción de la justicia, suicidio inducido o asistido); psicológica (inducción y promoción de actos sexuales a través de medios electrónicos; difusión ilegal de información, difusión de pornografía); económica (incumplimiento del deber de asistencia económica, robo de derechos de nacimiento, robo de beneficios de la actividad económica); y discurso (discurso violento contra la mujer). La violación es procesada por el Código Penal, el cual es el código penal criminal. El Instituto Salvadoreño para el Adelanto de la Mujer ("ISDEMU") tiene la tarea de supervisar la implementación de la ley y establecer refugios para mujeres asi como otros programas diseñados para ayudar a las víctimas de violencia doméstica y de violencia en base de género.

The Workers’ Statute contains some special rights for women who have suffered gender-based violence. Article 37.8 establishes that said women could work part-time if they wanted to. Article 40.4 gives them a preferential right to occupy a new position in another location if they needed to move as a result of the gender-based violence they suffered.

El Estatuto de los Trabajadores contiene algunos derechos especiales para las mujeres que han sufrido violencia de género. El Artículo 37.8 establece que dichas mujeres podrían trabajar a tiempo parcial si quisieran. El Artículo 40.4 les otorga un derecho preferencial a ocupar un nuevo puesto en otro lugar si necesitaban mudarse como resultado de la violencia de género que sufrieron.

Spain criminalizes certain behaviors contrary to gender justice, such as the practicing of abortions without the patient’s consent, and female genital mutilation. In particular, Article 149 criminalizes female genital mutilation, establishing a penalty of six to twelve years in prison. Article 173 criminalizes the habitual physical or psychological violence exercised against a spouse or partner, punished with a penalty of six months to three years of prison (regardless of the penalty for any specific acts of violence that may have occurred). Article 314 criminalizes employment discrimination because of someone’s gender, ideologies, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, family circumstances, etc. The penalty for employment discrimination is six months to two years of prison or a pecuniary fine of 12 - 24 months. Article 510 criminalizes the incitement of violence, hate, or discrimination against any person or group for the aforementioned reasons. The penalty is one to four years of prison and a pecuniary fine of six to twelve months. Article 511 criminalizes denying a public service because of the aforementioned reasons, to someone legally entitled to receive said service. The penalty is six months to two years of prison and a pecuniary fine of 12 to 24 months, as well as being barred from public office for one to three years. Article 144 criminalizes the practicing of abortions without woman’s consent. The penalty is four to eight years of prison and being barred from any job in the medical profession.

España penaliza ciertas conductas contrarias a la justicia de género, como la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la paciente y la mutilación genital femenina. En particular, el Artículo 149 penaliza la mutilación genital femenina, estableciendo una pena de seis a doce años de prisión. El Artículo 173 penaliza la violencia física o psicológica habitual ejercida contra un cónyuge o pareja, castigada con una pena de seis meses a tres años de prisión (independientemente de la pena por cualquier acto específico de violencia que pueda haber ocurrido). El Artículo 314 penaliza la discriminación laboral debido al género, las ideologías, la religión, el origen étnico, la orientación sexual, las circunstancias familiares, etc. de alguien. La pena por discriminación laboral es de seis meses a dos años de prisión o una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses. El Artículo 510 penaliza la incitación a la violencia, el odio o la discriminación contra cualquier persona o grupo por los motivos antes mencionados. La pena es de uno a cuatro años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de seis a doce meses. El Artículo 511 penaliza la denegación de un servicio público por las razones antes mencionadas, a alguien legalmente autorizado para recibir dicho servicio. La pena es de seis meses a dos años de prisión y una multa pecuniaria de 12 a 24 meses, además de ser excluido de un cargo público de uno a tres años. El Artículo 144 penaliza la práctica de abortos sin el consentimiento de la mujer. La pena es de cuatro a ocho años de prisión y se le prohibirá cualquier trabajo en la profesión médica.

Law No. 05/L-020 on Gender Equality promotes gender equality, by defining the relevant concepts, setting forth various measures to protect equal rights of genders, and specifying the institutions responsible for gender equality. The Law defines “woman” and “man” as including any person who considers oneself as such, and describes gender identity – which does not require medical intervention – as a “protected characteristic.” Direct and indirect gender discrimination are prohibited under the Law, including less favorable treatment of women for reasons of pregnancy, maternity, or sexual orientation, and gender-based violence. Harassment and sexual harassment are also forbidden, and whether a person refuses or surrenders to such behavior shall not be used as a basis for a decision affecting that person in a legal proceeding. The Law directs the Kosovo institutions to implement various general measures to achieve gender equality in Kosovo, including gender mainstreaming in all policies and legislation, gender budgeting in all areas, and ensuring recruitment and appointment are consistent with the requirement for equal representation of women and men. In areas where inequities exist, public institutions are further instructed by the Law to take temporary special measures to accelerate the realization of gender equality, including quotas, preferential treatment, hiring, and promotion. The Law in particular requires legislative, executive, and judicial bodies at all levels to adopt special measures until equal gender representation is achieved. The Law establishes an Agency for Gender Equality to support the implementation of the Law, and further mandates that all ministries and municipalities must appoint gender equality officials, and allocate sufficient resources from their budget, to implement the Law. Discrimination on bases including sex, pregnancy, or birth, is prohibited in employment matters including access to employment or training, and working conditions. In regard to education, the Law proscribes sex discrimination in access to education and scholarships, evaluation results, and attainment of degrees, and mandates the inclusion of gender equality education in school curricula at all levels. Persons who believe the principle of equal treatment has not been implemented in relation to them may initiate proceeding in accordance with the Law on Protection from Discrimination. Violations of the Law are punishable by fines of up to 700 Euros for individuals, and 900 Euros for legal entities. (Unoffocial English version available here.)

The Equal Rights Act was created “for the enforcement of the principles enshrined in article 29 of the Constitution so as to secure equality for women.” Section 2 of the Act provides that “[w]omen and men have equal rights and the same legal status in all spheres of political, economic and social life” and that [a]ll forms of discrimination against women or men on the basis of their sex or marital status are illegal.” The Act provides, among other things, that women and men be paid equally for the same work and that, in employment matters, men shall not be afforded more favorable opportunities than women.

The Labour Code enshrines equality in the workplace into Albanian legislation and provides specific protection to women’s rights. Article 9 (Prohibition against Discrimination) expressly prohibits any discrimination in the fields of labour and education (including but not limited to discrimination based on sex, race and nationality). Article 32 (Protection of Personality) specifically prohibits any acts of sexual harassment against an employee by an employer or other employees. Sexual harassment is defined to include any act that “considerably harms the psychological state of the employee because of sex.” Article 54 (Working Conditions) provides a requirement for pregnant women to have breaks every three hours. Article 105/a (Woman's Employment Protection) provides that women cannot be dismissed solely based on the reason of pregnancy or child delivery. Article 115 (Equality between Sexes in terms of Reward) makes mandatory equal pay between men and women for carrying out jobs of equal value. (External link to the International Labour Organization website for Albanian labor-related legislation, including the ILO's unofficial English translation available here.)

The Employment Ordinance regulates the general conditions of employment and related work matters. Part III of the Ordinance provides for maternity protection, including provisions for maternity leave.

The Act of Gender Equality in Employment (the “AGEE”) was enacted to protect gender equality in the workplace and promote the spirit of gender equality as enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution. Chapter II of the AGEE provides that employers shall not discriminate against employees because of their gender or sexual orientation when hiring, evaluating, promoting, providing education, training and welfare, paying wages and in the case of retirement, discharge, severance and termination. Employers must also implement measures for preventing and correcting sexual harassment and establish complaint procedures and disciplinary measures. Employers who are found to be in violation of the AGEE may be fined between N.T. $20,000 and $1,500,000, depending on the offence. The names and titles of offenders and their supervisors will also be put on public notice and they will have to make improvements within a specified period. Failure to do so will result in further punishment.

性別工作平等法（即「AGEE」）的制定是為了保護職場的性別平等，促進憲法第7條規定的性別平等精神。性別工作平等法第二章規定，雇主在雇用、評估、晉升、提供教育、培訓和福利、支付工資以及在退休、解雇、遣散和終止契約時，不得因員工的性別或性取向而歧視他們。雇主還必須實施防止和矯正性騷擾的措施，並建立投訴程序和懲戒措施。雇主違反性別工作平等法將被處以新台幣20,000至1,500,000元之罰鍰，具體數額則視情況而定。違反規定者及其主管的姓名和職稱將被公告，且其必須於指定期間內進行改善，否則將導致進一步的處罰。

Under Section 55(1), women are prevented from working at night in any industrial or agricultural position. However, under 55(2) female nurses in either sector are allowed to work at night, as are women working in management positions not “ordinarily engaged in manual labour.” Women who work at night because of unforeseeable and nonrecurring work interruptions or who work with materials that require night work because of rapid deterioration are provided with a possible defense to the law. Under Section 56, no woman may be employed in any work that requires time in any underground mine unless they hold positions of management and do not perform manual labor, are employed in health and welfare services, or are working as part of their courses of study. Under Section 57, the Minister, at any time, may prohibit or restrict women from employment in any particular industry or in any process or work carried out. Violations under any of sections 55-56 of the Act carry with them a fine, imprisonment for a term not to exceed one month, or both.

Sections 15(2) and 42(1) prohibit sex-based discrimination. Section 17 of the Constitution outlines the elimination of demographically derived disparities as a fundamental objective of state policy. Section 17(3)(e), focuses on gender-based disparity and states that the state shall direct its policy towards ensuring that “there is equal pay for equal work without discrimination on account of sex, or on any other ground whatsoever.” Section 26 of the Constitution, which relates to citizenship, specifically provides for extension of a Nigerian man’s citizenship to his foreign-born wife while making no reference to a similar path to citizenship for the foreign-born husband of a woman who is a Nigerian citizen. Section 26(2) provides that the president may confer Nigerian citizenship on “any woman who is or who has been married to a citizen of Nigeria.” By implication, this section limits the right of a Nigerian woman to transmit her nationality to a foreign husband.

Section 18(1) of the Constitution makes any law with discriminatory provisions or effect presumptively invalid. Discriminatory is defined as “affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly” to their respective descriptions by race, colour, sex, language, and so on. However, Section 18(1) is limited in its scope by the exceptions enumerated in Section 18(4). Section 18(4)(a) exempts any analysis of discrimination for laws pertaining solely to non-citizens of Lesothol; Section 18(4)(b) allows for discriminatory laws related to “adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other like matters which is the personal law of persons of that description”; and Section 18(4)(c) identifies customary law as exempt from evaluation according to Section 18(1). Section 26(1) calls for Lesotho to adopt “policies aimed at promoting a society based on equality and justice for all its citizens regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Section 30 of the Constitution provides for just and favorable conditions of work for women and calls for the creation of particular policies toward the completion of this end, including fair and equal pay, safe working conditions, equal promotion opportunities, and pregnancy and childbirth protections.

In 2000, the Public Service Act was amended to recognize sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is defined as “any unwanted, unsolicited or repeated sexual advance, sexually derogatory statement or sexually discriminatory remark made by an employee to another,” and it covers all offensive or objectionable remarks made in or outside the workplace that cause the recipient discomfort or humiliation or that “the recipient believes interferes with the performance of his or her job security or prospects” or that “create[s] a threatening or intimidating work environment.” The Act delineates the penalties for sexual harassment.

The law governs rights associated with labor. The law grants women the right to a 60-day paid maternity leave. In contrast, fathers receive a one-day paternity leave on the day immediately following the birth of the child. The law also provides that mothers have the right to up to 30 absences from work per year in order to care for minor children who are either sick or have suffered an accident.

Pregnant employees are prohibited from working during the eight-week period prior to giving birth and the eight-week period after giving birth. During this period, the mother is entitled to receive maternity pay, which is calculated as the employee’s average earnings during the three calendar months prior to the prohibition of work. After the prohibition period, women may take an additional period of parental leave (Karenz) until the child reaches the age of two. During this period, a mother (or father, if he has taken paternity leave, although both parents may not take leave concurrently) will not receive remuneration through her (or his) employer, although the parent taking leave may receive a child allowance through social insurance during this time. Pregnant employees and parents on parental leave may not be terminated from employment during that time and for a period of four weeks after returning to work. The Act also provides regulations for permissible types of work for pregnant women, women who are breastfeeding, and women who have recently given birth (i.e., prohibition of certain physical work and manual labor, handling of chemicals, work where the woman must sit or stand for long periods with no break, etc.) and regulations regarding the times pregnant and breastfeeding employees may work (i.e., must not work between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m., nor Sundays or public holidays).

Schwangeren Angestellten ist das Arbeiten während eines Acht-Wochen-Zeitraums vor der Kindesgeburt und nach der Kindesgeburt untersagt. Während des Zeitraums hat die Mutter einen Anspruch auf das sog. Wochengeld. Die Höhe dessen richtet sich nach dem Durchschnittsgehalt der Angestellten innerhalb der letzten drei Kalendermonate, bevor der Arbeitsuntersagung. Nach dem Zeitraum, in dem die Mutter nicht arbeiten darf, kann sie optional noch weitere Elternzeit, sog. Karenz, in Anspruch nehmen, bis das Kind ein Alter von zwei Jahren erreicht. In der Karenzzeit können Mutter oder Vater, je nachdem wer die Karenz in Anspruch genommen hat (niemals beide gleichzeitig), keine Vergütung von ihrem Arbeitnehmer verlangen, sie erhalten allerdings einen Kindesunterhalt von der Sozialversicherung. Schwangere Angestellte und Eltern in Elternzeit können während dieser Zeit und bis zu vier Wochen nach ihrer Rückkehr nicht gekündigt werden. Das MuSchG enthält darüber hinaus auch Regeln bezüglich der Arbeit, die schwangeren, stillenden und Frauen, die kürzlich gebärt haben, gestattet ist – insbesondere verboten: körperlich besonders anstrengende Arbeit, der Umgang mit Chemikalien, Arbeit, bei der die Frau ohne Pause lange sitzen oder stehen muss, etc. Außerdem enthält das MuSchG Regeln zur Arbeitszeit, die schwangeren und stillenden Angestellten gestattet ist – nicht zwischen 20 Uhr und 6 Uhr; nicht an Sonntagen und staatlichen Feiertagen.

This Act prohibits the employment of women in night work save in certain circumstances. Night work is recognized in the Act as “work in an industrial undertaking during the night.” The total hours of employment of women for both day and night work shall not exceed 10 hours in a 24 hour period. To ensure compliance with the Act and that no exploitation of women occurs, the Act provides for powers of inspection in industrial undertakings, and where it is found that an industrial undertaking obstructs any inspection or is guilty of an offence under this Act, it will be liable to a fine for summary conviction and in a default of payment thereof, imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. If a proprietor or manager of an industrial undertaking is found to be in contravention of the provisions of the Act, such person will be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months.

Esta ley prohíbe el empleo de mujeres en el trabajo nocturno, salvo en determinadas circunstancias. El trabajo nocturno se reconoce en la ley como "trabajo en una empresa industrial durante la noche." El total de horas de empleo de las mujeres, tanto de día como de noche, no excederá de 10 horas en un período de 24 horas. Para asegurar el cumplimiento de la ley y que no se produzca ninguna explotación de mujeres, la ley establece poderes de inspección en las empresas industriales, y cuando se determine que una empresa industrial obstruye cualquier inspección o es culpable de un delito en virtud de esta ley, será sancionable con multa por condena sumaria y en su defecto de pago, pena privativa de la libertad de hasta tres meses. Si un propietario o gerente de una empresa industrial se encuentra en contravención de las disposiciones de la ley, esa persona será condenada a prisión por un período máximo de seis meses.

The purpose of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act is to give effect to section 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, read in conjunction with item 23(1) of its sixth schedule. The effect of this is to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination and harassment; to promote equality and eliminate unfair discrimination; to prevent and prohibit hate speech; and to provide for matters connected therewith. Section 8 expands on the provisions of Section 9 by setting out, without limitation, the following specific examples of such prohibited discrimination: (a) gender-based violence; (b) female genital mutilation; (c) the system of preventing women from inheriting family property; (d) any practice, including traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between women and men, including the undermining of the dignity and well-being of the girl child; (e) any policy or conduct that unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance, and other resources; (f) discrimination on the ground of pregnancy; (g) limiting women’s access to social services or benefits, such as health education and social security; (h) the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons; and (i) systemic inequality of access to opportunities by women as a result of the sexual division of labor. The Act further regulates which party will bear the burden of proof in discrimination cases and further sets out which factors should be taken into account in determining whether discrimination is fair or unfair.

Wet op die Bevordering van Gelykheid en die Voorkoming van Onbillike Diskriminasie (2000)

Diskriminasie op werksgeleenthede, verminking van vroulike geslagsorgane of sny van vroulike geslagsdele, geslagsdiskriminasie, geslagsgebaseerde geweld in die algemeen, skadelike tradisionele praktyke, regte op erf en erfenis, seksuele geweld en verkragting​

Die doel van die Wet op die Bevordering van Gelykheid en die Voorkoming van Onbillike Diskriminasie is om uitvoering te gee aan artikel 9 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, in samewerking met artikel 23(1) van die Grondwet se sesde skedule. Die effek hiervan is om onbillike diskriminasie en teistering te voorkom en te verbied; om gelykheid te bevorder en onbillike diskriminasie uit te skakel; om haat-spraak te voorkom en te verbied; en om voorsiening te maak vir aangeleenthede wat daarmee verband hou. Artikel 8 brei die bepalings van Artikel 9 uit, sonder beperking, deur die volgende spesifieke voorbeelde van sodanige verbode diskriminasie uiteen te sit: (a) geslagsbaseerde geweld; (b) geslagtelike verminking van vroulike geslag; (c) die stelsel wat voorkoom dat vrouens familie-eiendom erf; (d) enige praktyk, met inbegrip van tradisionele, gebruiklike of godsdienstige praktyk, wat die waardigheid van vrouens belemmer en die gelykheid tussen vrouens en mans ondermyn, insluitend die ondermyning van die waardigheid en welstand van die meisie-kind; (e) enige beleid of optrede wat vrouens se toegang to grondreg, finansies en ander hulpbronne beperk; (f) diskriminasie op grond van swangerskap; (g) beperking van vrouens se toegang tot maatskaplike dienste of voordele soos gesondheidsopvoeding en sosiale sekuriteit; (h) die weierig van toegang tot geleenthede, insluitende toegang tot dienste of kontraktuele geleenthede vir die lewering van dienste vir oorweging, of versuim om stappe te neem om die behoeftes van sulke persone redelik te voorsien; en (i) sistematies ongelykheid van toegang tot geleenthede van vroue as gevolg van die seksuele verdeling van arbeid. Die Wet reguleer verder watter party die bewyslas in diskriminasiesake sal dra en lê verder uit watter faktore in ag geneem moet word by die bepaling of die diskriminasie billik of onbillik is.

Zimbabwe’s new 2013 Constitution addressed women’s rights and gender equality, and its bill of rights addressed damaging cultural and discriminatory practices. A gender commission was also established to accelerate the implementation of provisions related to women. More specifically, the Constitution recognized gender equality and women’s rights among Zimbabwe’s founding values and principles. It mandated that the State and all its institutions consider gender equality in laws and policy, to implement measures that provide care and assistance to mothers, and to grant women opportunities to work. The State must also prevent domestic violence, ensure marriages are consensual, and that there are equal rights in marriages. In the event of dissolution of marriage, the State must provide for the rights of spouses and children. The state is also obliged to afford girls and boys equal educational opportunities. The bill of rights specifically stipulates that women are equal to men, including deserving equal opportunities in political, economic, and social activities. Provision was also made for legislative seats reserved for women in the National Assembly. Finally, gender equality must be considered in making judicial appointments.

This Virginia law prohibits employers from discriminating between employees on the basis of sex by paying less wages to employees of a certain sex than employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on any other factor other than sex.

The Social Security Act provides maternity benefits to women through a compulsory combined scheme for sickness, maternity and death benefits through matching employer and employee contributions. The Act establishes the National Medical Benefit Fund to administer the payments for such benefits and the National Pension Fund for pension benefits for those who have retired. The Act also makes a provision for the funding of training programs for disadvantaged and unemployed persons through a Development Fund.

This Act states that where a co-operative has more than five female members, or if more than one-third of its members are women (whichever is the lesser) and no woman has been elected as a member of its board, the board must appoint a woman as a board member within its first meeting to increase the representation of women in management positions. A similar provision is provided for sub-committees of boards.

The Constitution serves as the fundamental law of Namibia and establishes the Republic of Namibia as an independent, secular, democratic, and unitary state safeguarding the rights to justice, liberty, dignity, and equality. Chapter 3 of the Constitution protects fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to equality and freedom from discrimination, including on the grounds of sex. It also bans child marriages and mandates equal rights for men and women entering into marriage, during the marriage, and at the dissolution of the marriage. Additionally, Parliament may not make any laws that contravene the Constitution, nor can the Executive take any action that abolishes or contravenes Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Any such laws or actions would be invalid.

The Italian Constitution provides for equality before the law without consideration of sex, race, religion, political affiliation, language, and personal and social conditions (art. 3). It also recognizes the moral and legal equality of spouses (art. 29). Finally, Iit mandates equal employment opportunity for men and women (art. 37). Finally, the Constitution provides that both men and women can access public offices and elected offices, without discrimination. In this regard, the Italian Republic shall promote equal opportunities between men and women through appropriate measures (art. 51).(English translation available through RefWorld.)

La Costituzione italiana prevede che tutti i cittadini siano eguali di fronte alla legge senza distinzione di sesso, razza, religione, opinione politica e condizioni personali e sociali (art. 3). Essa riconosce anche l’eguaglianza morale e legale fra i coniugi (art. 29). La Costituzione impone pari opportunità lavorative per uomini e donne (art. 37). Infine, la Costituzione prevede che gli uomini che le donne possano accedere alle cariche pubbliche ed elettive senza discriminazioni. A tal scopo, la Repubblica italiana promuove, con appositi provvedimenti, eguali opportunità fra uomini e donne (art. 51).

Chapter 1 of Cuba’s Labor Code sets forth the basic principles of the Labor Code, with specific reference to providing women with positions that are compatible with their physical and physiological characteristics and allowing women to incorporate themselves in the workforce, and entitlements to maternity leave for women, before and after childbirth, including medical services, free of cost, required by maternity. Additionally, Chapter 8 of the Labor Code is devoted to promoting policies conducive to women’s labor, including requirements that (1) the workplace create and maintain labor and sanitary conditions that are adequate for the participation of women in the labor process (Section 2); (2) labor conditions are consistent with the physical and physiological characteristics of women, taking into account, inter alia, women’s elevated functions as mothers (Section 4); and (3) single mothers be provided with stipends to help them care for their children until they return to work (Section 4).

El Capítulo 1 del Código de Trabajo de Cuba establece los principios básicos del Código de Trabajo y hace referencia específica los temas: brindar a las mujeres puestos que sean compatibles con sus características físicas y fisiológicas, permitir que las mujeres se incorporen a la fuerza laboral, y el derecho a la licencia de maternidad para las mujeres antes y después del parto, incluidos los servicios médicos, gratuitos, exigidos por la maternidad. Además, el Capítulo 8 del Código Laboral está dedicado a promover políticas que favorezcan el trabajo de la mujer, incluyendo requisitos que (1) el lugar de trabajo cree y mantenga condiciones laborales y sanitarias adecuadas para la participación de la mujer en el proceso laboral (Artículo 2); (2) las condiciones laborales sean compatibles con las características físicas y fisiológicas de la mujer, teniendo en cuenta, entre otras cosas, las funciones elevadas de la mujer como madre (Sección 4); y (3) las madres solteras recibirán estipendios para ayudarlas a cuidar a sus hijos hasta que regresen al trabajo (Sección 4).

The prevailing Indonesian labor laws reflect anti-discrimination principles. Each employee shall have equal opportunity without discrimination to obtain work and shall be entitled to equal treatment from the employer without discrimination (Articles 5 and 6 of the Labor Law). The Labor Law stipulates that termination of an employment relationship shall not be permitted if it is based on the ideology, religion, political inclination, ethnic group, race, social group, gender, physical condition or marital status of the employee (Article 153 (i) of the Labor Law).

The Law on Prevention of and Protection from Discrimination (the “LPPD”), which entered into force in 2011, introduced the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination (Article 6), instruction to discriminate (Article 9) and harassment and sexual harassment (Article 7). The LPPD covers almost all grounds of discrimination as covered by EU law i.e. “ sex, race, colour, gender, belonging to a marginalized group, ethnic origin, language, nationality, social background, religion or religious beliefs, other types of beliefs, education, political affiliation, personal or social status, mental and physical impediment, age, family or marital status, property status, health condition or any other basis anticipated by a law or ratified international agreement." However, the LPPD does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation. Article 9 of the LPPD also covers sexual harassment, which states that “sexual harassment shall be unwanted behavior of sexual nature, manifested physically, verbally or in any other manner, aimed at or resulting in violation of the dignity of a person, especially when creating a hostile, intimidating, degrading or humiliating environment." Article 4 of the LPPD covers a wide scope on the prohibition on harrassments, which includes: (a) labour and labour relations; (b) education, science and sport; (c) social security, including the area of social protection, pension and disability insurance, health insurance and health protection; (d) judiciary and administration; (e) housing; (f) public information and media; (g) access to goods and services; (h) membership and activity in unions, political parties, citizens’ associations and foundations or other membership-based organizations; (i) culture, and (j) other areas determined by law. (English translation available from the ILO through the external link.)

Article 9 of the FDRE Constitution provides that all international treaties ratified by Ethiopia are integral parts of the law of the land. Similarly, Article 13.2 provides that fundamental rights and freedoms shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia. Ethiopia has ratified many of these treaties including ICCPR, ICESCR, and CEDAW. Article 35 of the FDRE Constitution pertains to the Rights of Women. The article provides for equal rights under the constitution, equal rights with men in marriage, entitlement to affirmative measures, protection from harmful traditional practices, the right to maternity pay, the right to consultation, property rights (including acquiring and controlling and transferring property), employment rights, and access to family planning education. It is worth noting that this article explicitly imposes an obligation and accountability on the state to protect women from violence at Article 35.4: “The State shall enforce the right of women to eliminate the influences of harmful customs. Laws, customs and practices that oppress or cause bodily or mental harm to women are prohibited.”

The Act regulates sexually transmitted diseases including HIV, provides information for treatment of HIV, and provides punishment for violations. §18.3 of the Act provides that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Youth and Sports shall provide education on the prevention and control of HIV. §18.4-18.5 provide that educating the public regarding HIV and AIDS is part of the national response, and the government shall train all relevant personnel. While §18.7 provides that all employees shall receive the HIV training regarding the prevention and control of HIV and AIDS. Several portions of the act speak to the rights of women and girls specifically. §18.9(a) of the Act notes that when providing HIV and AIDS service to women and girls differences in sex and gender should be considered. §18.9(b) directs the government agencies, when implementing the strategies, policies and programs to address the following issues: protection of the equality of women in private and public life, to address their rights to refuse sex and to access reproductive services independently, to address men’s equal responsibilities in sexual and reproductive health, to increase educational, economic, and employment opportunities to women, to reduce inequalities in laws regarding marital issues, and to protect women’s rights in religious contexts. §18.9(c) covers pregnant women with HIV and grants them the right to marry. The government shall provide them with consultation and information regarding future pregnancy decisions and the protection of future children from HIV. Section 18.9(d) requires the government to implement national education and training to health care providers to reduce HIV infection caused by sexual assault, protect the confidentiality of the HIV test result, report the sexual violence, and assist the investigation of such violence, and to develop and implement education and training for security personnel and prosecuting authorities in conducting investigations and prosecutions about the sexual violence. §18.27 provides that willful transmission of HIV by an infected person who knows his or her HIV test constitutes first degree felony. §18.28 prohibits discrimination on the basis of HIV status.

Art. 8 of the Constitution provides that all people are equal and no person may be discriminated against because of gender. The Constitution also states that men and women have equal rights and the law shall ensure their equality. Art. 35 provides for protection of fundamental rights even in private relationships.

The Equal Opportunities Act of Ukraine (the “Act”) provides the legal framework for men and women’s parity in all spheres of social life through providing legal support for equal rights and opportunities, removal of gender-based discrimination, and prevention of imbalance between women’s and men’s opportunities in implementing the rights granted to each of them by the Constitution and other laws. The Act defines “equal rights” as the absence of gender-based restrictions or privileges. The Act provides that government regulatory bodies must ensure equal rights for men and women in elections, civil service, employment and career, social security, entrepreneurial activity, and education. The Act prohibits gender-based violence (which is defined as “actions directed at persons through their sex, stereotyped widespread customs or traditions or actions that relate predominantly to persons of a determined sex and create physical, sexual, psychological or financial damage or suffering”) and sexual harassment (defined as "sexual actions of a verbal or physical nature, which may humiliate or insult the person who is dependent on the perpetrator for work, official, financial or other reasons"). Exceptions to the prohibition of gender discrimination include when restrictions or privileges have a legitimate, objectively justified goal achieved with appropriate and necessary methods. Violation of the Act can result in the issuance of a limitation order to temporarily restrict the rights of the offender and protect the rights of the victim, including prohibiting the offender from residing with the victim, approaching the victim within a certain distance, and restricting telephone calls or other communication with the victim.

Закон України «Про рівні можливості» («Закон») створює правові основи рівності чоловіків і жінок у всіх сферах суспільного життя шляхом правового забезпечення рівних прав і можливостей, усунення дискримінації за ознакою статі та запобігання дисбалансу між можливостями жінок та чоловіків у реалізації прав, наданих кожному з них Конституцією та іншими законами. Відповідно до Закону «рівність прав» означає відсутність обмежень або привілеїв за ознакою статі. Закон передбачає, що рівні права чоловіків і жінок забезпечуватимуться у виборчому процесі, державній службі, працевлаштуванні та кар’єрі, соціальному забезпеченні, підприємницькій діяльності та освіті. Рівність забезпечується через відповідні державні/регулюючі органи. Закон забороняє гендерне насильство (діяння, спрямовані проти осіб через їхню стать, або поширені в суспільстві звичаї чи традиції (стереотипні уявлення про соціальні функції (становище, обов’язки тощо) жінок і чоловіків), або діяння, що стосуються переважно осіб певної статі чи зачіпають їх непропорційно, які завдають фізичної, сексуальної, психологічної або економічної шкоди чи страждань, включаючи погрози таких дій, у публічному або приватному житті) та сексуальні домагання (дії сексуального характеру, виражені словесно (погрози, залякування, непристойні зауваження) або фізично (доторкання, поплескування), що принижують чи ображають осіб, які перебувають у відносинах трудового, службового, матеріального чи іншого підпорядкування). Винятки, в яких можлива законна неріівність: коли обмеження чи привілеї мають законну об’єктивно виправдану мету, методи досягнення якої є доцільними та необхідними. Порушення Закону тимчасового обмеження прав правопорушника (цивільна, адміністративна та кримінальна відповідальність згідно із законом) та захисту прав потерпілого, у тому числі заборони потерпілому проживати з потерпілим за місцем проживання, наближатися до потерпілого до певна дистанція та обмеження телефонних розмов чи іншого спілкування з жертвою.

Pursuant to the Pay Gap Law of 22 April 2012, a mediator may be appointed to generate an action plan for gender neutrality or to intercede with employees who feel victimized by unfair treatment at work. This Royal Decree of 25 April 2014 determines the role and the qualifications of the mediator, enumerates the deontological rules s/he must respect, and describes the mediation procedures.

The Collective Labor Agreement No. 95 of 10 October 2008 was established by the National Labor Council to ensure compliance with equal treatment principles at all stages of the employment relationship. Equal treatment implies the absence of discrimination based on several factors, including gender and sexual orientation. The principle of equal treatment must be complied with at every stage of the labor market, e.g., the employment relationship, the conditions for access to employment, conditions for employment, and termination of employment. It was made binding in law by the Royal Decree of 11 January 2009.

The Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men and Women in Employment ("the Act") aims to promote equal opportunities and treatment of men and women in the workplace. The Act falls under Article 1 of the Constitution’s mandate for the government to ensure equality under law and promote measures to ensure the health of working women during pregnancy and after childbirth. Japan enacted the Act in 1985 upon the United Nation’s ratification of Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. The Act prohibits employment discrimination based on sex at each stage of recruitment, assignment, and promotion. It also prohibits discriminatory treatment based on marriage status, pregnancy, and childbirth. In addition, an Amendment to the Act in 2017 obligates employers to take steps to prevent harassment based on a protected status. To ensure its effectiveness, the Act requires that employer violations of the statute be publicly announced, and a fine imposed on employers who violate the reporting obligation.

「雇用の分野における男女の均等な機会及び待遇の確保等に関する法律」は、職場における男女の均等な機会及び待遇を促進することを目的としている。本法は、憲法第1条の「法の下の平等を確保し、働く女性の妊娠中及び出産後の健康を確保するための措置を推進すること」に該当します。 日本は、国連の女性差別撤廃条約の批准を受けて、1985年に本法を制定した。 同法は、採用、配置、昇進の各段階において、性別に基づく雇用差別を禁止した。また、婚姻関係、妊娠・出産に基づく差別的取り扱いも禁止している。2017年、同法改正により、雇用主は保護されるべき地位に基づくハラスメントを防止するための措置を講じることが義務付けられた。 その実効性を確保するため、同法では、雇用主が法令に違反した場合にはその違反を公示し、罰金を課すことができる。

The Employment (Sexual Harassment) Regulations of 2012 (the “ESH Regulations”) define, prohibit, and provide punishments for sexual harassment in the workplace. The ESH Regulations were produced by the Directorate of Labour pursuant to the powers conferred by the Employment Act of 2006 (sec. 7, 97(1)). The Regulations require employers with more than 25 employees to institute measures to prevent sexual harassment, including a written sexual harassment policy, providing the written policy to all employees with a copy, posting the policy in a public area, conducting regular trainings, and designating a “gender sensitive” person to handle sexual harassment complaints. The Regulations also provide reporting guidelines, prohibition of retaliation, and appeals processes. The penalty for sexual harassment is a fine not to exceed six currency points (a currency point is 20,000 USH) and/or imprisonment not to exceed three months.

The claimant, a female employee, exercised her right under the Transparency in Wage Structures Act (available here: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/entgtranspg/BJNR215210017.html) to obtain information from her employer about the average salary in the group of colleagues who performed the same or equivalent work as she did as a head of department. She found that her compensation was below average. The average salary of comparably employed male department heads at the claimant’s employer was 8% higher than that of female department heads, although the person with the highest remuneration within this group was a woman. The claimant’s employer justified the compensation disparity on the basis of the difference of the duration of employment between the individual employees serving as heads of department. The Court held that the employer bears the burden to prove that the reason for the pay disparity is not due to gender discrimination and that the mere assertion that the lower pay is based on other reasons is not sufficient. According to the Court, demonstrating a pay disparity between comparably employed male and female colleagues creates a rebuttable presumption of gender discrimination. This decision is an important step towards equal pay for women and men in Germany, as it places the burden of proof on the employer to prove that a pay disparity is justified by non-discriminatory reasons. This decision effectively promotes the enforcement of the law because an employee often will not be able to prove the actual reason for a disparity in compensation.

Die Klägerin, eine Arbeitnehmerin, machte von ihrem Recht nach dem Entgelttransparenzgesetz (EntGTranspG) Gebrauch, um von ihrem Arbeitgeber Informationen über das Durchschnittsgehalt in der Gruppe der Kollegen zu erhalten, die die gleiche oder eine gleichwertige Arbeit wie sie als Abteilungsleiterin verrichteten und stellte fest, dass sie unter dem durchschnittlichen Vergütungsniveau bezahlt worden war. Das Durchschnittsgehalt der vergleichbar beschäftigten männlichen Abteilungsleiter bei dem Arbeitgeber der Klägerin war 8% höher als das der weiblichen Abteilungsleiter, obwohl die Person mit der höchsten Vergütung innerhalb dieser Gruppe eine Frau war. Der Arbeitgeber des Klägers begründete den Gehaltsunterschied mit der unterschiedlichen Dauer der Beschäftigung der einzelnen Mitarbeiter/innen in der Abteilungsleiterstelle. Das Gericht stellte fest, dass der Arbeitgeber die Beweislast dafür trägt, dass der Grund für die niedrigere Vergütung nicht auf eine Diskriminierung aufgrund des Geschlechts zurückzuführen ist, und dass die bloße Behauptung, dass die niedrigere Vergütung auf andere Gründe zurückzuführen ist, nicht ausreicht. Nach Ansicht des Gerichts schafft der Nachweis von Lohnunterschieden zwischen vergleichbar beschäftigten männlichen Kollegen des Arbeitnehmers/der Arbeitnehmerin eine widerlegbare Vermutung für eine Diskriminierung aufgrund des Geschlechts.

This case concerned women’s equality in public-sector employment. The court ruled in favor of gender quotas for positions of public power. The plenary of the court reviewed a statutory project regulating the effective participation of women in public institutions by the establishment of gender quotas. A minimum of 30% of the top decision-making positions, among other senior positions in public Colombian institutions, shall be held by women. Sanctions were established for those appointing authorities that would not comply with the rule. Sanctions consisted of a 30-day period suspension and, if non-compliance persisted, destitution from public charges. It was argued that the aim of the project was to ensure genuine and effective equality of opportunities, which was considered a legitimate constitutional end. Nevertheless, the court held that some of the proposed provisions did not comply with the Constitution. For instance, some of the regulated sanctions were considered to be disproportionate. Thus, the court endorsed the Congress to issue the legislation excluding the provisions that were unconstitutional.

Este caso se refería a la igualdad laboral de la mujer en el sector público. La Corte Constitucional consideró constitucional el establecimiento de cuotas de género para los cargos del poder público. La plenaria de la Corte revisó un proyecto de ley que regulaba la participación efectiva de las mujeres en las instituciones públicas mediante el establecimiento de cuotas de género. Al menos el 30% de los cargos directivos y otros altos cargos de las instituciones públicas colombianas, deberán ser ocupados por mujeres. Se establecieron sanciones para aquellas autoridades que no cumplieran con la norma. Las sanciones consistían en la suspensión por un período de 30 días y, de persistir el incumplimiento, la destitución de los cargos públicos. Se argumentó que el objeto del proyecto era garantizar una igualdad de oportunidades real y efectiva, lo que se consideraba un fin constitucional legítimo. Sin embargo, la Corte argumentó que algunas de las disposiciones propuestas no estaban alineadas con la Constitución, por ejemplo, algunas de las sanciones reguladas se consideraron desproporcionadas. De esta manera, el tribunal avaló al Congreso para dictar la legislación excluyendo las disposiciones que fueran inconstitucionales.

This decision unified court’s criteria regarding issues of protection of motherhood and employment rights for pregnant women. The Constitutional Court analyzed 33 cases where pregnant women were dismissed by their employers after learning of their pregnancy status. The court ruled in favor of reinforced protection of motherhood in the workplace. Such doctrine must be duly applied in all those cases in which a woman is pregnant or during her lactation period. In relation to the dismissal of female workers, the court established criteria that takes into consideration the knowledge of the pregnancy status by the employer. It is argued that in order to dismiss a woman under such circumstances, the employer shall demonstrate (i) that a fair motive can be argued and (ii) that permission from the competent administrative authority has been granted. The required protection measures in cases where the employer dismissed the worker without the aforementioned procedure are as follows: (i) recognition of health benefits, up to the moment the woman acquires the right to claim the economic maternity leave benefit; (ii) reinstatement of the pregnant woman or the renewal of her contract, whenever possible; (iii) in some cases, compensation as provided for in article 239 of the Labor Code.

Esta sentencia unificó los criterios de la Corte Constitucional en temas de protección de la maternidad y derechos laborales de las mujeres embarazadas. La Corte Constitucional analizó 33 casos en los que mujeres embarazadas fueron despedidas por sus empleadores después de conocer su estado de embarazo. El tribunal falló a favor de una protección laboral reforzada de la maternidad en el lugar de trabajo. Tal doctrina debe ser debidamente aplicada en todos aquellos casos en los que una mujer se encuentre embarazada o lactando. En relación con el despido de trabajadoras, la Corte estableció criterios que toman en consideración el conocimiento del estado de embarazo por parte del empleador. Se argumenta que, para despedir a una mujer embarazada, el empleador deberá demostrar (i) que se puede alegar una justa causa y (ii) que se ha otorgado el permiso de la autoridad administrativa competente. Las medidas de protección requeridas en los casos en que el empleador despida a la trabajadora sin el procedimiento antes mencionado son las siguientes: (i) reconocimiento de beneficios de salud, hasta el momento en que la mujer adquiera el derecho a reclamar el beneficio económico de licencia por maternidad; (ii) la reincorporación de la mujer embarazada o la renovación de su contrato, cuando sea posible; (iii) en algunos casos, la indemnización prevista en el artículo 239 del Código del Trabajo.

This decision unified the court’s criteria regarding employment rights for pregnant women and their special labor protections. The Constitutional Court analyzed three cases where pregnant women were dismissed by their employers, who were not aware of the workers’ pregnancy status at the time of dismissal. The Constitutional Court reaffirmed the importance of guaranteeing job security for pregnant workers, especially during the lactation period, as a measure to avoid discrimination against women at work. Consequently, in order to dismiss a worker whose pregnancy status was known by the employer, an employment inspector must grant permission beforehand. However, the court ruled by elaborating on previous jurisprudence, that it was excessive to oblige a former employer to readmit an employee and pay social security contributions for a worker who was dismissed without prior knowledge of her pregnancy status. In the study of those cases, the court held that when the employer has no knowledge of the pregnancy status and terminates a pregnant employee’s employment contract, no discrimination can be argued and therefore no protection of motherhood can be granted.

Esta sentencia unificó el criterio de la Corte Constitucional respecto de los derechos laborales de las mujeres embarazadas y su protección laboral reforzada. La Corte Constitucional analizó tres casos en los que mujeres embarazadas fueron despedidas por sus empleadores, quienes desconocían el estado de embarazo de las trabajadoras al momento del despido. La Corte Constitucional reafirmó la importancia de garantizar la estabilidad laboral de las trabajadoras embarazadas, especialmente durante el período de lactancia, como medida para evitar la discriminación laboral de las mujeres. En consecuencia, para despedir a una trabajadora cuyo estado de embarazo era conocido por el empleador, un inspector de trabajo debe otorgar un permiso previo. Sin embargo, la Corte Constitucional dictaminó, con base en fuentes jurisprudenciales, que era excesivo obligar a un ex empleador a readmitir a una empleada y pagar las contribuciones a la seguridad social de una trabajadora que fue despedida, si no tenían conocimiento previo de su estado de embarazo. En el estudio de esos casos, la Corte Constitucional sostuvo que cuando el empleador no tiene conocimiento del estado de embarazo y termina el contrato de trabajo de una empleada embarazada, no se puede alegar discriminación y, por lo tanto, no se puede otorgar protección laboral reforzada.

The case concerned labor rights and protection of sex workers. The plaintiff, a sex worker, sued her former employer for firing her after she became pregnant. Under articles 236 and 239 of the Colombian Labor Code, a pregnant woman is subject to special labor protection, and therefore cannot be fired without cause and without authorities’ permission. The court consisdered whether pregnant sex workers should have the same labor protection as other professions. Article 13 of the Constitution provides the right of all citizens to be treated equally, as such, the court held it necessary to provide the aforementioned labor protection to sex workers. This conclusion was achieved by virtue of comparative law and legislation, where the protection shall be provided in connection with the right to motherhood. Sex workers, whether men or women, shall not be discriminated and should hold the same rights as any other worker. In this regard, court acknowledged the plaintiff’s right to the financial compensation she was entitled to.

El caso se refería a los derechos laborales y la protección de las trabajadoras sexuales. La demandante, una trabajadora sexual, demandó a su antiguo empleador por despedirla después de quedar embarazada. De conformidad con los artículos 236 y 239 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, la mujer embarazada es sujeto de una protección laboral reforzada, por lo que no puede ser despedida sin justa causa y sin permiso de las autoridades competentes. El tribunal analizó si las trabajadoras sexuales embarazadas deberían tener la misma protección laboral que otras profesiones. El artículo 13 de la Constitución establece el derecho de todos los ciudadanos a ser tratados por igual, por lo que el tribunal consideró necesario extender la mencionada protección laboral a las trabajadoras sexuales. Esta conclusión se logró en virtud de análisis de derecho comparado y de la legislación local, donde la protección nace del estado de embarazo. Los trabajadores sexuales, ya sean hombres o mujeres, no deben ser discriminados y deben tener los mismos derechos que cualquier otro trabajador. En este sentido, el tribunal reconoció el derecho de la demandante a la compensación económica a la que tenía derecho.

The applicant, a translator for the Romanian Embassy, was terminated without explanation the day after officially informing the employer of her pregnancy. She argued that her dismissal was based on gender discrimination, while the employer stated that it was because of unsatisfactory results during the contractual probationary period. The Court ruled in favor of the applicant awarding LT 50,000 in pecuniary and LT 10,000 in non-pecuniary damages to be paid by the Romanian Embassy in the Republic of Lithuania.

Pareiškėja, vertėja Rumunijos ambasadoje, buvo atleista iš darbo be paaiškinimo dieną po to, kai oficialiai informavo darbdavį apie savo nėštumą. Ji grindė šį atleidimą diskriminacija dėl lyties, bet darbdavys nurodė, kad priežastis buvo nepatenkinami rezultatai bandomuoju sutarties laikotarpiu. Teismas priėmė sprendimą ieškovės naudai priteisdamas 50 000 LT turtinės žalos ir 10 000 LT neturtinės žalos, kurią turi sumokėti Rumunijos ambasada Lietuvos Respublikoje.

The plaintiff lost a portion of her salary because she could not work overtime during her pregnancy. In deciding whether she was entitled to maternity leave payments, the Austrian Supreme Court considered the overtime work element rather than regular wage elements. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, causing a general improvement in the financial position of Austrian maternity benefit recipients.

Die Klägerin verlor einen Teil ihres Gehalts, weil sie während ihrer Schwangerschaft keine Überstunden machen konnte. Bei der Entscheidung, ob sie Anspruch auf Mutterschaftsurlaubszahlungen hatte, berücksichtigte der österreichische Oberste Gerichtshof das Element der Überstundenarbeit und nicht die regulären Lohnbestandteile. Der Oberste Gerichtshof entschied zugunsten der Klägerin, was zu einer allgemeinen Verbesserung der finanziellen Lage der österreichischen Bezieherinnen von Mutterschaftsgeld führte.

The plaintiff, a gay man, participated in a gay recreational softball league. Subsequently, he received criticism at his job as a welfare services coordinator for Clayton Country, Georgia, for his sexual orientation and participating in the league. Previously he had received positive professional evaluations. In 2013, Clayton County conducted an internal audit of the funds the plaintiff managed and then dismissed him for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.” The plaintiff filed a case with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His case was dismissed by the district court and such dismissal was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court had to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompassed discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court held that it was a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fire an employee for being gay or transgender. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” was that firing an employee based on sex was a violation of the Act. This, in turn, applied to one’s homosexuality or transgender status as discrimination on the basis of this required employers to discriminate against employees based on their sex.

The Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality of Art. 14 of the Labor Code and Arts. 10 and 21 of the law “on Employment of the Population of the Republic of Belarus” and decided that, to ensure the completeness of legal regulation in the field of labor relations and the implementation of the constitutional right of citizens to work, it was necessary to add age and place of residence to the list of circumstances, based on which employment discrimination is prohibited. The Court specifically noted that the employer’s inclusion of requirements based on age, place of residence, or other circumstances that could be deemed discriminatory in job announcements creates the prerequisites for the violation of citizens’ constitutional rights, including the right of women to opportunities equal to those of men at work and career advancement.

The Supreme Court rejected the appeal of a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals of Santiago (Case No. 11717-2016), which had ratified the judgment of the 12th Civil Court of Santiago finding for the plaintiff in a complaint for violation of the Article 2 of Law No. 20,069 by the defendant. The plaintiff, a host in a TV show, claimed discrimination for his sexual orientation by his employer, the TV show. The Trial Court found that, in light of focus group research that found the plaintiff was well received by the audience of his TV show, there was no basis for his change in roles other than his sexual orientation, and that the actions of the TV show that forced the plaintiff to make his sexual orientation public were not reasonable or proportional. Thus, the defendant violated the plaintiff’s right to privacy.

La Corte Suprema rechazó el recurso de apelación de una decisión de la Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago (Causa No. 11717-2016), que había ratificado la sentencia del 12º Juzgado Civil de Santiago en favor de la demandante en su denuncia de la violación del demandado del artículo. 2 de la Ley N ° 20.069. El demandante, presentador de un programa de televisión, reclamó discriminación por su orientación sexual por parte de su empleador, el programa de televisión. El Tribunal de Primera Instancia determinó que, a la luz de la investigación de grupos focales que encontró que el demandante fue bien recibido por la audiencia de su programa de televisión, no había ninguna base para su cambio de roles además de su orientación sexual, y que las acciones del programa de televisión que obligaron al demandante a hacer pública su orientación sexual no eran razonables ni proporcionales. Por lo tanto, el acusado, el programa, en efecto violó el derecho a la privacidad del demandante.

The respondent’s group insurance plan provided weekly benefits for loss of pay due to accident or sickness. The plan covered pregnant women subject to an exclusion from coverage during the period commencing on the tenth week prior to the expected week of childbirth and extending to six weeks after it (even if the accident or sickness was unrelated to the pregnancy). The appellants, who all became pregnant in 1982, alleged that the differential treatment of pregnancy in the respondent’s plan constituted discrimination on the basis of sex contrary to s.6(1) of the Human Rights Act of Manitoba. The Supreme Court ruled that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination and that the respondent had discriminated against the appellants on the basis of sex. It said that bearing children benefits society as a whole and women should not be economically or socially disadvantaged due to childbearing.

Here, the Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the appeal of the respondent employer and rejected a prior holding of the Edinburgh Employment Tribunal that found the respondent employer liable for having violated Section 1(3) of the Equal Pay Act for having given a male staff member a more favorable employment contract than two female co-workers and having done so without genuine, material, and sex-neutral factors accounting for this disparity. The claimants in this appeal were two female employees of Scottish Enterprise, a non-departmental public body of the Scottish Government focused on economic development. The women alleged that a male co-worker doing work of equal value had a more favorable employment contract, and that there were no genuine, material, and sex-neutral factors accounting for this disparity. The Employment Appeal Tribunal accepted respondent’s argument that the reason for the disparity in compensation between the claimants’ contracts and that of their male comparator was due to the fact that the terms of the male comparator’s contract were protected under Scotland’s Transfer of Undertakings (TUPE) regulations. These regulations protect an employee’s contract from modification in the case of a business transfer. While the lower tribunal had accepted that this explanation for the disparity was genuine, it held that the respondent should have frozen the male comparator’s salary and not granted him pay increases after a certain period to keep his pay equal to that of the claimants. The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected this holding and granted the appeal, noting that it was not the respondent’s practice to freeze salaries for any employees. Furthermore, the Employment Appeal Tribunal stated that the lower tribunal had made “no finding that the Claimants suffered discrimination on grounds of sex.” Neither had it made any finding that respondent committed any form of “culpable inactivity” motivated by sex. Finally, the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the respondent established a valid defense under the Equal Pay Act. The Equal Pay Act states that an employer must show that “that the difference in pay or other conditions is explained by something that has nothing to do with sex.” The Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the respondent made a “causal link between a non gender related explanation and the difference in pay complained of,” and that, therefore, respondent had established a defense. Therefore, it rejected the decision of the Edinburgh Employment Tribunal, upheld the appeal, and dismissed the claims.

The plaintiff alleged that, during the course of her employment at construction firm Winslow Constructors, she was abused, bullied, and sexually harassed by Winslow employees and subcontractors. She alleged that Winslow was vicariously liable for the acts of its employees and subcontractors, or in the alternative, negligent in failing to provide a safe working environment. On the fifth day of the trial, Winslow admitted liability for negligence. The decision before the Court was the quantum of damages available to the plaintiff. The Court found that she had sustained very considerable psychiatric injuries and a jaw injury (due to teeth grinding) as a direct consequence of the bullying, abuse, and sexual harassment leveled at her by Winslow’s employees and subcontractors. The Court found that these injuries “have and will continue to diminish the quality of her life.” The Court awarded general damages AUD 380,000. Based on “virtually unanimous” evidence that the plaintiff would never work again, the Court also awarded her AUD 283,941.70 for past economic loss AUD 696,085.41 for future economic loss, to reflect her loss of future earning capacity.

A to-be midwife, E.G., was denied jobs for which she had applied at three different obstetrics and gynecology departments. When applying, E.G. said that she could not participate in performing abortions due to her religious beliefs. The court considered whether the region had discriminated against E.G. according to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Swedish Discrimination Act and whether the region had violated E.G’s rights under Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the ECHR. The Swedish Labor Court found that the region’s decision not to employ E.G. for the positions she applied to, which included tasks that she had declared that she would not perform, did not constitute direct or indirect discrimination. The Labor Court stated that the region’s criteria – that the applicant could perform all tasks falling within the position, including abortion – was motivated by a legitimate purpose, i.e. good healthcare for the women seeking abortion as defined in the democratically adopted law. The criteria was also found appropriate and necessary to reach the aim of good health care. The Labor Court further deemed that it was E.G’s “professional limitations” and not her opinions regarding abortion that had mattered in the region’s decision not to hire her. Therefore, the Labor Court ruled that region had not committed violations of neither Article 9, 10 or 14 of the ECHR, nor the Swedish Discrimination Act.

The respondent was employed by the appellant, Property Center Bienes Raíces, as the secretary of the owner, Taylan Ozdemir, for approximately four years. When the respondent was three months pregnant, she experienced a health issue threatening her pregnancy and presented a doctor’s note to her employer stating that she could not work for 10 days and had to rest at home. Four days later, she returned to her office to return a work laptop for the use of her co-worker who was filling in while she was absent. According to the co-worker’s testimony, the appellant-owner began to yell at the respondent, stating she was uneducated, that there was “too much risk” in having a pregnant employee, and that she was fired. When the respondent began to cry, informing the owner-appellant that he could not terminate a pregnant employee, he said that he did not care if he was brought before the courts because he had enough money to pay any penalty. He then practically dragged the respondent physically from the premises. The lower court found that the appellant and his business illegally discriminated against the respondent. The Supreme Court agreed and rejected the appeal. Article 233 of the Employment Code (Código de Trabajo) clearly states that a woman cannot be dismissed from her employment because of her pregnancy (“La mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo por el hecho de estar embarazada.”). The Supreme Court found that witness testimony and medical documentation clearly established that 1) between the parties a contract of employment existed, 2) that the respondent was pregnant; and 3) that at the time of her dismissal, her pregnancy was known to her employer. The Supreme Court ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the legal proceeding and the appropriate back pay to the respondent.

La demandada era empleada del demandante, Property Center Bienes Raíces, como secretaria del propietario, Taylan Ozdemir, por aproximadamente cuatro años. Cuando la demandada tenía tres meses de embarazo, sufrió un problema de salud que amenazó su embarazo y presentó una nota del médico a su empleador indicando que no podía trabajar durante 10 días y tenía que descansar en casa por ese período. Cuatro días después, regresó a su oficina para devolver una computadora portátil del trabajo para que la usara su compañera de trabajo que la estaba reemplazando mientras ella estaba ausente. Según el testimonio de la compañera de trabajo, el apelante comenzó a gritarle a la demandada, diciendo que no tenía educación, que había "demasiado riesgo" en tener una empleada embarazada y la despidió. Cuando la demandada comenzó a llorar, informando a el apelante que no podía despedir a una empleada embarazada, éste le dijo que no le importaba si lo llevaban ante los tribunales porque tenía suficiente dinero para pagar cualquier multa. Luego, prácticamente arrastró físicamente a la demandada fuera del local. El tribunal de primera instancia determinó que el apelante y su negocio discriminaron ilegalmente a la demandada. La Corte Suprema estuvo de acuerdo y rechazó la apelación. El Artículo 233 del Código de Trabajo establece claramente que una mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo debido a su embarazo (“La mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo por el hecho de estar embarazada”). La Corte Suprema determinó que el testimonio de testigos y la documentación médica establecían claramente que 1) existía un contrato de trabajo entre las partes, 2) que la demandada estaba embarazada; y 3) que al momento de su despido, su empleador tenía conocimiento de su embarazo. La Corte Suprema ordenó a los recurrentes que pagaran las costas del proceso judicial y el correspondiente pago atrasado a la demandada.

The Court held that it was unconstitutional to require an attorney without earnings to continue to make compulsory pension contributions during time taken off to care for children (up to the age of three years). The Court found that requiring such compulsory pension contributions was a breach of the right to equal treatment enshrined in the German constitution because it disproportionately affected women, who are the parent taking time off to care for small children in the vast majority of cases.

Der Gerichtshof hielt es für verfassungswidrig, dass eine Rechtsanwaltskammer von einer Rechtsanwältin weiterhin Pflichtbeiträge zur Rentenversicherung verlangt, obwohl die Rechtsanwältin während der Freistellung zur Kinderbetreuung (bis zum Alter von drei Jahren) kein Einkommen hat. Eine solche Beitragspflicht wurde als Verstoß gegen das im Grundgesetz verankerte Gleichbehandlungsgebot angesehen, da sie Frauen, die in der überwiegenden Zahl der Fälle derjenige Elternteil sind, der eine Auszeit zur Betreuung von Kleinkindern nimmt, unverhältnismäßig stark belastet.

Employees of state hospitals in Hamburg were granted the right in 1995 to continued employment in case of privatization of the hospitals. In 2000, the cleaning staff were spun off into a separate company which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the state hospitals. Upon privatization in 2005, the right to continued employment was applied only to those employees employed by the state hospitals, not those employed by the wholly-owned subsidiary company. The Court held this to be in breach of the right to equal treatment enshrined in the German constitution as the cleaning staff denied the right to continued employment due to the separation were predominantly women and there was no evident justification for the unequal treatment of the two groups of employees.

Den Beschäftigten der staatlichen Krankenhäuser in Hamburg wurde 1995 das Recht auf Weiterbeschäftigung im Falle einer Privatisierung der Krankenhäuser eingeräumt. Im Jahr 2000 wurde das Reinigungspersonal in eine eigene Gesellschaft ausgegliedert, die eine hundertprozentige Tochtergesellschaft der staatlichen Krankenhäuser war. Bei der Privatisierung im Jahr 2005 wurde das Recht auf Weiterbeschäftigung nur den bei den staatlichen Krankenhäusern beschäftigten Arbeitnehmern gewährt, nicht aber denjenigen, die bei der hundertprozentigen Tochtergesellschaft beschäftigt waren. Das Gericht sah hierin einen Verstoß gegen das im Grundgesetz verankerte Gleichbehandlungsgebot, da es sich bei den durch die Ausgliederung vom Weiterbeschäftigungsanspruch ausgeschlossenen Reinigungskräften überwiegend um Frauen handelte und eine sachliche Rechtfertigung für die Ungleichbehandlung der beiden Beschäftigtengruppen nicht ersichtlich war.

The plaintiff sued a senior manager at the company she worked for, alleging repeated sexual harassment. The harassment, which included many unwanted sexual advances toward the plaintiff, started with the plaintiff’s initial interview and continued until her eventual firing by the defendant. The court found that the defendant’s acts were a violation of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. The court awarded the plaintiff damages to cover emotional distress as well as lost earnings.

Plaintiff worked as a secretary for the defendant. The plaintiff was experienced and had a history of good performance reviews. However, her relationship with the defendant deteriorated after she became pregnant. The plaintiff shared her pregnancy news with human resource and one colleague only, but then more colleagues learned about her pregnancy. According to the plaintiff, colleagues threatened to force her to have an abortion and suggested that she take only a four-week maternity leave despite her preference for an eight-week maternity leave. Plaintiff later learned that the defendant had hired a permanent replacement for her during her maternity leave. Subsequently, the plaintiff was fired. The court found that the plaintiff had showed that, on a balance of probabilities, she had been discriminated against by the defendant on the basis of her pregnancy.

The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant along with her husband, who was her direct supervisor. The defendant fired the plaintiff’s husband. Subsequently, the defendant informed the plaintiff that because of her marital relationship with her husband, she would have to be fired too, despite the lack of any wrongdoing on her part. The defendant moved to dismiss the claim, but the Court refused to, finding that there were credible allegations of violations of the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance and the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.

The defendant was an employment consultancy company that worked on behalf of various Hong Kong government agencies. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, who worked under a one-year contract. The plaintiff’s contract was renewed, with a start-date immediately following the end-date of the original contract. The plaintiff subsequently informed the defendant that she was pregnant. The defendant rescinded the renewal of the contract, on the grounds that the plaintiff had been dishonest in informing the employer of her pregnancy. The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Opportunities Commission, claiming that the defendant had violated the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. To resolve the complaint, the defendant proposed a new contract, which the plaintiff accepted. The plaintiff later applied for maternity leave, but was denied by the defendant, who informed her that she did not satisfy the requirement of continuous employment prior to the request (due to a one-day gap between the original contract’s end-date and the new contract’s start-date). The court found that the defendant’s imposition of a one-day gap was a discriminatory act that was prohibited by Sections 8 and 11 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.

The applicant was dismissed by her employer, the respondent, because of operational requirements. The applicant was employed by the respondent from 1 November 2007 until her dismissal on 24 October 2012. The applicant claimed that she was dismissed unfairly because she was pregnant. Prior to her dismissal, the applicant delivered a letter from the Qacha’s Nek Hospital stating that she was pregnant and would be required to attend monthly clinics until she delivered her baby. The respondent then dismissed the applicant, claiming that her employment could not continue because of her pregnancy. The Labour Court referred to subsection 3(d) of the Labour Code Order 24 of 1992, which provides that pregnancy, among others, does not constitute a valid reason for terminating employment. The court stated that this type of dismissal carried an element of discrimination, the freedom against which is protected by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho, the highest law of the land. The court held that the dismissal of the applicant was unfair, that the respondent must reinstate her to her former position, and that the respondent pay for her lost earnings following dismissal.

The complainant worked at the Club Resort Holdings Pty Ltd., the respondent. She was working in a cold larder preparing food when a colleague sexually harassed her. The complainant sought an investigation by their employer. The complainant alleged that the employer improperly conducted this investigation, resulting in further distress for the complainant and her needing to take several months of work. Ultimately, she resigned. The complainant also alleged that their mutual employer was vicariously liable for these acts as a result of a failure to take “reasonable steps” to prevent such acts. The Tribunal awarded damages to the complainant, finding that: (i) the complainant was sexually harassed by her colleague; (ii) the sexual harassment constituted sex discrimination; (iii) the harassment constituted age discrimination; (iv) that the complainant was not victimized by her employers because she brought a sexual harassment complaint; and (v) respondent did not take reasonable steps to prevent the sexual harassment.

The complainant was an employee of the respondent company. The complainant filed this complaint against the respondent primarily for appointing a man, J., in the position of Administration Manager without advertising the position and therefore not giving the complainant an opportunity to compete for the position. The complaint rested on the following: (i) discriminating in complainant’s salary because J., even though he held positions of similar ranking and job descriptions over the years, always received a higher salary than the complainant by at least $5,000; (ii) removing complainant’s name from the list of attendees to the Perth Conference of the Institute of Quarrying; (iii) not giving her the opportunity to relieve her line manager from his duties during his absence and giving this task to J.; (iv) deciding not to give her the task of delivering a presentation even though she was the project coordinator and instead giving it to J.; (v) placing J. on the Archipegalo Project and denying complainant’s request for leave time; and (vi) selecting J. to conduct a computer training when complainant had expertise in the area. The complainant suffered from emotional distress and subsequently resigned from her position. The complainant sought compensation for the ongoing financial loss caused by not finding a full-time employment since her resignation. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal did not find discrimination on the part of respondent based on complainant’s allegations, except for two years of salary discrimination. Accordingly, the Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the complainant a compensation sum for the difference in the salaries within 30 days.

The respondent was employed as an apprentice by the first appellant, the second appellant was her supervisor, and the third, fourth, and fifth appellants were her co-apprentices. Over the course of the respondent’s employment with the first appellant, she was subject to unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment by the third, fourth, and fifth appellants (among others). The complaint by the respondent included her receiving sexual comments and unequal treatment by her superiors and co-workers because she was a female, and many of her peers told her that she was not fit for her job because she was a female. Examples of these acts were a display of pictures and posters of half-dressed women in various parts of the workplace, addressing the respondent in the presence of others at a training with inappropriate comments, not giving the respondent the same work opportunities as her male peers, and providing her with unfavourable report cards that included clear comments against her as a female. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal in the first instance found that the first appellant was negligent in providing the proper training to its employees on anti-discrimination and sexual harassment at the work place, subsequently allowing the other appellants to act in a discriminatory way towards the respondent because of her gender. Since these are considered unlawful acts under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, the Tribunal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent compensation for damages caused by discrimination and sexual harassment. The appellants’ filed this appeal objecting to the Tribunal’s findings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the orders of the Tribunal.

The policy and practice of the New South Wales Department of Education and Training restricted pay scales of temporary teachers to level 8, which excluded temporary staff from the highest level of pay. The applicants, 13 female temporary teachers, sued, arguing that only permanent staff had access to the highest pay rates and that there was a gender imbalance between permanent and temporary teachers. Of the 13 female teachers, 11 took temporary rather than permanent positions due to family responsibilities and two applied for permanent positions, but those two, due to family reasons, limited the areas in which they could work. The court considered that making over-award payments to only women would be discriminatory against men, whereas the second option of making over-award payments to those who had family commitments would be difficult to formulate and to apply in practice. As such, the court held that there was no indirect discrimination.

The plaintiff in this action was an elected councilor in the municipality of Tolata. She was forced to sign a letter of resignation under pressure from a group of intruders who had entered the session room of the municipal building. The plaintiff alleged that her rights relating to legal security in the exercise of a public function under Articles 46 and 144 of the constitution were violated and sought constitutional protection and the return to the office of municipal councilor of Tolata. The Constitutional Tribunal granted these requests.

La demandante en esta acción era un concejal electo en el municipio de Tolata. Se vio obligada a firmar una carta de renuncia bajo la presión de un grupo de intrusos que habían entrado en la sala de sesiones del edificio municipal. La demandante alegó que sus derechos relacionados con la seguridad jurídica en el ejercicio de una función pública en virtud de los Artículos 46 y 144 de la constitución fueron violados y solicitó protección constitucional y el regreso a la oficina del concejal municipal de Tolata. El Tribunal Constitucional concedió estas solicitudes.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for infringing upon her right to employment equality. The plaintiff alleged that the online advertisement posted by the defendants, to which Liang responded, required kitchen apprentices to be “men between the ages of 18 and 25.” The plaintiff further alleged that when she went to the restaurant, the receptionist informed her of the restaurant’s policy that “all employees in the kitchen should be men, even if a woman possesses the qualifications of a chef.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ behavior violates Articles XII and XIII of the People’s Republic of China’s Employment Law, which provide that potential employees should not be discriminated against on the bases of ethnicity, race, sex, and religious beliefs. As relief, the plaintiff requested (1) an official apology from the defendants; (2) 21 Chinese yuan in damages for costs incurred by responding to the advertisement; and (3) 40,800 Chinese yuan in damages for emotional distress. The court of first instance held that the defendants’ actions constituted gender-based discrimination against the plaintiff. However, it found insufficient evidence for the plaintiff’s emotional distress and awarded 2,000 Chinese yuan in damages. It also denied Liang’s request for an official apology. Both the plaintiff and defendants appealed. Relying on the explicit requirement in the advertisement and the receptionist’s explanations that the candidate be a man, the Intermediate People’s Court held that the defendants’ exclusion based on the plaintiff’s gender was unlawful and unreasonable and constituted gender-based employment discrimination. With respect to relief, the Intermediate People’s Court held that under the Supreme People’s Court’s interpretations, emotional distress normally should not be compensated in monetary terms unless there are severe consequences. The Intermediate People’s Court held that compensation of 2,000 Chinese yuan was within the discretion of the lower court, and thus upheld the amount. The Intermediate People’s Court, however ordered the defendants to issue an official apology to the plaintiff in newspapers in the Guangzhou area.

就业歧视、性别歧视

原告诉称被告侵犯了她与男子平等的就业权利。原告称自己对被告的网上招聘广告进行了应聘。招聘广告要求厨房学徒须为“男性，18-25岁”。原告称在她去被告酒楼时，被告知公司规定厨房不找女工，即使具备厨师证也不行。原告称被告违反了《中华人民共和国劳动法》第十二条和第十三条的规定。法律规定，劳动者就业，不因民族、种族、性别、宗教信仰不同而受歧视。原告的诉讼请求包括（1）判决被告书面赔礼道歉；（2）判决被告连带赔偿原告因应聘产生的经济损失21元；（3）判决被告赔偿原告精神损害抚慰金40800元。原审法院判决被告的行为构成了对被告的性别歧视，但原告提交的证据不足以支持原告精神损害抚慰金的诉讼请求，并判决被告支付原告经济损失2000元。原审法院还驳回了原告要求被告书面赔礼道歉的诉讼请求。原告与被告均不服原审判决并提起上诉。根据被告招聘广告和前台工作人员对只招聘男性厨师的解释，中级人民法院认定被告对原告进行限制及排斥的行为不具有合法性，并且损害了女性应聘者的就业平等权。就赔偿问题，中级人民法院判决，在最高法院的解释下，因侵权致人精神损害，但未造成严重后果，受害人请求精神损害赔偿的，一般不予支持。原审法院酌情由被告赔偿原告精神损害2000元，属于原审法院自由裁量权范围，中级人民法院予以维持。中级人民法院判决被告向原告作出书面赔礼道歉。

The plaintiff, a female professor sued the defendant, alleging that her salary raises were less than those of comparable male professors in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. At trial, both parties’ experts provided statistical evidence based on multiple regression analyses controlled to eliminate any observed gender disparity, including rank, years of service, division, tenure status, and degrees earned. Both experts found a difference in pay between comparable men and women, but disagreed about the statistical significance of that difference. The District Court for the Southern District of New York entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to make a case for discrimination because she had not identified a specific higher-paid male professor in her department and that she had impermissibly compared herself to a male employee statistical composite rather than an actual male employee. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff had identified a specific male comparator since only two other professors were comparable in each of the five categories identified by the expert witnesses, and one of them was a male professor who received higher pay. The Second Circuit further held that it was proper for the professor to introduce

The plaintiff, the manager of the Tennessee Department of Correction’s Murfreesboro probation office, was fired after an anonymous letter was sent to the department alleging that the office was rife with sexual harassment, creating a hostile work environment. An administrative law judge reviewed the plaintiff’s termination and found it to be warranted. The plaintiff appealed the administrative law judge’s decision to the Davidson County Chancery Court, which affirmed the order. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision, holding in part that the conduct for which he was fired was not protected speech under the First Amendment.

The plaintiff, a 59 year-old male employee, was fired following his failure to disclose documents he received from a customer. He filed suit in the Shelby County Circuit Court alleging both age and sex discrimination in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. He asserted that a female employee in a similar situation was treated more favorably and that the firing was a pretext for replacing him with a younger female employee. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of his employer, and the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed because the plaintiff was neither replaced by a younger female employee nor was he similarly situated to a younger female employee.

The plaintiff was the defendant’s employee. She applied for the position of store manager, but the promotion was given to a younger male employee with less experience. She sued her employer in the Hamilton County Chancery Court alleging sex discrimination and other tort claims. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed and remanded her sex discrimination claims, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was qualified for the store manager position.

The plaintiff worked at-will as a sales representative for the defendant. Shortly after she started working there, she discovered she was pregnant and informed her supervisor. Shortly after that, her supervisor informed her that her yearly salary would be halved, allegedly because she had failed to meet sales quotas. When she contacted the CEO (with whom she had interviewed) about her pay reduction, her supervisor met informed her that it was inappropriate to go over his head. After renegotiating the terms of her employment, her employment was soon terminated, again allegedly for failing to meet sales quotas. The plaintiff filed suit in the Shelby County Chancery Court for of sex and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed, holding that the defendant did not establish that there were no male comparators that were treated more favorably than the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a sales manager. Another sales manager in her office sexually harassed her verbally and physically. He repeatedly made sexually explicit comments towards her and grabbed her buttocks on one occasion. The plaintiff sued in the Hamilton County Circuit Court, alleging sexual harassment and constructive discharge in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”). The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, and the Court of Appeals of Tennessee affirmed, finding that the employer took reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment.

The plaintiff was the co-manager of a Save-A-Lot grocery store in Memphis, where her immediate supervisor sexually harassed her daily and threatened to kill her if she reported the harassment. She reported him and transferred to another store, but suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and other psychological problems for which she sought medical treatment. She filed a complaint for workers compensation, which is at issue in this appeal, as well as a claim in federal court for sexual harassment in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Shelby County Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer on her worker’s compensation claim, finding that that her injuries did not arise out of her employment. The Special Workers Compensation Appeals Panel reversed and remanded, but the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Panel’s ruling, holding that her employment was not the “but for” cause of her injuries.

The plaintiff sued her former supervisor and former employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress due to her supervisor’s harassment, which consisted of sexist and belittling remarks over an extended period of time. The lower courts held that her claim was barred by the Virginia’s Workers Compensation Act, which supplies remedied for injuries by accident, arising out of and in, the course of the employment or occupational disease but excluded any other remedies for such injuries. The issue before the Court was whether a pattern of harassment constituted the type of injury for which a lawsuit had to be filed under the Workers Compensation Act only. In reversing the lower courts’ decision, the court overruled its prior decision in Haddon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 389 S.E.2d 712 (Va. 1990), which held that a pattern of sexual harassment constituted an “injury by accident” and thus could only be brought under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Court reasoned that Haddon was irreconcilable with long-established precedent holding that a “gradually incurred” injury over an extended period of time did not constitute an “injury by accident” and was thus not covered by the Act’s exclusion of other remedies. The Court’s decision allowed for a tort cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a pattern of sexual harassment in the workplace.

The plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging wrongful termination because she refused her supervisor’s request for unmarried sex in violation of a statute that proscribed fornication. The plaintiff alleged that her supervisor also made frequent lewd requests and comments when he was alone with her as well as suggestive gestures and inquiries concerning her romantic life. After plaintiff played secret recordings of these conversations to human resources she was terminated without explanation. The issue before the court was whether termination for refusing to engage in unmarried sex could be the basis of a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim, the court reasoned that a public policy argument cannot be based on an unconstitutional statute. Further, that a statute that sought to regulate private consensual sexual activity between adults was unconstitutional. Here, plaintiff could not base her claim on the statute that forbade unmarried sex because such a statute sought to regulate private consensual activity between adults and was therefore unconstitutional. This case is significant because the court reached this conclusion even though the conduct at issue was economically coercive and the same alleged facts could arguably have supported a wrongful discharge claim based on statutes concerning gender discrimination or “criminal acts” of “adultery and lewd and lascivious cohabitation,” statutes, which the court did not purport to overrule.

The petitioner claimed that she was terminated from her position because she confronted a male vice president about his repeated lunch invitations to two female employees outside his department. The Texas Supreme court held that no reasonable person could have believed the invitations gave rise to an actionable sexual harassment claim. Accordingly, the Court held the petitioner did not engage in a protected activity under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act when she confronted the vice president about his behavior. The Court reversed the lower court and dismissed the claim.

The plaintiff-appellant, who worked for General Motors for more than 30 years, sued the company for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming that she experienced a hostile work environment and retaliation. She alleged that she suffered a variety of sexually harassing comments, as well as other slights such as being the only employee denied a break and the only employee without a key to the office. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer on both her hostile work environment and retaliation claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim, but reversed and remanded the lower court’s ruling on her hostile work environment claim, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her allegations were sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to violate Title VII.

The plaintiff-appellant, a trans (“a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual”) police officer, applied to be promoted to sergeant within the Cincinnati Police Department. The plaintiff passed the sergeants exam but failed a rigorous training program and was denied promotion. The plaintiff sued the City of Cincinnati, alleging that the denial of her promotion was due to sex-based discrimination and failure to conform to male sex stereotypes, such as wearing makeup, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $320,511 as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff met all four requirements of a claim of sex discrimination: that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, that she applied and was qualified for a promotion, that she was considered for and denied a promotion, and that other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions.

After the plaintiff-appellant, a theater professional who was openly homosexual, complained that a coworker had threatened him based on his sexual orientation and a union hiring hall of which the plaintiff was a member refused to provide him with work. Gilbert sued his union and a collection of various employers, alleging, among other claims, discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court observed that, while Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, and that this prohibition includes “sex stereotyping” whereby a plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action due to his or her nonconformity with gender stereotypes. The court held that Gilbert had not plead a sex stereotyping claim since other than his sexual orientation, the plaintiff fit every male stereotype, and sexual orientation did not suffice to obtain recovery under Title VII: “[f]or all we know,” the Court stated, “Gilbert fits every ‘male stereotype’ save one—sexual orientation—and that does not suffice to obtain relief under Title VII.”

The plaintiff-appellant, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, initiated sexual harassment and retaliation claims under Title VII against New Breed Logistics, the defendant, on behalf of three employees. The plaintiff alleged that Calhoun, a supervisor at New Breed sexually harassed three female employees and then retaliated against the women after they complained. The plaintiff further alleged that Calhoun retaliated against a male employee who verbally objected to Calhoun’s harassment of the women. The evidence presented to the district court that showed that each woman communicated her intent to complain about Calhoun’s sexual harassment shortly after which all three women were fired or transferred. One of the women lodged a complaint through the company’s complaint line but the company asked Calhoun five questions about his conduct and determined there was no misconduct. A jury found the defendant liable under Title VII for Calhoun’s sexual harassment and retaliation, and the district court denied the defendant’s post-trial motions for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law. The district court determined that complaints to management and informal protests were protected activities under Title VII. Therefore, the three employees’ demand that Calhoun stop harassing them were considered protected activity under Title VII, and retaliation constituted a violation of Title VII. The defendant appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of its post-trial motions. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions, finding that sufficient evidence supported the district court’s rulings and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when providing instructions to the jury.

The plaintiff-appellant worked as a mental health technician for the defendant, Detroit Receiving Hospital’s Mental Health Crisis Center. Her duties included assisting registered nurses with treating psychiatric patients. A few days after assisting a nurse with the mistaken discharge of a patient who should not have been discharged, the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, even though she consistently received high ratings on her performance evaluations. The plaintiff sued the defendant for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, in part because two men committed “nearly identical” infractions of “comparable seriousness” and were not terminated like the plaintiff. The appellate court remanded the case for trial proceedings.

The respondent was charged with two counts of sexual harassment of female coworkers and with the verbal abuse of another female coworker. His employer (the “company”) found that he had violated the company’s policies and fired him. The respondent brought a claim for wrongful termination to the Office of the Labour Commissioner, and the dispute was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator found in favor of the respondent and ordered the company to reinstate him and pay him N$102,000 in lost wages. The company appealed the decision to the courts. The judge overturned the arbitrator’s decision, finding that he overlooked numerous relevant facts in making his conclusions, which “no reasonable court or tribunal court have reached.” The court held that the company acted appropriately in terminating the respondent’s employment because sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace are serious offenses that create obstacles to equality in employment.

On July 6, 2016, the plaintiff notified the defendant-employer of her pregnancy and intention to take maternity leave. As of the date of notification, the plaintiff held a temporary executive position. On July 11, 2016, the defendant notified the plaintiff that her temporary designation as an executive was of no effect. The defendant subsequently provided a maternity compensation package beginning on the date her temporary designation was revoked, but it did not reflect her higher earnings as a temporary executive. The court of first instance granted the plaintiff maternity leave at a salary corresponding (1) to her executive status as from the date she provided notice until 30 days before the probable date of birth and (2) to her non-executive status during the 100 days following the birth of the plaintiff’s child. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the trial court’s ruling denying her executive pay for the 100-day period following the birth of her child, while the defendant challenged the trial court’s ruling granting the plaintiff executive pay from the date of notice of her pregnancy because of the subsequent cancellation of the plaintiff’s executive status on July 11, 2016. The appellate court found in favor of the plaintiff, noting that (1) the Argentine Constitution provides for the full protection of women during pregnancy and breastfeeding, (2) the International Treaty for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (to which Argentina is a signatory) requires the adoption of laws that prevent discrimination based on marriage or pregnancy, and (3) the failure to award the plaintiff maternity compensation corresponding to her executive status would result in a failure to ensure employment stability. The appellate court ruled against the plaintiff’s request to return to her executive position following maternity leave on the basis that the designation was temporary in nature and that laws protecting women during maternity leave cannot alter the fundamental nature of the relationship prior to maternity.

El 6 de julio de 2016, la demandante notificó a su empleador que estaba embarazada y que tenía intención de tomar la baja por maternidad. En la fecha de notificación, la demandante ocupaba un cargo ejecutivo temporal. El 11 de julio de 2016, el empleador notificó a la demandante que su designación temporal como ejecutiva no surtía efecto. Adicionalmente, el empleador le proporcionó un paquete de compensación por maternidad a partir de la fecha en que se revocó su designación temporal, pero este no reflejaba sus mayores ingresos como ejecutiva temporal. El Juzgado de Primera Instancia otorgó a la demandante licencia de maternidad con un salario correspondiente (1) a su condición de ejecutiva a partir de la fecha de notificación hasta 30 días antes de la fecha probable de nacimiento y (2) a su condición de no ejecutiva durante el 100 días después del nacimiento del hijo del demandante. La demandate apeló esta decisión, citando como error del tribunal de primera instancia el que se le negara la paga ejecutiva durante el período de 100 días después del nacimiento de su hijo. El empleador discutió que la orden inicial le otorgaba a la demandante paga ejecutiva desde la fecha de notificación de su embarazo debido a la subsiguiente cancelación de la condición de ejecutivo de la demandante el 11 de julio de 2016. El tribunal de apelaciones decidió a favor de la demandante, señalando que (1) la Constitución Argentina prevé la protección total de la mujer durante el embarazo y la lactancia, (2) el Tratado Internacional para la Eliminación de todas las formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (de la cual Argentina es signataria) requiere la adopción de leyes que prevengan la discriminación por matrimonio o embarazo, y (3) la falta de adjudicación a la demandante de una compensación por maternidad correspondiente a su condición de ejecutiva sería resultar en un fracaso para asegurar la estabilidad del empleo. El tribunal de apelación decidió en contra de la solicitud de la demandante de regresar a su puesto ejecutivo después de la licencia de maternidad sobre la base de que la designación era de carácter temporal y que las leyes que protegen a las mujeres durante la licencia de maternidad no pueden alterar la naturaleza fundamental de la relación antes de la maternidad.

An employer fired a woman after learning of her intention to start an assisted reproduction process. The local court and the court of appeal stated that such dismissal was substantially due to gender discrimination against the employee who wanted to start the assisted reproduction process. Such decisions were challenged by the employer who argued that the dismissal of the employee was not connected to any gender discrimination but rather to the absences for illness that would have affected the efficient management of the work. The Italian Supreme Court confirmed that the dismissal was null and void due to a gender discrimination, irrespective of the fact that the assisted reproduction process had been commenced or not and sentenced the employer re-hire the employee and to pay her the relevant salaries as if she had never been fired.

Un datore di lavoro aveva licenziato una donna dopo aver appreso della sua intenzione di iniziare un processo di riproduzione assistita. Il Tribunale e la Corte d’Appello avevano stabilito che tale licenziamento era sostanzialmente dovuto alla discriminazione di genere contro la dipendente che voleva iniziare il processo di riproduzione assistita. Tali decisioni erano state contestate dal datore di lavoro che aveva sostenuto che il licenziamento della dipendente non era legato ad alcuna discriminazione di genere, ma piuttosto alle assenze per malattia che avrebbero influenzato la gestione efficiente del lavoro. La Corte di Cassazione italiana ha confermato che il licenziamento era nullo a causa di una discriminazione di genere, indipendentemente dal fatto che il processo di riproduzione assistita fosse stato avviato o meno e ha condannato il datore di lavoro a riassumere la dipendente e a pagarle il rilevante stipendio come se non fosse stata licenziata.

The Defendant regularly verbally abused his wife (the victim) shouting at her, insulting and cursing her, demeaning her status and causing her deep embarrassment at in front of other employees. The Defendant also joked that he should just divorce the victim and get a new younger wife instead. These verbal abuses were not isolated incidents. The court viewed them as a form of psychological abuse which resulted in psychological suffering, a deep sense of helplessness, and the victim experiencing fear, losing confidence, and losing the will to act. The court found that the Defendant was guilty of domestic violence under Article 45 of Law No. 23 2004 and sentenced the Defendant to seven months imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of raping a 16-year-old female colleague and was sentenced to eight years in prison. The Court of Appeal granted a retrial because the trial court had “erred in failing to give a proper/adequate direction to the jury.” Under Section 92(3)(a) of Belize’s Evidence Act, a trial court has discretion to “warn the jury of the special need for caution” where the only evidence against a person charged with rape is the word of the victim. Where a judge exercises such discretion, he or she must provide the reasons for cautioning the jury. The trial judge did caution the jury in the case, but the Court of Appeal found he had erred by not warning the jury that the complainant had lied during her testimony and by not pointing out the complainant’s admission that she had been raped was made only after being threatened by her father. The Court of Appeal also found that the trial judge should have warned the jury that the complainant “may have had some kind of relationship with the Appellant.”

The Plaintiff was employed as secretary of the Director by the Defendant in 2001. In February 2002, the Plaintiff suffered a threatened miscarriage, and was admitted to the hospital several times thereafter. From June to August 2012, she took sick leave frequently for treatment of her pregnancy complications. During that period, a permanent secretary was hired by the Defendant. The Plaintiff returned to work after expiry of her maternity leave in November 2012 as agreed with the Defendant, but was moved to a new work station which was not properly equipped, and was not given her original duties. Shortly after she resumed her work after maternity leave, she was dismissed by the Defendant. She sued the Defendant for her dismissal on the grounds of discrimination due to pregnancy, family status and victimization. The Court applied the “but for” and “less favorable treatment” test, and held that the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove discrimination on a balance of probabilities – once the Plaintiff can show that a possibility of discrimination can be inferred from the primary facts, the Court will look to the employer for an explanation, with which or if such explanation is not enough, the Court will infer the existence of discrimination. Based on the facts and evidence in this case, the Court found that the Plaintiff has established the primary facts on her claims on the grounds of discrimination due to pregnancy and family status, and found that the Defendant failed to establish the unsatisfactory performance of the Plaintiff and there were no significant enough reasons for the Defendant to dismiss the Plaintiff. On a balance of probabilities, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff was dismissed because of her pregnancy and family status, and held the Defendant liable. Damages for injury to feelings and loss of income were awarded to the Plaintiff.

The plaintiff, Helen Tsang, was employed by Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. (“Cathay”) as a flight attendant in 1979. According to the retirement policy at the time of her employment contract, the retirement age for a female attendant was 40, while the retirement age for a male attendant was 55. Ms. Tsang was required to retire in 1992 when she reached 40. Cathay offered consecutive one year extensions of her employment thereafter till 1997 when she reached the age of 45. During that period, Cathay adopted a new retirement policy in 1993, which changed the retirement age of both the female and male cabin crew to the age of 45 and provided that female employees already on extension may choose to further extend the employment with Cathay till the age of 45 if Cathay agreed so. After 1997 (when Ms. Tsang was 45), Cathay did not offer Ms. Tsang any extension of her employment. Ms. Tsang sued Cathay alleging that the retirement policy implemented by Cathay was discriminatory and that she was discriminated on the ground of her sex. The court held that it constituted direct sex discrimination against Ms. Tsang because a male employee in the similar situation would be in a much better position than Ms. Tsang as he would have been entitled to remain employed with Cathay until the age of 55, or would at least have had the option to retire at 45 if he chose so and would have received more favorable benefits than Ms. Tsang had. In reaching such conclusion, the court upheld the view that the employment contract does not form the basis of a discriminatory claim and the discrimination is continuing and actionable if the discriminatory policy has been in place and implemented during subsequent extension(s) of employment.

The claimant accompanied one of respondents, a co-worker “J.”, on a work-related trip. Throughout the business trip, J. made sexual innuendos towards the claimant and when his advances failed, he physically beat her. He booked a single hotel room, while the claimant believed she would have her own room. As a result, the claimant was forced to sleep on the floor and returned to Kenya two days later, while J. continued to the conference. Upon the claimant’s return, she received multiple threatening emails from J. and her employment was terminated as of May 24, 2010 for alleged “misconduct” for not travelling to the conference. Her salary for May was unpaid. Although there were numerous legal issues decided in this case, including jurisdiction, the key issue was whether the claimant was subjected to gender-based discrimination and thus unlawfully terminated, and what, if any, entitlement is due to her. The Industrial Court determined that J.’s conduct toward the claimant, no matter where it had occurred, clearly amounted to gender-based violence against an employee, and that his conduct “had the effect of nullifying or impairing the equality of opportunity or treatment in employment, based on her sex.” The Industrial Court awarded P total compensation of Kshs 3,240,000, which included general damages for sexual harassment, and unfair and wrongful termination of Kshs 3,000,000. This case is important to demonstrate Kenyan courts afford protection against sexual violence in multiple ways, including equal opportunity and human rights legislation, labor legislation, civil remedies and criminal law. In addition to Kenyan employment law, the Industrial Court also relied on the 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, the International Labour Organization, as well as other forms of jurisprudence to support eradicating violence and sexual discrimination against women in the workplace. The decision noted that while the Constitution of Kenya was not yet in effect and thus not directly applicable when the case was tried, Articles 1, 3 and 5 of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights were included in the Kenyan Constitution and thus were applicable at the time the case occurred.

The respondent was employed by the appellant to bottle Aquelle spring water. The appellant’s plant was located on property belonging to a religious mission, and to gain access to the workplace, the appellant’s employees had to cross the mission’s property. The mission’s security guards were instructed to bar entry to any persons who did not comply with its code of conduct; one provision, for example, prohibited “amorous relationships between any two persons outside of marriage”. The respondent and a colleague were denied access because they became pregnant outside of marriage. Consequently, the respondent and her colleague were not able to access the workplace, as they were refused access to the mission’s property. They were subsequently fired. The court ruled that the dismissal of the respondent employee was automatically unfair because she had been dismissed for her pregnancy. The court noted that all persons have a constitutional right to equality. Discriminatory dismissals, such as this one, are accordingly automatically unfair and higher compensation is allowed in such cases. Employers are obliged to avoid discriminating against employees directly or indirectly ̶ protection against being discriminated against on the ground of pregnancy is not a preserve of married women. An agreement that denies pregnant employees access to the workplace is accordingly prima facie unenforceable unless it can be justified on grounds consistent with constitutional norms. The mission’s code of conduct interfered with the employment relationship between the appellant and its employees and created a situation in which breaches could lead to dismissal. Such provisions blurred the line between the appellant’s terms and conditions of employment and the mission’s code. That the employee was not a party to the mission’s code proved decisive. As lessee, the appellant had legal remedies to compel the mission to allow full use and enjoyment of the leased property. The appellant’s faint plea of operational necessity could not serve as a defense because it had failed to exercise its rights as lessee to protect its pregnant employees. The employee had tendered her services, and the appellant’s refusal to accept the tender constituted a breach of contract. The court further held that the appellant’s acquiescence in the mission’s discriminatory practice of barring unwed pregnant women from the leased premises violated the appellant’s constitutional duty to treat its employees fairly and was a breach of its common law duty to accept the employees into service. The court, therefore, confirmed that the employee had been dismissed and that her dismissal was automatically unfair. The court also confirmed the remedy of 12 months’ compensation.

Die respondent is in die diens van die appêlant om Aquelle water te bottel. Die appêlant se aanleg was op eiendom wat aan 'n godsdienstige sending behoort, en om toegang tot die werksplek te verkry, moes die appêlant se werknemers die sending se eiendom oorsteek. Die sending se sekuriteitswagte is opdrag gegee om toegang te verbied aan enige persone wat nie aan hul gedragskode voldoen het nie; een bepaling, byvoorbeeld, het "verliefde verhoudings tussen enige twee persone buite die huwelik" verbied. Die respondent en 'n kollega is toegang geweier omdat hulle buite die huwelik swanger geraak het. Gevolglik was die respondent en haar kollega nie in staat om toegang tot die werksplek te verkry nie. Aangesien hulle toegang tot die missie se eiendom geweier is is hulle is daarna afgedank. Die hof het beslis dat die ontslag van die respondent werknemer outomaties onregverdig was omdat sy vir haar swangerskap ontslaan is. Die hof het kennis geneem dat alle persone 'n grondwetlike reg tot gelykheid het. Diskriminerende afdankings, soos hierdie een, is dienooreenkomstig outomaties onregverdig en hoër vergoeding word toegelaat in sulke gevalle. Werkgewers is verplig om te verhoed dat daar diskriminasie is teen werknemers, direk of indirek - beskerming teen diskriminasie op die grond van swangerskap is nie 'n bewaar van getroude vrouens nie. 'n ooreenkoms wat verwagtende werknemers se toegang tot die werksplek ontken is gevolglik prima facie-onafdwingbaar tensy dit geregverdig kan word op grond wat met grondwetlike norme bestaanbaar is. Die sending se gedragskode het met die werksverhouding tussen die appêlant en sy werknemers ingemeng en 'n situasie geskep waarin oortredings tot ontslag kan lei. Sodanige bepalings vervaag die lyn tussen die appêlant se bepalings en voorwaardes van indiensneming en die sending se kode. Dat die werknemer nie 'n party tot die sending se kode was nie, was beslissend. As huurder het die appêlant regsmiddels gehad om die sending te dwing om volle gebruik en genot van die gehuurde eiendom toe te laat. Die appêlant se dowwe pleidooi van operasionele noodsaaklikheid kon nie dien as 'n verdediging nie omdat dit versuim het om sy regte as huurder om sy swanger werknemers te beskerm uit te oefen. Die werknemer het haar dienste aangebied, en die appêlant se weiering om die aanbod te aanvaar het 'n skending van die kontrak saamgestel. Die hof het verder bevind dat die appêlant se vrywaring in die diskriminerende praktyk van die missie om ongewenste swanger vroue van die gehuurde perseel te belet. Die appellant se grondwetlike plig om sy werknemers billik te behandel is geskend en dat dit ‘n oortreding van sy gemeenregtelike plig was om die werknemers in diens te neem. Die hof het dus bevestig dat die werknemer ontslaan is en dat haar ontslag outomaties onregverdig was. Die hof het ook die regsmiddel van 12 maande se vergoeding bevestig.

The appellee, a former employee of the appellant’s subsidiary, suffered sexual harassment and stalking from an employee of the appellant’s other subsidiary who shared the same work site with the appellee. The appellant had developed a corporate-group-wide compliance system, which included a consulting desk at which an employee of the appellant or its subsidiaries could raise and discuss any compliance-related matters. The appellee brought the harassment issue to her supervisors at her immediate employer (i.e. the appellant’s subsidiary) twice, but sufficient solutions were not provided, following which she left the company without bringing the issues to the consulting desk. The stalking continued even after her resignation, so her former colleague who still worked at the appellant's subsidiary brought the issue before the appellant through the consulting desk, but it did not provide sufficient solutions either. The question brought before the Supreme Court was whether the appellant (i.e. a parent company of her former immediate employer) bore the duties based on the principle of good faith to provide certain protective measures to the appellant because it had developed the corporate-group-wide compliance system. The Supreme Court found that the appellant was not imposed with such duties in light of particular facts in the case since the appellant did not bring the harassment issue to the consulting desk during her employment. However, in dicta, the Court stated that a parent company, depending on particular facts of the case, can be responsible for providing sufficient solutions to an employee of its subsidiary who is a victim of sexual harassment––failure of which would result in liability for damage based on the principle of good faith––if the parent company provides a system through which the employee could, and actually did, bring an issue of sexual harassment to the parent company’s attention.

上告人の子会社の元契約社員である被上告人は、同じ事業場内で就労していた他の子会社の従業員からセクシャル・ハラスメントやストーカー行為を受けていた。被上告人は、直属の勤務先（上告人の子会社）の上司にこの問題に関して二度相談したが、問題が十分に解決されなかったため、上告人が設置していたグループ会社内全体の社員が事業場内に関する事項を相談できるコンプライアンス相談窓口に相談することなく退職した。その後も被上告人に対するストーカー行為が継続していたため、上告人の子会社に勤務していた被上告人の元同僚は、被上告人のため、上告人の設置したコンプライアンス相談窓口に相談した。しかし、それでも問題は解決されなかった。最高裁では、コンプライアンス相談窓口を設置していたことを理由に、上告人が信義則に基づき一定の付随義務を負うか否かが問題となった。被上告人が在職中にハラスメント問題を相談窓口に申し出なかったことと、本件の特殊な事実関係に照らして、最高裁は上告人が雇用契約上の付随義務を負わないことを確認した。一方で、本件判決は、子会社の従業員がセクシャルハラスメントに遭った際、問題を親会社の相談窓口への申出ることができ、その申出の具体的状況によって、親会社が申出をした者に対し、申出に係る相談の内容等に応じて適切に対応すべき信義則上の義務を負う場合があると判示した。

ADEQUATE DEFENSE OF PREGNANT WOMEN IN LABOR MATTERS. PREGNANT WOMEN ARE CONSIDERED A VULNERABLE GROUP AND THEREFORE THE JUDGE SHALL RULE BASED ON A GENDER PERSPECTIVE.

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on all cases resolved by such tribunal. In addition, such criteria issued may be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. The labor law states that every person shall have an appropriate defense. In addition, this right acquires different considerations when the claimant is a pregnant woman. Historically, women in Mexico have been fired solely for being pregnant. Pregnant women are consequently considered a vulnerable group. Therefore, this isolated thesis requires the courts to inform the claimant of her right to have an attorney, and in those cases where the claimant cannot afford one, the court shall appoint one for her. (Amparo Directo Laboral: http://sise.cjf.gob.mx/SVP/word1.aspx?arch=484/04840000187544100005005.d...)

DEFENSA ADECUADA DE LAS MUJERES EMBARAZADAS EN ASUNTOS LABORALES. LAS MUJERES EMBARAZADAS SON CONSIDERADAS EN UN GRUPO VULNERABLE Y, POR LO TANTO, EL JUEZ REGIRÁ BASADO EN UNA PERSPECTIVA DE GÉNERO.

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son vinculantes para todos los casos resueltos por dicho tribunal. Además, los criterios emitidos pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. La ley laboral establece que cada persona tendrá una defensa apropiada. Además, este derecho adquiere diferentes consideraciones cuando el reclamante es una mujer embarazada. Históricamente, las mujeres en México han sido despedidas de sus empleos por estar embarazadas. En consecuencia, las mujeres embarazadas son consideradas un grupo vulnerable. Por lo tanto, esta tesis aislada requiere que los tribunales informen al reclamante de su derecho a tener un abogado, y en aquellos casos en que el reclamante no pueda pagar uno, el tribunal le asignará uno.

This legal advisory opinion found that a divorced woman is not entitled to the typical social allowance provided to married individuals by their employers. The woman, unnamed in the opinion, applied for the allowance because she has custody of her minor son. The opinion states that the allowance can be only provided to married women with children whose husband is unemployed, jobless, or incapacitated. A divorced woman cannot benefit from this support even if she is the sole custodian of her child. Nonetheless, this Advisory Opinion requests that the Qatar Legislator revisit this situation a “with a view to cure the unreasonable position of a divorcee employee who has children, because her situation resembles the situation of a widow in jurisprudence.”

Quijote, S.R.L., (the “Company”) fired the plaintiff while she was pregnant. The Labor Appeals Court (the “Court”) found that the firing was illegal because the law seeks to protect pregnant women, and though the medical certificate is a guarantee for the employer, it is not a requirement. The Court ordered the company to reinstate the plaintiff to her position and pay her lost wages. The Company challenged the court order in 1993, but the Supreme Court dismissed the challenge as an unconstitutional action in 1995. Consequently, the Labor Appeals Court ruling remained in effect.

Quijote, S.R.L., (la “Compañía”) despidió a la demandante mientras estaba embarazada. La Corte de Apelaciones Laborales (la “Corte”) determinó que el despido era ilegal porque la ley busca proteger a las mujeres embarazadas y, aunque el certificado médico es una garantía para el empleador, no es un requisito. El Tribunal ordenó a la empresa que reinstalara a la demandante en su puesto y le pagara su salario perdido. La Compañía impugnó la orden judicial en 1993, pero la Corte Suprema desestimó la impugnación como una acción inconstitucional en 1995. En consecuencia, la sentencia de la Corte de Apelaciones Laborales se mantuvo vigente.

The Labor Court of Ghent referred a number of prejudicial questions to the Constitutional Court in the context of a dispute between a woman who claimed that her employer dismissed her after having requested maternity leave, parental leave and the continuation of a related “time credit” contract. The Labor Court agreed that the company had not provided justification for the dismissal, but had questions about how to calculate the indemnity. The applicant claimed it should be calculated on the basis of full-time employment. The Constitutional Court, however, ruled that reducing an employee’s benefits proportionally for part-time workers (which disproportionately affects women) was not a form of discrimination as the regime applies equally to men and women.

On appeal of a judgment of a lower court, the Labor Court ruled that the protection of women from being fired by an employer for reasons related to their pregnancy (including pregnancy-related absences/illnesses) also applies during the trial period, regardless of legislation permitting employers to fire employees during their trial period when absent for a period exceeding seven days. As a result, a pregnant employee may only be fired during the pregnancy-related protection period (i.e., from the moment the employer is notified of the pregnancy until one month following the legal post-natal maternity leave) if the employer can prove that the laying-off is due to reasons unrelated to the pregnancy. In case of doubt, the court will rule in favor of the employee.

The Plaintiffs, Ms. Stanley (case available here) and Ms. Poppy, each claimed that their employer discriminated against them due to their pregnancies. Both were made redundant from the same organization while on parental leave, about two years apart. Both of the Plaintiffs’ positions were eliminated by their employer due to a reorganization of the employer’s management structure. In both cases, the Plaintiffs’ absence from work caused their employer to conclude that their positions were no longer required. In particular, when Stanley and Poppy went on parental leave, their job duties were redistributed to colleagues. This caused their employer to decide that Stanley and Poppy’s positions were redundant. In both cases, the Federal Court found that the employer would not have restructured its management in this way if the Plaintiffs had not taken maternity leave. Because the restructuring involved only those employees working at the time it occurred, the fact that the Plaintiffs were on maternity leave (and thus not present) disadvantaged them. However, the Federal Court found that Plaintiffs’ dismissals did not constitute discrimination because neither Plaintiff could show that the employer treated them any differently than it would an employee who was not pregnant or on leave in similar circumstances.

Two former employees of the defendant were subjected to repeated instances of sexual harassment by the clinic’s patients. The employees alleged that they complained to the defendant about the conduct, but he failed to take any corrective action. They filed suit in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas alleging sexual harassment. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, holding that Ohio law did not recognize such a claim based on the conduct of non-employees. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, holding that Ohio Civil Rights law does permit courts to impose liability on employers for non-employees’ sexual harassment at the place of employment.

Marilyn Payton worked for Receivables Outsourcing for six weeks, during which time she was sexually harassed by a fellow employee who was assigned to train her at her new job. The harassment consisted of inappropriate comments until one day the coworker pulled up to her car as she was driving away from work, asked her to roll down her window, and then offered her ten dollars to perform a sex act. She complained to her manager that she felt unsafe, and the manager said he would “take care of it.” When she returned to work to find the manager not there, she informed the company lawyer of the harassment and left work, stating that she felt unsafe without the manager there. The next day she was fired for leaving work. She filed suit against her employer in the Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas for hostile work environment sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge, but the Court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether the alleged harassment rose to the level of creating a hostile work environment and whether the employer negligently retained the alleged harasser.

The plaintiff -appellant was the “head golf professional” at the Congress Lake Golf Club. Despite her formidable golfing pedigree, the club’s board of directors requested her resignation, ostensibly because of her inability to manage various golf programs. She sued the defendant for sex discrimination in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, finding that there was an issue of fact as to whether the golf club’s proffered legitimate reason for her termination were pretextual.

The plaintiff-appellant worked as an assistant manager of a Valvoline Instant Oil Change branch. She was on track for a promotion but did not pass all the required courses. When she was eight months pregnant, she tripped and fell at work. On the advice of her doctor, she reported the injury to her employer. Later, when she returned form maternity leave, she found the work environment distrusting, and she was often not permitted to take breaks to pump her breast milk for long periods of time. After she failed to follow correct procedures on an oil change, her employment was terminated. She sued Valvoline alleging gender discrimination and retaliation, but the Stark County Court of Common Pleas granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant’s legitimate reason for terminating her employment was not a pretext.

Ginger Mender, who was elected mayor of the Village of Chauncey, alleged that immediately after she took office, the Village conspired to force her to resign. She claimed that Village employees refused her an office, keys to Village buildings, basic office equipment, and disrupted her attempts to speak at Village council meetings with ridicule and laughter. After she refused a request to resign, three different petitions were filed in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. She filed suit for gender discrimination, among other claims, in the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. The defendants argued that the disagreements were not gender discrimination but political power struggles. After a jury trial, the court granted the Village’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals for Ohio affirmed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a prima facie case of gender discrimination; even though her successor was a man and thus outside the protected class, the voters of the Village rather than the Village government itself made the decision regarding her replacement.

The plaintiff-appellant worked as a regional operations director for Total Renal Care, Inc., which operated dialysis centers. The plaintiff received positive reviews by her coworkers and supervisors, but following Total Renal Care’s acquisition, she was transferred to a different group than the one she had previously worked in, which came with a reduced bonus and fewer stock awards. In addition, her employer filled her previous position with a male and promoted another male to a position for which she was potentially eligible. She brought suit in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas for gender discrimination and retaliation, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer. The Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed on all counts except the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim, finding that there was a fact issue as to whether the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action necessary for sustaining a gender discrimination claim.

Jenean McBrearty held an eleven-month tenure-track teaching contract with the Kentucky Community and Technical College System. One of her colleagues recommended that she include an opinion poll in her course materials, but McBrearty declined, and continued to decline when her colleague pressed. After she complained about what she considered to be harassment to her supervisors, she learned that her contract would not be renewed. She filed claims of sex and disability discrimination in the Fayette County Circuit Court, but the court dismissed her claims. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed, holding that she was unable to demonstrate a prima facie case of either form of discrimination.

Connie Withrow was employed as a floater technician at an industrial plant. One day she and a male coworker were assigned to light a furnace, but when they attempted to do so, there was an explosion. When Withrow was fired but her male coworker only received a 30-day suspension, she sued her employer, alleging that she was terminated because of her gender in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Boyd Circuit Court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer, finding that her employer had good cause to terminate her and that she was not similarly situated to her male colleague because she had a different role with more control during the explosion, was uncooperative during the investigation, and had more disciplinary issues on her record. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, though the trial court erred in finding that Withrow was not qualified for her job, her employer’s reason for firing her was not pretextual and that there was no evidence that the decision was based on her gender.

Several Best Buy employees alleged that their supervisor sexually harassed them on three separate occasions. During the ensuing investigation, the three appellant-employees submitted a letter supporting their supervisor and stating that they had never seen him engage in improper conduct. While investigating the supervisor, Best Buy discovered allegations from five other employees that the three appellant-employees had also behaved in sexually inappropriate ways while at work. Best Buy hence suspended them pending an investigation and later terminated their employment after concluding the investigation. The employees brought suit against Best Buy for, among other claims, gender discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Bullitt Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Best Buy, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the employees had not sufficiently established the elements of a prima facie case of either gender discrimination or sexual harassment.

Jacques Ransom was employed at one of several Wendy’s restaurants owned by B.F. South, but quit after one of her coworkers, “T.J.”, made several comments to other coworkers about Ransom’s gender reassignment surgery. When Ransom reported the comments to her supervisor, the store manager, the store and regional mangers met to discuss the situation and transferred T.J. to another Wendy’s location. Ransom was not fired or retaliated against; instead, she was promoted to crew leader and given a raise after lodging her complaint. She filed claims of hostile work environment and retaliation under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Jefferson County Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Ransom’s employer, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the conduct of which Ransom complained did not rise to the level of actionable harassment because no adverse action was taken against her.

Donna Solly was employed as a limited-status teacher at Caldwell Area Technology Center. Her employment was not renewed. The reason her employer gave for her non-renewal was that she had had an affair with a male colleague. Solly filed suit in the Franklin County Circuit Court, alleging sex discrimination. The Circuit Court found in favor of her employer, but the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reversed and remanded, holding that she had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding both that she had not established that her male colleague with whom she had had an affair was not similarly situated, and that her employer’s stated justification for firing her was not pretextual.

Deborah Powell was the women’s basketball coach at Asbury University who brought numerous complaints over several years to the university’s athletic director that the men’s team was receiving preferential treatment. Later, the university placed Powell on administrative leave allegedly for her having an inappropriate relationship with a female assistant coach. Powell brought suit under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act claiming that Asbury discriminated against her based on gender, defamed her, and retaliated against her for her complaints about her team receiving inferior treatment. The Jessamine Circuit Court ruled in Asbury’s favor regarding the discrimination and defamation, but in Powell’s favor on the retaliation claim. Both the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while the school had not engaged in gender discrimination, it had engaged in retaliation against Powell for her complaining about alleged gender discrimination, which is in itself unlawful.

After disclosing her pregnancy to her employers, Pinchback, a correctional officer at a county jail, was terminated. As a reason for the termination, Sheriff O’Loughlin explained that while pregnant, Pinchback could not perform the duties of a correctional officer and was placing her baby’s health in danger. Pinchback petitioned Florida’s Human Rights Commission for relief pursuant to Florida’s Human Rights Act (which is patterned after Title VII). The Sheriff argued that Pinchback’s dismissal was based on the affirmative defense of “bona fide occupational qualification” (“BFOQ”), which requires that the employer demonstrate that the discrimination based on sex, religion, or national origin is “reasonably necessary to the normal operation” of the place of employment. The trial court found that the Sheriff violated Pinchback’s rights, which the appellate court upheld. The Court of Appeal explained that O’Loughlin’s actions were indefensible as there was no evidence that Pinchback (or any pregnant employee) could not perform her work as before. As a result, the court found Pinchback entitled to back pay and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the back pay and benefits award.

A female employee brought suit against her former employer for retaliation and sexual harassment based on claims that, among other things, her supervisor was constantly talking about his penis including graphic descriptions of its size, and his sexual prowess, history, successes, and aspirations. Blizzard did not allege that her supervisor’s comments were directed to her. Instead, she alleged that his comments were pervasive and that the female employees who were receptive to his “management style” received favors and preferences that Blizzard did not. Blizzard’s sexual harassment claim against her employer was based on the employer’s creation of a hostile work environment. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the employer. The appellate court explained that to establish a hostile work environment claim based on harassment by a supervisor, Blizzard was required to show: (1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on her sex, (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that there was a basis for holding the employer liable. Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007), the court found that Blizzard could maintain her claims even though the offensive language and acts at issue were not specifically directed at her and remanded the case for a new trial.

The applicant, Salome Jumbo, claimed she was dismissed as a result of her pregnancy. In 1999, the applicant started as a temporary nurse aid at a clinic and continued in that position until 2001. In 2001, the manager of the clinic assured the applicant that her job had become permanent. On April 4, 2001, the manager discovered that the applicant was pregnant. He immediately warned the applicant that he would not allow her to keep her job if she remained pregnant, as they wanted a permanent nurse aid. The manager also enquired into the applicant’s private affairs and made inappropriate sexual remarks. On June 1, 2001, the manager terminated the applicant’s employment explicitly informing her that her termination was due to her pregnancy. The applicant asked for a reference letter, but the manager refused saying that she was a temporary employee and did not deserve one. The Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (the “Court”) ruled that the termination was contrary to the spirit of the Employment Act and ordered that the clinic immediately re-instate the applicant. The Court found that the respondent specifically violated the applicant’s rights under §31(1) of the Employment Act, which requires employers to provide a reference if the employee requests one on termination of an employment contract. In addition, the respondent violated § 49 (1) of the Employment Act, which dictates that “terminating a woman’s employment because of pregnancy amount[s] to an offence [that is] punishable with a fine of K20,000 and imprisonment of five years” (p. 3). The Court also found that the manager’s inquiries into the applicant’s private affairs with her husband amounted to sexual harassment. This case is notable in Malawi because it set the precedent that inquiring into a married woman’s private affairs with her husband is an unfair labor practice.

The applicant and her husband were both employed by the respondent as an accounts clerk and teacher, respectively. After the applicant’s husband resigned to join the Public Service, the respondent terminated the applicant’s employment contract noting that her employment was tied to her husband’s. The applicant challenged the dismissal alleging that it was invalid. The Industrial Relations Court of Malawi (the “Court”) found that the respondent discriminated against the applicant on the basis of her marital status. The Court reasoned that “the effect of the reason used by the respondent was to prevent the applicant from entering and sustaining an employment contract and pursuing a livelihood in her own right because she was married” (p. 2). In reaching its decision, the Court consulted § 5 of Malawi’s Employment Act and §§ 20, 24(1)(i), 24(2)(b) and 31 of Malawi’s Constitution. The Court held that the applicant’s termination was invalid because the reason for her termination “denied her right to engage in economic activity through employment” and “her right to fair labor practices” (p. 2). Therefore, the applicant’s termination was also prohibited under section 57(3)(a) of Malawi’s Employment Act. The Court awarded the applicant compensation for the unfair dismissal and discrimination.

The plaintiffs were two male employees who had been temporarily suspended from work and demoted from their managerial positions for sexually harassing female employees by making comments of a sexual nature in the office. The plaintiffs sued the company, seeking a declaratory judgment that such disciplinary actions were void because there were no grounds for such actions, and/or the actions were taken abusively. The High Court found for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s judgment, finding that the disciplinary actions taken against the plaintiffs were not an abuse of the company’s right to take action, and that furthermore the actions did not lack objectively reasonable grounds and were appropriate from a general societal perspective. The Supreme Court reasoned that 1) the plaintiffs had repeatedly made obscene or insulting statements to or about the female employees, despite warnings from superiors, 2) the company had distributed guidelines prohibiting sexual harassment and had held a mandatory seminar on sexual harassment, 3) in many cases, employees who experience sexual harassment may not expressly object due to concerns about damaging relationships with colleagues, despite the distress caused by the harassment, and 4) the plaintiffs, who were in managerial positions, should have recognized the policy and attitude of the company on the issue of sexual harassment as a matter of course.

被上告人らは、上告人の男性従業員2人で、オフィスで女性従業員に性的な発言をしてセクシュアル・ハラスメントを行ったとして、一時的な出勤停止と管理職からの降格処分を受けていた。被上告人らが上告人に対し、上記各処分は懲戒事由を欠き又は懲戒権を濫用したものとして無効であり、上記各降格処分もまた無効であるなどと主張して、出勤停止処分の無効確認や各降格処分前の等級を有する地位にあることの確認等を求めた事案である。高裁は被上告人らを支持したが、最高裁は、被上告人らに対する懲戒処分は、会社の懲戒権を濫用したものではなく、また、客観的に合理的な理由を欠くものでもなく、社会通念上相当であると判断し、高裁の判決を破棄した。最高裁は、(1）原告が上司の警告にもかかわらず、女性従業員に対して卑猥な発言や侮辱的な発言を繰り返していたこと、(2）会社がセクシャル・ハラスメントを禁止するガイドラインを配布し、セクシャル・ハラスメントに関するセミナーを義務的に開催していたこと、(3）多くの場合、セクシャルハラスメントを受けた従業員は、苦痛を感じているにもかかわらず、同僚との関係を懸念して、明確にセクシャル・ハラスメントに反対しない場合が多いこと、(4）管理職であった原告らは、セクシャルハラスメントの問題に関する会社の方針・姿勢を当然認識していたはずであることなどを理由に挙げた。

The petitioner received a salary a little over half that of a male employee with the same responsibilities and duties. She sued respondent under the Equal Pay Act (the “EPA”) and Equal Job Opportunities Act (the “EJOA”) and won because the respondent could not justify the discrepancy, though the district labor court also found that the respondent did not have a policy of paying female employees less than male employees. The lower court also determined that the petitioner had a legitimate claim under the EJOA because the respondent violated the EPA. For each violation, the labor court awarded her the difference between her salary and that of her male colleague (NIS 6,944). Each party appealed the damages to the National Labor Court, which held in a split decision that the right to contract trumps the right to equal pay and that an award under the EPA does not necessarily trigger a claim under the EJOA. The majority held that the purpose of the EPA is to compensate an employee for discrepancies in pay between herself and a male colleague who performs the same task in the same workplace while the purpose of the EJOA is to combat discrimination; the former does not require any evidence of discrimination while the latter does, although that discrimination need not be intentional. The High Court of Justice rejected the appellate court’s argument that the right to contract trumps the right to equal pay, calling it “a fig leaf to cover up real discrimination,” but agreed that the EPA and EJOA have different elements, purposes, burdens of proof, and remedies. The High Court held that an employee has the burden of demonstrating discrimination, but that burden shifts to the employer under certain circumstances, like a pay discrepancy. A larger pay discrepancy means a more significant burden for the employer. In this case, the employer had the burden to prove that the petitioner’s lower salary was solely based on her request for a lower salary and not her gender. The High Court held that an employer cannot justify a 35% difference in pay solely based on an employee’s salary request when hired. However, due to her delay in filing, the Court voided the respondents’ damages obligation under the EJOA.

Plaintiff Gonzales was a full-time accountant for the Los Angeles Airport Marriott when she arranged to be a gestational surrogate, due to give birth in April 2014. When the child was born, Plaintiff used her three work breaks to pump breast milk and send it to the child’s family. After two weeks of shipping the milk to the family, Plaintiff continued to lactate for personal health reasons and donated the milk to women’s organizations for mothers who could not breastfeed. Marriot then discontinued her two extra breaks arguing that she was not disabled and not feeding a child at home. Plaintiff sued claiming disparate treatment, sex stereotyping, and failure to make reasonable accommodation to for a condition related to pregnancy. Marriott motioned to dismiss, and the court found that there was a question of fact as to all claims such that the motion to dismiss was denied in whole.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant when she became pregnant with a high-risk pregnancy. Plaintiff told supervisor that she was not strong enough to endure the pregnancy and had several dangerous near-miscarriages. Plaintiff was shortly demoted to a position which included manual labor. After work-related anxiety attacks, she prematurely delivered a son. Plaintiff brought claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, gender discrimination, and pregnancy-related retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as a negligence claim on behalf of her son. Defendant moved to dismiss the claims brought on behalf of Plaintiff’s son. The court determined that children have a right to be born free of prenatal injuries which a breach of duty on the mother’s behalf could foreseeably cause and that a child has a right to recover for injuries obtained prenatally from the negligence of another. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss.

The Cine Costume Make-up Artists and Hair Dressers Association of Mumbai (Association) was registered as a trade union under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The Association’s by-laws prohibited qualified women make-up artists from becoming members of the Association based solely on their sex. Ms. Charu Khurana, a women make-up artist whose application for membership to the Association was rejected, challenged this prohibition on the grounds that it violated several rights under the Indian Constitution, including her rights to equality, to employment, and to a livelihood. Noting that gender justice is integral to the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court struck down the Association’s by-laws as violating Articles 14, 15 and 21. Although the Court acknowledged that fundamental rights in India are enforceable only against the State and its authorities and not against purely private individuals or organizations, it found at the same time that a clause in the by-laws of a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, which is accepted by the Registrar of Trade Unions—a State authority under the Trade Unions Act—cannot violate the Indian Constitution.

Plaintiff sued the Buckeye Valley Fire Dept. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and a denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. However the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment citing that the Plaintiff needed only to provide evidence of a nexus between the alleged discrimination and her lack of promotion. The court determined that she did provide enough evidence to establish a nexus because a man seeking the same promotion was granted the promotion without having participated in assessments, the results of which kept the plaintiff from her promotion

The Bombay Police Act, 1951 was amended in 2005 with the object of securing public order, morality, dignity of women, and reducing exploitation of women including trafficking of minor girls. Section 33A was inserted that prohibited performance of all types of dance in eating houses or permit rooms or beer bars. Section 33B was inserted that permitted three star hotels and Government associated places of entertainment to hold dance performances. The Indian Hotel & Restaurants Association filed a writ petition challenging Section 33A of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 before the Bombay High Court on the grounds that such prohibition: (a) discriminates against women employed to dance in eateries and bars and those employed to dance in three star hotels and government establishments; (b) interferes with their right to work and right to earn a livelihood, and thus is violative of the Indian Constitution. The Bombay High Court held that Section 33A is violative of Articles 14 (equality) and 19(1)(g) (right to work), of the Indian Constitution. The Government of Maharashtra filed an appeal before the Supreme Court and prayed that the terms “All dance” found in Section 33A be read down to mean “dances which are obscene and derogatory to the dignity of women” instead of striking it off altogether to ensure that the right to work of women is not interfered with. The Supreme Court upheld the judgement of the Bombay High Court. It declared that Section 33A violates Article 14 the Constitution of India on the ground that such law is based on an unacceptable presumption that the so-called elite (i.e. rich and the famous) have higher standards of decency, morality or strength of character than their counterparts who have to content themselves with lesser facilities of inferior quality in the dance bars. It declared that Section 33A violates Article 19(1)(g) on the ground that it interferes with the right of women to work and that, contrary to the ban’s purpose, it resulted in forcing some women into prostitution. The Court further urged the government to take affirmative action to ensure the safety and improve the working conditions of the persons working as bar dancers who primarily constitute of women.

The First Respondent Edwin Michael Jalleh was a senior manufacturing supervisor at the Appellant, and he deliberately touched the buttocks of Intan Nurulain, while she was working at the saw machine. Jalleh was a supervisor on the floor. The administrative inquiry found the allegation to be proved, and he was issued a letter of dismissal from the Appellant. The First Respondent filed a claim under Section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 that his services had been terminated without just cause or excuse. He sought, among other things, reinstatement. The Industrial Court ordered that the First Respondent be accorded with backwages and compensation in lieu reinstatement, because the punishment of dismissal was too harsh. The High Court dismissed the application by the Appellant for judicial review to quash the award of the Industrial Court. The Court of Appeal, in this case, stated that the germane consideration in industrial relations is that the remedy imposed is warranted and not disproportionate to the misconduct committed, and that consideration must be taken not only of matters concerning the interests of the party who committed the misconduct, but also the whole of the circumstances in the interest of maintenance of good industrial relations in the workplace. The Court of Appeal provided that the Industrial Court failed to take into account that the offense of the sexual misconduct was not committed by a peer, but rather by a superior, which increased the magnitude of the misconduct. Further, an award to the First Respondent (i.e., the person who committed the sexual harassment) in lieu of his reinstatement imposes an unfair punishment upon the Appellant (i.e., the employer), when the misconduct is not the act of or contributed by the employer, but solely a personal act of the employee. As such, the Court of Appeal set aside the order of the High Court and the award of the Industrial Court.

In 2004 an amendment was introduced to the Local Government Elections Act 1998 (the “Amendment”) that reserved one third of all seats in every local council for women, the remainder was open to both men and women alike. The constitutionality of the electoral quota was challenged by a man whose candidacy for local government was rejected on the single ground that the electoral division at issue was reserved for women. The appellant argued that these measures are unconstitutional since women’s participation in local governments could have been achieved without debarring men from the same. The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the court a quo, dismissed the appeal and held that the Amendment was not unconstitutional, among others, since the impugned measures were carefully designed to achieve its objective, they were rationally connected to the objective and impaired the appellant’s rights in question as little as possible.

The Plaintiff worked as an employee for a corporation in which the Defendant served as a supervisor. The Defendant, who had the authority to hire and fire employees, singled out the Plaintiff frequently for her passive nature and alleged inferior job skills. On numerous occasions, the Defendant forced the Plaintiff to touch his penis and engaged in other various acts of sexual misconduct. The lower court found that the Defendant’s sexual misconduct constituted an invasion of the Plaintiff’s right to self-determination. Additionally, the lower court found the employer, the Defendant-Corporation, liable for the supervisor’s sexual misconduct. The Supreme Court of Korea affirmed, finding the supervisor and employer liable. Under Article 756 of the Civil Act, an employer can be held liable for an employee’s action if the act is “related to the employee’s execution of the undertaking (for which he is employed).” Thus, the Supreme Court noted that when an employee injures another intentionally, even if the act is not related to the employee’s undertaking of his job responsibilities, employer liability still attaches if the misconduct is “apparently and objectively related” to the employer’s work. Additionally, if an employee commits an intentional act such as sexual misconduct, the court noted employer liability attaches where the misconduct was objectively related to the execution of the employer’s work. Noting the Defendant-employee’s authority to fire and hire employees, as well as his ability to punish the Plaintiff for resisting his unwelcome sexual advances, the Supreme Court held that the Defendant-employee took advantage of his superior position over the Plaintiff and therefore committed the sexual misconduct in a situation proximate, in terms of time and place, to his job responsibilities. Therefore, the court found the lower court correctly applied the law in finding employer liability, as the sexual misconduct was objectively related to the Defendant’s job duties.

The plaintiff exercised her right under Japanese law to reduce her working hours to spend time taking care of her child. The internal policy of her employer stated that employees who did not attend work for 90% or more of work days are ineligible for a bonus. The plaintiff’s employer counted the plaintiff’s shortened working days as absences and refused to pay her a bonus. The plaintiff sued her company for a bonus. The Supreme Court determined that the employer’s internal policy violated public policy and the employer should have counted actual working hours when calculating attendance rate.

The issue here was whether the concept of presumption of discrimination, as set forth in the Finnish Equality Act (609/1986, as amended) (the “Equality Act”), applied in the case where a less-merited male applicant had been appointed over two female applicants, and whether there was a justifiable reason for discrimination. In the case, the Regional Council of Lapland, a politically steered joint municipal board, had appointed V, a male applicant, as its director of development. Two female applicants, E and H, had disputed the council’s decision to appoint V on the basis that the appointment was based on V’s political affiliations and also because the decision breached the Equality Act. The Supreme Administrative Court considered (i) whether the threshold for presumed discrimination had been exceeded and, if this were the case, (ii) if there were grounds for the rebuttal of the presumption. The Court found that both E and H had been adequately qualified for the position and had more merits relevant to the position than V. On this basis, the Court held that E and H had sufficiently shown that they had not been appointed because of their gender and that, as a result, a presumption of discrimination, as set forth in Section 8 of the Equality Act, had arisen. Under the Equality Act, to rebut a presumption of discrimination an employer must show that its actions are attributable to a justifiable reason not connected to gender or that the actions were based on weighty and acceptable grounds related to the nature of the job or the task. The Regional Council of Lapland claimed that, in this case, the justifiable reason not connected to gender was V’s having more socio-political experience. The Court, however, held that socio-political experience was not specifically mentioned in the pre-established selection criteria for the position and was, therefore, part of the general merit assessment of the applicants. As discussed, the Court had found that, based on this assessment, both E and H had more merits relevant to the position than V. Therefore, the Court held that V’s socio-political experience was not a justifiable reason for his appointment. For these reasons, the Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the earlier holding of the Administrative Court of Rovaniemi that the decision of the Regional Council of Lapland to appoint V as its director of development was made in breach of the Equality Act and, therefore, ordered the decision to be annulled.

Marea Hickie, a solicitor, claimed unlawful discrimination by her employer, the partnership of Hunt & Hunt, during and after her maternity leave. Shortly after returning from maternity leave, the firm decided not to renew Hickie's contract. At issue was a requirement that Hickie work full-time to maintain her position at the firm. Hickie claimed that the firm’s non-renewal constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, pregnancy, potential pregnancy and family responsibility. Upon review of the case, the Commission noted that such a requirement was “likely to disadvantage women” and therefore the firm’s non-renewal resulted from “an act of [indirect] discrimination.” The respondent firm was ordered to pay Hickie $95,000 in compensation.

Mrs. Yolanda was dismissed from her job post when she was in a situation of temporary incapacity as a consequence of an anxiety disorder due to physical abuse carried out by her husband. The company alleges that during the period of temporary incapacity due to anxiety disorder, Mrs. Yolanda carried out a normal life. This situation may be a cause of dismissal for normal workers, but not when the worker is a victim of gender abuse. Mrs. Yolanda was in a situation of temporary incapacity determined by the Spanish health services. The High Court of Catalonia decided that as Mrs. Yolanda was in a situation of temporary incapacity determined by the health services due to gender based violence she had to be readmitted in her job.

La Sra. Yolanda fue despedida de su puesto de trabajo cuando se encontraba en una situación de incapacidad temporal como consecuencia de un trastorno de ansiedad debido a los abusos físicos cometidos por su esposo. La compañía alega que durante el período de incapacidad temporal debido a un trastorno de ansiedad, la Sra. Yolanda llevó a cabo una vida normal. Esta situación puede ser causa de despido para los trabajadores normales, pero no cuando el trabajador es víctima de abuso de género. La señora Yolanda se encontraba en una situación de incapacidad temporal determinada por los servicios de salud españoles. El Tribunal Superior de Cataluña decidió que, dado que la Sra. Yolanda se encontraba en una situación de incapacidad temporal determinada por los servicios de salud debido a la violencia de género, tuvo que ser readmitida en su trabajo.

Ms. Ayoub claimed harassment and discrimination following a performance appraisal after which her position was made redundant. She also sought worker’s compensation for anxiety/distress caused by the alleged conduct. An arbitrator found for Ms. Ayoub on the basis that the company had failed to consult her on the redundancy decision and mishandled the performance appraisal and these actions caused her mental injuries. A court overturned the arbitrator, finding that first, while it would be unreasonable for an employer to inform a worker of her redundancy in a callous way, the redundancy decision was unrelated to Ms. Ayoub’s performance, and second, Ms. Ayoub’s position was such that she did not legally have to be consulted ahead of time. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Acting Deputy President’s decision, finding no error of law.

A commercial airline pilot was dismissed after making an unscheduled overnight stop and having sexual relations with a cabin crew member. The pilot appealed to the Employment Court. The Employment Court declined to suppress the pilot’s name from the public record. The court held that the Employment Court was not wrong to find that the public’s right to know outweighed the pilot’s reputational interests, and dismissed the appeal.

Female flight attendants employed by Philippine Airlines alleged their collective bargaining agreement was discriminatory due to unequal grooming standards and a compulsory retirement requirement at fifty-five years of age for women but sixty years of age for men. At issue was whether the claim was a labor grievance such that the Regional Trial Court would lack jurisdiction to hear the claim. The Supreme Court held that the regional court had jurisdiction, because the action was not a grievance, but instead a civil action to annul a provision of the contract, and that the question for decision did not involve any determination of labor or union actions.

The petitioner challenged a pension rule requiring women to retire at age 60 while requiring men to retire at age 65. The court held that the rule was discriminatory, because it treated women differently from men where there was no relevant difference between men and women such that the rule served a legitimate purpose. In addition, the fact that the Male and Female Workers (Equal Retirement Age) Law, which corrected the difference, came into force subsequent to the judgment of the lower court did not preclude a showing of discrimination prior to the law coming into effect.

The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or “STF”) reviewed the constitutionality of the 1998 Amendment 20 of the Federal Social Security Law. The amendment imposed a maximum value on the amount of social security benefits that could be paid to a beneficiary under the general social security system at R$1,200 per month. On its face, the R$1,200 maximum applied equally to a number of eligible benefit categories, including maternity or pregnancy-related leave. The amendment was challenged on the grounds that, when read together with Article 7, Section XVIII, of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, the amendment had a discriminatory effect on women. This provision essentially guarantees that an employee is paid her full salary during maternity leave. By imposing a cap on social security coverage during maternity leave, Amendment 20 would require the employer to cover the difference between the R$1,200 cap and the employee’s full pay. The party challenging the amendment argued that this created a negative incentive to employers who would discriminate in hiring women or in setting women’s salary by paying women less in order to stay under the R$1,200 cap. The Court agreed that Amendment 20 was discriminatory in its effect. In a unanimous decision, the STF held that the effect of Amendment 20 conflicted with the Brazilian Constitution’s equal protection provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. The Court therefore ordered that Amendment 20 be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Article 7 of the Constitution such that implementation of the social security cap does not extend to maternity and pregnancy-related leave.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF, ao analisar a constitucionalidade da Emenda Constitucional n. 20/1998 que modificou as regras da previdência social brasileira. Referida Emenda Constitucional estabeleceu um limite máximo para os benefícios da previdência social em R$ 1.200,00 por mês. Nesse sentido, o teto de R$ 1.200,00 se aplicava igualmente a várias categorias de benefícios elegíveis, incluindo licença maternidade ou relacionadas à gravidez. A emenda foi contestada com base no fato de que, lida em conjunto com o artigo 7, inciso XVIII, da Constituição Brasileira de 1988, a emenda teve um efeito discriminatório sobre as mulheres. Esta disposição garante essencialmente que uma funcionária receba seu salário integral durante a licença-maternidade. Ao impor um teto à cobertura da seguridade social durante a licença-maternidade, a Emenda 20/98 exigiria que o empregador cobrisse a diferença entre o teto de R$ 1.200 e o salário integral da empregada. A parte que contesta a emenda argumentou que isto criou um incentivo negativo para empregadores que discriminariam na contratação de mulheres ou na fixação do salário das mulheres, pagando às mulheres menos para permanecerem abaixo do teto de R$ 1.200. O Tribunal concordou que a Emenda 20/98 era discriminatória em seu efeito. Em uma decisão unânime, o STF considerou que o efeito da Emenda 20/98 conflitava com as disposições de proteção igualitária da Constituição brasileira, que proíbe a discriminação com base no gênero. Portanto, o STF determinou que a Emenda 20/98 fosse interpretada de forma coerente com o artigo 7 da Constituição, de modo que a imposição do teto da previdência social não se estendesse à licença maternidade e à licença relacionada à gravidez.

S was employed by Bull as a temporary secretary and was subsequently given a permanent placement responsible to the Marketing Manager, R. S resigned on the ground that she found working with him intolerable as R allegedly sexually harassed her. S never confronted S nor made any identifiable protests about his behavior with the exception of complaint she made about him telling dirty jokes to colleagues in her presence. But she had made complaints to her mother and colleagues at work. Although the tribunal decided that no single incident was serious enough to be capable of constituting sexual harassment, they did find that there had been a series of sexual inferences with a pervading sexual innuendo and sexist stance and that R realized that they were unwanted and were bullying in nature. With regard to the liability of Bull, the tribunal found that colleagues in the personnel department were well aware of the applicant's deteriorating health and that she had made complaints to other members of staff which had been dismissed. In those circumstances there should have been an investigation into the cause of the illness and the complaints that had been made. By failing to implement this, Bull committed a repudiatory breach of contract as they failed to deal with the issue of sexual harassment adequately. The tribunal concluded that the applicant was entitled to compensation for unfair dismissal by reason of sexual discrimination. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal and added that whilst not “gross: the behavior of R towards S was most inappropriate in the workplace. The EAT placed the burden on the victim to place the harasser on notice that she does not welcome his conduct and endorsed the reasonable person perspective in assessing a victim’s rejection. The question at issue should be was the victim subjected to a detriment on the grounds of her sex. A one-off ace may suffice. The Court also directed tribunals to pay attention to the impact of totality of successive incidents, individually trivial.

In both cases, female employees sought accommodation from their employers to attend to their childcare responsibilities. In both cases, the employers refused the employees’ requests and forced the employees to either accept part-time work or an unpaid leave to care for their children. The human rights tribunal in Hoyt and the Federal Court in Johnstone found that the employees had been discriminated against on the basis of family status when they were denied full-time employment status. The employers failed to show that they would have suffered undue hardship by adjusting the female employees’ work schedules.

Three female Safeway employees filed a complaint with the Manitoba Human Rights Commission stating that the company plan discriminated based on sex and family status by denying benefits for loss of pay due to accident or sickness during a 17-week period during pregnancy (even if the accident or sickness at issue was unrelated to the pregnancy). The Commission’s adjudicator dismissed the claims, and this decision was upheld by the Court of the Queen’s Bench and the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada decided that Safeway’s plan did discriminate against pregnant women. Noting that “it cannot be said that discrimination is not proven unless all members of a particular class are equally affected,” the Supreme Court of Canada determined Safeway discriminated against the employees on the basis of sex under the Manitoba Human Rights Act.

A firm of attorneys was willing to enroll Madeline Wookey as an articled clerk, but Wookey met with opposition from the Cape Law Society, which refused to register her articles. Wookey submitted an application to the Cape Supreme Court, which ordered the Society to register her. The Law Society appealed this decision to the Appellate Division, arguing that Wookey could not be admitted as an attorney because she was a woman. The Appellate Division was called upon to decide whether the term “persons” used in the statute governing admission of attorneys to the bar included only “male persons” or also included women. They determined that “persons” included only male persons, thus excluding women from the legal profession.

'n Prokureurs firma was bereid om Madeline Wookey as 'n geartikelde klerk in te skryf, maar Wookey het teenkanting van die Kaapse Regsvereniging ontvang, wat geweier het om haar artikels te registreer. Wookey het 'n aansoek by die Kaapse Hooggeregshof ingedien, wat die Vereniging beveel het om haar te registreer. Die Regsvereniging het hierdie besluit aan die Appel-afdeling beroep en geargumenteer dat die Wookey nie as 'n prokureur toegelaat kon word nie omdat sy 'n vrou is. Die Appélaat Afdeling was ontbied om te besluit of die term "persone" wat in die statuut wat die toelating van prokureurs tot die balie hanteer slegs "manlike persone" insluit het of ook vroue ingesluit het. Hulle het vasgestel dat "persone" slegs manlike persone ingesluit het, en het dus vroue by die regsprofessie uitgesluit.

In 1909, Judge Bristowe of the Transvaal Supreme Court presided over Schlesin v. Incorporated Law Society, the first case in South Africa to consider whether women had a right to enter the legal profession. The Transvaal Supreme Court held that women were barred from admission to legal practice based on historical practice in South Africa, Holland, and England. Judge Bristowe explained that the Interpretation of Laws Proclamation 15 of 1902 provided that “words of the masculine gender shall include females…unless contrary intention appears” and found that given long historical practice, it was evident that contrary intention did indeed appear in the legislation governing admission to the bar.

In 1909 het Regter Bristowe van die Transvaal se Hooggeregs Hof oor Schlesin v. Geinkorporeerde Regsvereniging voorgesit. Die hof het beslis dat vroue toegang tot die regspraktyk verbied word op grond van die historiese praktyk in Suid-Afrika, Holland en Engeland. Regter Bristowe het verduidelik dat die interpretasie van Wette- Proklamasie 15 van 1902 met dien verstande dat "woorde van die manlike geslag, vroulikes sal insluit ... tensy daar ‘n teenstrydige bedoeling is" en het gevind dat die gegewe lang historiese praktyke, was dit duidelik dat ‘n teenstrydige voorneme inderdaad verskyn in die wetgewing wat toelating tot die balie toelaat.

The Supreme Court stated that a woman could not be admitted to the bar because she was under a common law disability: she did not have the right to enter into contracts with third persons without the permission of her husband.

Myra Bradwell petitioned to be admitted to the bar and to be allowed to practice law, but was denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The United States Supreme Court upheld this decision, noting that a woman’s freedom to pursue the occupation of a lawyer was not a “privilege and immunity” of Untied States citizenship that was protected from state restriction by the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus the court found that excluding women from the bar did not violate the U.S. Constitution.

Vimmi Joshi was the principal of a public school who alleged her superior had sent her love letters and made sexual advances towards her. She brought a complaint to the School Managing Committee and was asked to bring the complaint in writing. Subsequently, the Committee received two anonymous complaints against Joshi and her employment was terminated. She challenged the termination claiming sexual harassment. The High Court held that this was a clear case of sexual harassment and ordered disciplinary actions to be taken. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the High Court’s decision because the Supreme Court had previously laid out guidelines for sexual harassment complaints in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan; a complaint committee must have been formed to inquire into the complaint further. The Supreme Court held that since the High Court did not fully look into the matter, they could not have found that this was a clear-cut case of sexual harassment. The High Court was directed to appoint a three-member committee, which must be headed by a woman, to hear the case.

Plaintiff-ex-employee challenged the jury instruction given by the Superior Court, which directed the jury to find in plaintiff’s favor in a discrimination case brought pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180(2), only if it concluded, inter alia, that gender was the determining factor in the decision by defendant ex-employer to discharge plaintiff. RCW 49.60.180(2) provides that “[i]t is an unfair practice for any employer . . . (2) [t]o discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained guide dog or service dog by a disabled person.” The Supreme Court of Washington declined to read the “because of” language of the statute, as requiring proof that one of the attributes enumerated in RCW 49.60.180(2) was a “determining factor” in the employer’s adverse employment decision. Rather, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that in order to prevail on a discrimination claim brought pursuant to RCW 49.60.180(2), plaintiff only needed to prove that her gender was a “substantial factor” in defendant’s decision to terminate her employment.

Plaintiff worked for the defendant and sold cars. Following termination of her employment, she filed a complaint with the Humans Rights Commission. The Commission found she was entitled to back pay, fringe benefits, interest, and that the defendant was to cease and desist its unlawful employment practices. In response to defendant’s appeal, the court found that the plaintiff’s testimony that she was never confronted for unsatisfactory work performance, and she neither received formal evaluations, nor written or oral warnings was credible. Notwithstanding her positive performance, the plaintiff was terminated. The defendant argued that she was “laid-off,” and that the Commission failed to take into account that the defendant did not hire a male replacement for the plaintiff’s position. However, the defendant did hire a male employee a day before it fired the plaintiff. The court found that the Commission was entitled to reject the defendant’s testimony and find that it was clear that the plaintiff was replaced by a male employee. Thus, the Commission’s finding of liability was affirmed.

Although plaintiff had satisfactorily completed her firefighter-training year and had been highly recommended for advancement, she was found to have allegedly failed five final task tests and her employment was terminated shortly thereafter. Plaintiff filed an action against defendant City of Medford for unlawful employment practice alleging she was unlawfully discharged as a firefighter on the bases of gender and of perceived impairment in violation of ORS 659.030 which provides, in pertinent part, “(1) It is an unlawful employment practice: (a) For an employer, because of an individual's . . . sex, . . . to . . . discharge from employment such individual. However, discrimination is not an unlawful employment practice if such discrimination results from a bona fide occupational requirement reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business.” Plaintiff was required to prove only that she was treated less favorably than male candidates because of sex, which is sufficient to establish a discriminatory motive. The Circuit Court found for the employee on the gender discrimination claim, and the appellate court affirmed. Here, the grading was unfair to plaintiff because it was highly subjective and allowed for too much internal bias. Furthermore, because two of the evaluators were officers who had previously expressed reservations regarding a gender-integrated department on behalf of other firefighters, it was a permissible inference that those evaluators attempted to give effect to the line firefighters' animus by giving plaintiff lower scores than she deserved. These testing problems existed within a context, revealing a general animosity toward female firefighters as firemen had told plaintiff that they were having problems with their wives over the hiring of a woman and had expressed concerns about plaintiff’s ability to ably assist the other firefighters during a fire despite plaintiff’s proven physical ability. Finally, plaintiff's success as a firefighter before and after her experience in Medford provided circumstantial evidence of discriminatory treatment. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the judgment, concluding that plaintiff satisfied her burden in proving that gender was a substantial and impermissible factor in the city's decision to discharge her.

Here, an employer appealed the superior court’s decision that it discriminated against an employee on the basis of sex. A few weeks after College-Town hired the employee, Rizzi, Rizzi’s supervisor began making sexually suggestive comments to her. Once he touched her back, and another time he put his hand over a slit in her dress and told her to fix her skirt. On one occasion, Rizzi asked her supervisor to review her performance in a meeting and he told her that she handled it well and that he “liked the way [her] tits stood out in the red shirt.” Once, he asked her if she was a good f----. Rizzi then spoke to the director of manufacturing, who told her he was “not qualified to go into these things,” and refused to talk to her. Rizzi had to wait several days before she could tell someone else at work. A College-Town executive finally spoke with the supervisor about the allegations, which were denied. A meeting was held to determine the truth of the allegations, which the supervisor and all other women in the department attended except for Rizzi. She was not asked to the meeting or notified of its occurrence. At the meeting, the supervisor explained the allegations and Rizzi’s co-workers were generally supportive of the supervisor. College-Town made no further investigation. Prior to that meeting, Rizzi sought a promotion to a position in another department. After the meeting was held, Rizzi was informed she was not qualified for the promotion and College-Town hired someone with more knowledge and experience. Soon thereafter, College-Town attempted to transfer Rizzi as tension in the office was affecting productivity and she declined. Rizzi was never told the transfer was mandatory, and within weeks of her denial, she was discharged. The trial court found that College-Town’s supervisor created a sexually harassing work environment, it failed to remedy the situation, and it retaliated against the employee in its attempt to transfer her and discharge her once she declined the transfer. Id. at 158. The Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the decision and found that sexual harassment may constitute discrimination under Gen. L. C. 151B, §4(1), which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of gender.

Plaintiff was hired as a bookkeeper and secretary for the defendant company, and worked exclusively for the company’s president. The president subjected plaintiff to comments about the her clothing and body, quizzed her about intimate details of her sex life, purchased underwear for her, and showed her pictures of naked women. Some of this behavior was done in front of other employees. In response, plaintiff began wearing baggy clothing to work and told the president that his behavior made her uncomfortable. Subsequently, in a discussion about plaintiff’s work performance, the president told plaintiff that he was happy with her work and that she may receive a raise if her performance continued. Two days after this discussion, plaintiff met with the president again to discuss her discomfort at work due to his comments. Several days later, the president terminated plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff sought back pay and reimbursement to the state for unemployment compensation benefits. The trial court granted back pay but did not order reimbursement. Defendant appealed against having to provide back pay, arguing that under Gen. Stat. § 46a-86, an order of reinstatement to the employment position is a prerequisite for back pay or reimbursement, and the court had not ordered reinstatement. The court rejected this argument and found it could order back pay and reimbursement even though reinstatement to the position was not ordered by the trial court.

The plaintiff applied for a job to work at the defendant’s race track as a security officer. The defendant’s director of security informed the plaintiff that he normally did not hire women and instead employed her in the dispatch hour to answer telephones and complete paper work. The plaintiff had a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and experience in security work. The plaintiff subsequently requested to work the late night security shift at the stable gate to work additional hours. Her request was denied as the director did not hire women for this position. When the general manager learned of the incident, he informed the director that he violated company policy and directed him to change his discriminatory practices. Ultimately, the plaintiff left the company due to disputes over her work assignments and she filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission and sued the defendant. The trial court determined that but for the director’s gender discrimination, the plaintiff could have worked an additional sixteen hours each week for thirty-three weeks and that she would have earned overtime. The Supreme Court of Maine held that the plaintiff was entitled to back pay for these lost wages under 5 M.R.S.A. § 4613.

Here, the plaintiff worked for the defendant in a union shop and she joined the union as a requirement for her employment. After working without incident for a few months, the plaintiff applied to work a different position for higher pay. The plaintiff’s foreman told her that if she wanted the job, she would have to be nice. The plaintiff got the job. Subsequently, the foreman asked her out and she refused. Following this, the plaintiff’s personnel manager visited her at home about some annoying phone calls the plaintiff was receiving, and during that visit, the manager told the plaintiff he knew that the foreman used his position to make advances at female employees under his authority, and asked the plaintiff “not to make trouble.” After that, only three weeks after having worked in the new position, her machine was shut down, her overtime was taken away (even though no one else’s was), and she had to return to a position at a lower salary. The foreman continued to harass plaintiff in various ways, eventually firing her for refusing to comply an order at the very moment she was making a complaint to the union steward. After she was reinstated, the plaintiff was fired yet again when she called in sick over a period of time. The plaintiff did not file a claim for hostile working environment upon her termination. However, she did sue for breach of her employment contract. The plaintiff was an at-will employee. The court noted that in order to find termination was improper, the plaintiff would need to show that the termination was motivated by bad faith or malice. The court noted that the facts of the case—in particular, the foreman’s overtures, manipulation of assignments, and the connivance of the personnel manager, all supported the jury’s conclusion that termination was maliciously motivated and thus improper. Thus, even though the plaintiff did not sue for sexual harassment, she was able to use the harassment to show she was maliciously terminated from her job.

Here, the plaintiff worked for the defendant as a worker on production lines. Since the first day she was sexually harassed by her supervisor and two foremen, as were other women workers. Although plaintiff reported some of the incidents, she did not report all because she was afraid the supervisor would make her work harder if she complained. Complaints to management were followed by periods of relief, but the sexual harassment would restart or would turn into a hostile work environment. Similar occurrences continued and the plaintiff filed the suit against the defendant for a hostile work environment. Gen. Law. C. 151B, § 5 requires a plaintiff to file a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination (“MCAD”) within six months of the occurrence of the discrimination to allow the MCAD an opportunity to investigate the claim and to provide the defendant with notice of potential liability. However, this requirement does not exist where the discrimination is of a continuing nature and where there is a discrete violation within the six-month period to anchor the earlier claims. Here, the plaintiff did not file a complaint with the MCAD within six months of the first occurrence. The defendant argued that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply here because the plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she considered the discrimination by other employees at the time the acts occurred. A continuing violation claim will fail if the plaintiff should have been aware that she was being discriminated against while the earlier acts which are now untimely, were taking place. Id. at 534-35. The court found though that a plaintiff may not be able to appreciate the true character of the discriminatory environment until after it has continued for some time. Further, a hostile work environment constitutes a pattern of sexual harassment, which by definition, has to take place over time. The court found the plaintiff’s claims were thus timely and not barred by the six-month requirement.

The Illinois Human Rights Commission (HRC) filed a suit against Northtown Ford alleging discrimination against an employee who had been terminated with regard to sick leave benefits and salary, sex discrimination for reduction in salary, and retaliation. The administrative law judge entered a judgment in favor of the employee for salary claims and sick leave benefits, and the HRC affirmed. The Court of Appeals decided that the employee was allowed to amend the complaint because the amended claim was reasonably related to the original claim.